瑜伽論記 9.202

9.202

泰云：此釋下兩句，此一切色等假名所目分別性，薩婆多即色等自性都無所有，如僧佉立憂喜闇三德諸法自性，如衛世師立第四有句義及第六和合句義，是色等自性而非色等，欲明無此二外道所計故言亦無餘色等自性，而於其分別性中，色等假名所目諸分別性所依依他真實，離言義性真實是有，當知即是勝義諦自性。

Tai says: This explains the lower two lines. This conceptually differentiated nature designated by all provisional names such as form—which the Sarvāstivādins take as the intrinsic nature of form and so forth—is entirely non-existent. Like the Sāṃkhyas who posit the three guṇas of sattva, rajas, and tamas as the intrinsic nature of all phenomena, and the Vaiśeṣikas who posit the fourth category of existence (bhāva) and the sixth category of inherence (samavāya) as the intrinsic nature of form and so forth while not being form and so forth—intending to clarify that what these two non-Buddhist schools conceptually construct does not exist, it says "there are also no other intrinsic natures of form and so forth." Yet, within that conceptually differentiated nature, the paratantra reality that is the basis of all conceptually differentiated natures designated by provisional names such as form—the ineffable referential nature—truly exists; one should know that this is the intrinsic nature of the ultimate truth.