瑜伽論記 13

English (machine translation) 13

Language: English

[The section titled] 'In the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī: The Stage Associated with the Five Groups of Consciousness and the Mental Stage, Part One': This treatise as a single work has five divisions in total. The preceding fifty fascicles have already explained the essence and meaning of the seventeen stages, which is the initial Maulī Bhūmiḥ. For the lower four divisions, because they re-analyze the meanings of what preceded, all place 'saṃgrahaṇī' at their head. This division is the first among the lower four divisions.

13.4

Because it re-gathers what has not yet been determined and clearly selected, it is called the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī.

13.5

Alternatively, some [explain that] it gathers text by text: what was present in the preceding division is now re-clarified to constitute one division. Furthermore, based on the Abhidharmakośa's name 'Abhidharma Treasury' (Abhidharmakośa), because within that Abhidharma treatise the ultimate truth enters and gathers this, this treatise obtains the name 'treasury' (kośa). Or, this depends on that and is drawn forth from that, being that which is contained in that; therefore it is also named 'treasury'.

13.6

Since that has two meanings, this is also like that: because the ultimate truths in the preceding Maulī Bhūmiḥ are gathered into this division to be determined and clarified; or because this depends on that, being brought forth from the Maulī Bhūmiḥ, it is the meaning contained in that and gathered by this division; therefore it is called the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī.

13.7

This is precisely gathering text by text; hence it is called 'saṃgraha' (gathering). Alternatively, some [explain that] it gathers meanings by text: although the preceding eight [stages] spoke of the entities of dharmas, their meanings were not yet fully clarified, so this now clarifies them to constitute one division—like saying the visual realm gathers the visual realm, etc., where the self-entity gathers itself. Alternatively, some [explain that] it gathers text by meanings: using the essential determined meanings in this division, it marshals the incomplete texts of the preceding division. Alternatively, some [explain that] it gathers meanings by meanings: using the determining wisdom that is the referent, it distinguishes the differences among the various stages. Yet when the distinguished meanings are equal, it gathers them again; this is precisely using meanings to gather this division of teaching. That which expresses, viniścaya, is named after that which is expressed; hence it is called 'saṃgraha'. In clarifying the meaning of 'saṃgraha' here, all four propositions are present.

13.8

Regarding 'viniścaya' (決擇, determination): 'jue' means decisive judgment, meaning resolving the doubts of others; it can also mean clear comprehension, being able to understand clearly oneself. 'Ze' means discerning selection, which can mean distinguishing right from wrong. Here, it clarifies the right and refutes the wrong; hence it is called 'viniścaya'. The [wrong] view denying the real and the conventional, though decisive, does not discern right from wrong; doubt, though discerning right from wrong, is not decisive judgment. 'Jue' is stated to exclude doubt and confusion; 'ze' is discussed to distinguish wrong views. The preceding Maulī Bhūmiḥ directly set forth the characteristics of the meanings; now it re-examines questions and answers to resolve doubts and select the essentials; hence it is called 'viniścaya'. The old translation 'Juedingzang' (Treasury of Determination) is incorrect. If their term were 'niyama', it could be called 'jueding'; but since it is called 'viniścaya'—which means 'jueze'—how could it be called 'jueding'?

13.9

When the treatise says 'division' (分, saṃgrahaṇī), it means section and limit, distinguishing and dividing. It is a single section between the Maulī Bhūmiḥ and before the Vyākhyānasaṃgrahaṇī.

13.10

'In' means selecting and holding: among the seventeen stages, it sets aside the remaining fifteen stages and specifically clarifies these two stages; hence it says 'in this'.

13.11

Regarding 'the stage associated with the five groups of consciousness and the mental stage': this has already been explained as in the record on the Maulī Bhūmiḥ.

13.12

Question: Why does it not say 'mental consciousness' (意识)?

13.13

Because the name would be confusing. Here it clarifies mind (citta), intellect (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna); therefore it does not insert 'consciousness'.

13.14

Question: The meaning of 'conjunction' (samprayukta) is not restricted solely to the five [consciousnesses]; why does it head the title without mentioning that the mental [stage] has it?

13.15

Answer: In fact, both have it, but it is omitted for brevity. Furthermore, mentioning the beginning indicates what follows; therefore the mental stage does not mention 'conjunction'. Furthermore, it is clarified based on the predominant dharmas: the five consciousnesses have no appropriation and the like, and their objects are narrow and small; mentioning 'conjunction' leaves the faculties and dusts (objects) unmentioned. In the mental stage, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are also clarified, and faculties and dusts, etc., are all clarified; one cannot speak one-sidedly of conjunction, so it is omitted.

