瑜伽論記 13.93

13.93

Regarding the eighth characteristic, that is, 'at the time of dying, up to is not reasonable': as in the first fascicle, whether withdrawing from above or withdrawing from below, it is only upon reaching the heart that it is finally abandoned. As for 'it is not that that mental consciousness sometimes does not operate': if the eighth consciousness universally appropriates parts of the body, when the upper part is abandoned and the lower part is not yet abandoned, there is the meaning that it operates and does not operate; with the sixth consciousness, this is not necessarily so, because it takes other objects as its intentional object, and because it is not the case that it does not arise in a certain part, it cannot appropriate. Furthermore, while the eighth takes subtle objects as its intentional object, so at the time of death its intentional object cannot be known, the sixth consciousness's intentional object and cognitive activity are coarse; if the sixth could abandon life, its mental mode should be [coarse]. It is not that that mental consciousness sometimes does not operate. One should formulate the syllogism: 'At the time of death, the object cognized by consciousness should be known, because it is the sixth consciousness, just like in other states.' One should further make a general syllogism that the sixth mental consciousness abandons life, saying: 'The sixth mental consciousness is not the mind that abandons life (thesis), because of being subsumed under the evolving consciousnesses (reason), just like the five consciousnesses (example).' Therefore, one knows that the meaning of the eighth is established. Examining the third chapter of that Mahāyānasaṃgraha: 'At that time, mental consciousness has no place where it does not exist', because mental consciousness cannot appropriate the body, so there is no place on the upper or lower parts of the body where it can be clarified that there is no mental consciousness and that cold tactile sensations arise and so on; 'the ālayavijñāna has a place where it does not exist', because the ālayavijñāna appropriates the body, so it can be clarified that there is a place where there is no ālayavijñāna and cold tactile sensations arise and so on; 'because it manifests appearing as a spatial aspect depending on the locus of dwelling', because the ālaya dwells relying on the locus of its own body, and dwelling, it manifests appearing as the spatial aspect of cold tactile sensations.