瑜伽論記 9.156

9.156

下結破類通，景云：問曰：如聞色分別時意識見分即有相分影像色名起，云何而言隨言說法無有自性？又復意識緣名分別影像之色，影像之色即是依他，云何後說依他是離言法性？解云：意識相分影像之色實是依他如幻化法，意識見分緣名分別此相分時不作因緣虛幻法解，乃依此相分依他色上種種搆畫執有定性，執有定性倒情所立自性是遍計所執，隨言說法畢竟無，相分依非隨言說倒情所立，故不得說相分依他，種種搆畫都不稱彼相分依他，是故依他還是離言諸法自性。上來破小乘增益執竟。

Below, in concluding the refutation and generalizing the reasoning, Jing says: Question: When hearing the conceptualization of matter, the seeing part of mental consciousness gives rise to the image-part reflection of the name of matter; why then say that phenomena corresponding to speech lack intrinsic nature? Furthermore, the mental consciousness conceptualizes the reflected matter by taking the name as an object, and this reflected matter is precisely paratantra; why say later that paratantra is the phenomenon-nature beyond speech? Explanation: The reflected matter that is the image part of mental consciousness is indeed paratantra, like an illusion or magical creation. When the seeing part of mental consciousness conceptualizes this image part by taking the name as an object, it does not understand it as an empty, illusory phenomenon of causes and conditions; instead, relying on this paratantra matter of the image part, it fabricates various notions and clings to a fixed nature. This intrinsic nature clung to as a fixed nature, established by inverted sentiments, is parikalpita. What corresponds to speech is completely non-existent, whereas the paratantra of the image part is not established by the inverted sentiments that correspond to speech. Therefore, one cannot say that the paratantra of the image part is such that the various fabrications completely fail to match that paratantra of the image part. For this reason, paratantra remains the ineffable intrinsic nature of all phenomena. The refutation above of the Hīnayāna attachment of superimposition is complete.