13.16

Question: Since in the preceding Maulī Bhūmiḥ they were opened into two stages, why are they clarified together here?

13.17

It is stated that there are two intentions. First, the respective distinct supports of the six consciousnesses are the six sense faculties, while their common support is the fundamental consciousness; now, this division first clarifies that the eighth [consciousness] is the common support of the five and sixth consciousnesses, and for that reason they are clarified together; whereas the preceding division was based on the meanings of their self-nature, functional activities, and so forth, and for that reason they were separately opened into distinct stages. Second, the six consciousnesses have distinct seed supports; although the ālayavijñāna was clarified in the Maulī Bhūmiḥ, it was only clarified as seed support, and was spoken of in accordance with the six consciousnesses, their functions being distinct; therefore they were separately opened into two stages.

13.18

Now in this division, it concurrently clarifies that the active eighth consciousness is the common support of the six consciousnesses; since it is the common support, it cannot be clarified by opening them into two stages, which is why they are explained together. Being explained from the viewpoint of the eighth, they are combined into one to be clarified. Furthermore, if viewed solely in terms of initiating karma, since initiating karma is distinct, they must be opened and clarified separately; but both depend on faculties and take dusts as conditions, their modes of activity being similar, so they are explained together. Furthermore, as the sixth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: 'Question: Under which consciousness is the ālayavijñāna subsumed?'

13.19

'Answer: It is subsumed under the six consciousnesses.' Previously it was distinguished in terms of seeds; now it is subsumed in terms of the six consciousnesses, which is why they are clarified together. The determination of these stages comprises seven fascicles in total.

13.20

Since this is the very beginning, it says 'part one'. Within this division there are thirty fascicles, which determine the meanings of the preceding seventeen stages, divided into twelve sections: combining the stage of the five groups of consciousness and the mental stage into one; the stage with investigation and the like into one; the stages of the śrāvaka and the pratyekabuddha into one; and combining the stages with remainder and without remainder into one.

13.21

That is, the first seven fascicles jointly determine the stage of the five groups of consciousness and the mental stage; the next four fascicles jointly determine the three stages of with investigation, etc.; the next one and a half fascicles determine the samāhita stage; the next one page and more in fascicle 63 determines the asamāhita stage; the next two pages and more determine the stage with mind; the next two and a half pages determine the mindless stage; the next, fascicle 64, a single fascicle, determines the stage arisen from hearing; the next two fascicles determine the stage arisen from thought; the next, about three pages in fascicle 67, determines the stage arisen from cultivation; from fascicle 67 down for four and a half fascicles, it jointly determines the śrāvaka stage and the pratyekabuddha stage—in the title there is only 'śrāvaka' and it does not determine the pratyekabuddha stage [separately]; from fascicle 70 down to the middle of fascicle 80, altogether eight and a half fascicles determine the bodhisattva stage; the latter half of fascicle 80 jointly determines the stage with remainder and the stage without remainder. The basic [stages] and the determinations correspond to each other in four alternatives: 1. combined at first and separated later, namely the stages with mind and without mind; 2. separated at first and combined later, namely the five groups of consciousness and mental stages, together with the pratyekabuddha stage and the stage with remainder; 3. combined both at first and later, namely the three stages with investigation, etc.; 4. separated both at first and later, namely the remaining six stages, i.e., the samāhita stage, the asamāhita stage, the stages arisen from hearing, thought, and cultivation, and the bodhisattva stage.

13.22

Within the first section, it first summarizes what preceded and introduces what follows, generally analyzing the superior benefits; later it properly analyzes according to the stages. Although the initial text is general, because it is brief, it is placed at the beginning of the five consciousnesses and mental stages to be clarified.

13.23

Within the proper analysis, there are three parts: first, distinguishing and separately clarifying the two stages; second, properly analyzing through questions and answers; third, concluding with a brief determination. In properly analyzing through questions and answers, it first determines separately, and later distinguishes generally. In the former, there are two parts: first, from the beginning through the latter half of the third fascicle, it briefly clarifies six kinds of skill; second, from after the latter half of the third fascicle, it extensively clarifies the six kinds of skill. In the former, there are ten gates: 1. the gate of mind, intellect, and consciousness; 2. distinguishing the thorough knowledge that remedies the body; 3. distinguishing the differences between two skills; 4. the reasoning establishing proof and determining causes and conditions; 5. clarifying the meaning of conditioning dharmas not associated with mind; 6. clarifying their seeds; 7. explaining karma; 8. clarifying the two mindless absorptions; 9. clarifying space and uncalculated cessation; 10. generally distinguishing the names and meanings of the unassociated [dharmas].

