瑜伽論記 9.186

9.186

次明善取空者，景云：言云何復名至正觀為空者，謂由於此所依真法智彼虛妄彼無所有故正觀為空，復由於此乃至如實知等者，此彼之言更互相望皆名彼此，前將真對妄說真為此說妄名彼，今舉對真即說妄為此說真為餘，復由於此妄法空故餘真實法即為是有，故言復由於此餘實有是，謂於如前所說一切色等相事者，能詮色等名也，所說色等假說法性都無所有者，隨言搆畫色等無也，是故已下結說空，於此一切色等相等者，於此色等名假說事，何者為餘，即推假說所依為餘，真在假外名餘，如是二種皆如實知是實是假無增減執，不取唯假不捨唯實。言如實了知真如離言自性者，就勝偏指真如為離言性，道理依他亦是離言自性。

Next, to clarify the well-grasped emptiness: Jing says: As for the passage from "How is it further termed..." to "correctly contemplating it as empty": this means that because, in relation to this underlying real phenomenon, one knows that that which is false and deceptive is non-existent, one correctly contemplates it as empty. As for "Furthermore, due to this..." up to "knows in accordance with reality," etc.: the words "this" and "that" refer to each other reciprocally, both being called "this" and "that". Previously, setting the real against the false, the real was called "this" and the false was called "that". Now, citing in contrast to the real, the false is called "this" and the real is called the "remainder" (or "the other"). Furthermore, because this false phenomenon is empty, the remaining real phenomenon is therefore existent; hence it says, "Furthermore, due to this, what remains truly is existent." "Regarding all things that are objects of conception such as form, as previously explained" refers to the names that express form and so forth. "The nature of phenomena nominally designated as form and so forth, as explained, is entirely non-existent" means that form and so forth conceptually constructed according to speech do not exist. From "Therefore..." onwards it concludes by explaining emptiness. Regarding "In this, regarding all objects of characteristics such as form...", in these things nominally designated by names such as form, what is the "remainder"? One deduces that the basis of nominal designation is the remainder; the real existing outside the provisional is called the "remainder". In this way, one knows both kinds in accordance with reality—which is real and which is provisional—without grasping in terms of superimposition or depreciation; neither grasping merely the provisional nor abandoning merely the real. As for "knowing in accordance with reality the ineffable intrinsic nature of tathatā": this points particularly to tathatā as the ineffable nature according to its preeminence; according to principle, the paratantra is also an ineffable intrinsic nature.