13.24

Within the first gate, there are three parts: first, determining the meaning of mind, intellect, and consciousness; second, the four alternatives regarding possession; third, distinguishing through questions and answers. In the former, there are again three parts: first, restating what was clarified earlier and raising three questions; second, properly answering according to the questions; third, concluding. In the question, there are again three parts: first, restating the earlier fundamental consciousness as that to be determined; second, opening the three topics of question as the reasons for the inquiry; third, properly posing the three questions to raise the determination together.

13.25

Regarding 'Question: Earlier it was said that the seed support is called the ālayavijñāna': this is the first part. That is, in the preceding Maulī Bhūmiḥ it was already clarified that the eighth consciousness is the support of all seeds, because all seeds exist depending on it.

13.26

Regarding 'yet it was not said to exist, nor were the causes and conditions of its existence or its extensively distinguished meanings [spoken of]': this is the second part, opening the three topics of question as the reasons for the inquiry.

13.27

Regarding 'yet it was not said to exist': in the preceding Maulī [Bhūmiḥ], although it was extensively stated that the eighth exists, in the Hīnayāna sūtras it was not said to exist; this is the first question. For example, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha cites Hīnayāna sūtras as stating: 'loving, taking pleasure in, delighting in, and clinging to the ālaya'; the sūtras that were brought together also speak like this. Since this states that it already exists in the Hīnayāna sūtras, why is it said that it did not exist? Ji sets forth two meanings: here, [the assertion of] its non-existence refers to the Sarvāstivādins and others; furthermore, although those sūtras spoke of its existence, its entity was just the sixth [consciousness], lacking any separate referent or other distinct meanings such as causes and conditions, extensive distinctions, and so forth; now, its 'not existing' means lacking a distinct entity, not that the name does not exist.

13.28

Regarding 'the causes and conditions of its existence': this is the reason why the eighth consciousness exists; although its existence is spoken of, the reason for its existence is not known; once the reason is known, because it exists, the eighth consciousness is maintained, and it operates together with active mental factors such as feeling.

13.29

'Its extensively distinguished meanings' constitutes the third question.

13.30

From 'Why is it not spoken of' below, it properly poses the three questions to prompt the determination. 'Why is it not spoken of' merely asks about the reason for the minor discrepancies; the remaining text is understandable. Master Jing's 'Supplementing Omissions' states: 'In the preceding Maulī Bhūmiḥ, when distinguishing the stage of the five consciousnesses and the mental stage, it repeatedly asks five questions such as

13.31

From 'Established through this, the Buddha, the World-Honoured One...' below, in the second part, the answer, three answers are given corresponding to the questions. This is the answer to the first question. That is, the ālaya is subtle, and bodhisattvas before the stages generate understanding according to teaching without having fully penetrated it; therefore, for the two vehicles it is not distinguished for them; hence it says it was kept a secret teaching, which is why it was not spoken of.

13.32

From 'As the World-Honoured One said...' below, citing the verse from the Sandhinirmocanasūtra, it properly analyzes why it was not spoken of. The first line reveals generally that it is profound and subtle; the second and fourth lines properly clarify the reasons why it was not spoken of; the third line properly clarifies that it was not spoken of. Question: Why do the fourth and second lines clarify the reasons why it was not spoken of? Answer: It was not spoken of for two reasons: 1. because it is profound and subtle, it was not spoken of, which is the second line properly clarifying the meaning of its depth and subtlety; 2. fearing that afflictions would arise, it was not spoken of for them, which is the fourth line.

13.33

Regarding the statement that "the ādānavijñāna is profoundly deep and subtle": Jing says, "For bodhisattvas before the stages and others not to understand it is called 'profoundly deep'; for the two vehicles not to comprehend it is called 'profoundly subtle'." Ji says, "The old claim that both the seventh and eighth [consciousnesses] are called ādāna is incorrect. That is, the verse in the old treatise says: 'The appropriating consciousness (執持識) is deep and subtle.' Since it says 'appropriating and holding', how could the seventh be capable of holding? The Sanskrit says kliṣṭamanas, translated here as 'defiled mind' (染污意); what is now called ādāna precisely bears the meaning of the eighth [consciousness's] appropriating and holding."

13.34

Question: In the old treatise it is "the appropriating consciousness is deep and subtle"; how is it different now?

13.35

The commentary says: The phrase 'appropriating and holding' is correct in meaning, yet there is a difference in what it excludes; the meanings do not exclude the same things. Why is this? Previously saying 'deep and subtle' only excluded ordinary beings and had not yet excluded the two vehicles, because the meanings relied upon by ordinary beings are all coarse and shallow. If here it says 'deep and subtle' and only excludes ordinary beings, the teachings of the two vehicles are all deep and subtle and this would be equal to them; therefore, 'profoundly' (甚) is now used to distinguish the two vehicles, because the scriptural teachings of the two vehicles are deep and subtle, but not profoundly so. Because this exclusion is complete, it must be different. Therefore, it says below that only the noble ones who see the truth are able to know it, while the rest are not yet able to know it. Prior to the path of seeing, the sixth consciousness performs the contemplation of consciousness-only and has not yet seen the eighth; entering [the path of] seeing, one only then knows it. Therefore it is said to be 'profoundly deep and subtle'.

13.36

(Ce says:) The name ādāna is explained through three meanings: First, it is called appropriation in the sense of holding onto (執持), meaning it is able to hold the seeds of names, characteristics, and the like so that they are not lost. Second, it is called appropriation in the sense of appropriating and experiencing (執受), meaning it is able to appropriate the physical sense faculties and their bases, causing sensation to arise. Third, it is called appropriation in the sense of grasping (執取), meaning it is able to grasp rebirth in continuous succession. Sentient beings lacking the nature [for liberation] cannot fathom its depths, hence it is said to be 'profoundly deep'; those of the gotra destined for quietude cannot penetrate it, hence it is called 'profoundly deep'—this is as explained in the Vijñaptimātratā[siddhi]. If one relies on Vasubandhu, 'deep and subtle' are explained together; hence his treatise says: 'Profoundly deep and subtle, because it is difficult to know', without assigning them to different gotras. If one relies on Asvabhāva, it says: 'Profoundly deep' means that its depth is difficult to fathom by the wisdom perceived by the worldly wise; 'profoundly subtle' means that it is difficult to know for the śrāvakas and others. Now, examining the old translation, it differs in textual character from the present text. As the Bodhisattva *Mati-līna's (?) Manokarmamīmāṃsāśāstra says: 'The World-Honoured One, in the Mahāyāna Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, spoke of the ādāna mind-consciousness: Deep and subtle beyond measure, with immeasurable seeds, their number like drops of rain; I do not explain this teaching to ordinary beings, not because I am possessive, but out of fear that they will further construct a self.'

13.37

Regarding "all seeds [flow] like a torrent": this single line presents the meaning of the eighth consciousness being deep and subtle, on account of which it is not taught; this is the first reason why it is not taught, namely, its depth and subtlety. Master Jing says: "The Laṅkā[vatārasūtra] says that the ādānavijñāna is the tathāgatagarbha because, based on the fact that the ālaya-consciousness possesses a single seed of affliction, it is able to conceal that tathāgata dharmakāya and is thus called tathāgatagarbha; furthermore, within the ālaya there are taintless seeds of that tathāgata capable of containing many fruits, and it is thus called tathāgatagarbha. It also says that there are eight or nine various kinds of consciousnesses, referring generally to all consciousnesses, distinguishing nine grades of consciousness, without intending to argue that consciousness has eight or nine separate kinds." (Ji says:) "When water is not struck by the wind, it is called a calm flow; only when it encounters wind and waves do surges rise up. This consciousness is also like this: when the wind of active perfuming has not stirred, it is merely a calm flow thought-moment by thought-moment; when the wind of active perfuming stirs, it forms seeds and immediately becomes like waves; or, seeds giving rise to actualities is like waves: when the cause of a single wave arrives, a single wave arises; when the causes of many waves arrive, many waves rise up."

13.38

Question: Previously it was translated as "the seeds flow like the Ganges" (種子如恒流); how is it different now?

13.39

The commentary says: Although it said 'seeds', it was not necessarily clear what was meant. There was fear of limitation, whereas now saying 'all' contains and embraces the entire meaning. Furthermore, what was the meaning of the words 'constant flow' (or 'flow of the Ganges')? If it meant 'flowing like the river Ganges', that is incorrect; if it meant 'flowing constantly', how could that refer to the meaning of perfuming by causes? Now saying 'torrent' (暴流), the meaning lies precisely here.

13.40

Regarding "to the ordinary and the foolish, I do not reveal it": this single line is the third [part], directly clarifying that it is not taught. Jing says: "Once in the Ekottarika Āgama, he also taught it in general terms, calling it liking, delight, pleasure, attachment, and the like; fearing that they would increase their conceptual clinging to the two selves of person and phenomena, he did not elaborate and reveal it in detail for them."

13.41

Question: The Buddha did not teach the ālaya-consciousness for the two vehicles, and the two vehicles do not give rise to the view of self. Since he likewise did not teach the ālaya-consciousness for ordinary beings, should ordinary beings not also be free of the conceptually constructed view of self?

13.42

Answer: Although ordinary beings do not generate a conceptually constructed self by relying on the Buddha's verbal teachings, they generate a conceptually constructed self by relying on the heterodox false teachings of the non-Buddhists. Ji says: "In the Hīnayāna there is the name, but not the actual entity. This is 'I do not reveal it to the foolish'. Because it is only a name, for all ordinary beings even the name has not yet been given; that is 'I do not disclose it to the ordinary'. If for the Hīnayāna the name already exists, it is simply not elaborated for them; if even the name does not exist, it is also not disclosed to them."

13.43

Question: Since it is neither disclosed nor elaborated for the two vehicles and ordinary beings, why is it taught now so that ordinary beings may hear it?

13.44

Answer: Here there are two types of persons in each case. Among the śrāvakas there are two types of persons: first, those whose faculties are not mature; second, those whose faculties are not yet mature. The first are of determinate nature, and the second are of indeterminate nature; hence it is not elaborated for them. If those of indeterminate nature have mature faculties, why would it not be elaborated for them? Ordinary beings are also like this: first, those whose faculties are not mature, persons without gotra; second, those whose faculties are not yet mature; hence it is not taught to them. Now, regarding those who hear it, they are all those whose faculties have already matured, and therefore they receive it. Now saying that 'to the ordinary and the foolish, I do not reveal it', the meaning lies in this.

13.45

Question: Previously it said "to the ordinary, I do not speak"; how does this differ?

13.46

The commentary says: That is incorrect; it only excluded ordinary beings and did not exclude the two vehicles. Therefore the present meaning is as stated.

13.47

Regarding "lest they conceptually grasp it as a self": this is the fourth line, explaining the second reason why it is not taught, namely, out of fear of giving rise to afflictions. Ordinary beings have not yet severed the two graspings, and there is fear that the grasping of the two selves would arise; as for the two vehicles, although the self of the person has been removed, the self of phenomena still remains, and there is fear that they would give rise to this. The self is of two kinds: first, conceptually constructed; second, innate. The innate self arises spontaneously, whereas the conceptually constructed self arises only due to teachings. Fearing that ordinary beings would, because of the teachings, give rise to conceptually constructing the two selves, and that the two vehicles would, through conditions, give rise to conceptually constructing the self of phenomena, he therefore did not teach it.

13.48

Question: Previously it said "lest they should grasp it as a self"; how is this different?

13.49

The commentary says: That statement was general and did not distinguish the spontaneous self; its meaning can be understood.

13.50

Question: The continuum of the eighth [consciousness] resembles a single permanent [entity]; fearing that ordinary beings would give rise to the view of a personal self, they do not hear of it. The fundamental consciousness has an ontological nature and characteristics that are real; for fear of the grasping of phenomena, is it also not taught in the Mahāyāna?

13.51

The commentary says: Although teaching that eighth [consciousness] may give rise to grasping of phenomena, the elimination of grasping of phenomena must depend on consciousness-only. Since the eighth is the real causal condition of all phenomena, this is the very basis of consciousness-only; therefore, for those of great faculties, the fundamental consciousness may be taught. As for the meaning of this consciousness: the Buddha's preaching of the Dharma takes benefiting sentient beings as its foundation; if teaching this Dharma ensures that initially one does not fall into saṃsāra and ultimately one is able to attain nirvāṇa, then the Buddha teaches it. However, if ordinary beings hear of this consciousness, they give rise to conceptual construction of the two selves; and if the two vehicles hear of it, they give rise to grasping of phenomena and cannot perform the contemplation of consciousness-only; thus initially there is harm, and ultimately there is no benefit.

13.52

Question: Consciousness-only is not an object for the inferior [vehicles], so the eighth is not taught to them. But since the manas is eliminated by the path of contemplation of the two vehicles, should it not be taught to the two vehicles?

13.53

The commentary says: The defilements of the manas obstruct personal contemplation; in the path of contemplation of the two vehicles they are eliminated. The consciousness that grasps a person is subtle, and the two vehicles do not possess the knowledge of all aspects; this is why the seventh is not taught to them. Just as in the path of seeing, although the fruits of the three miserable realms are severed, the eighth is subtle and therefore not taught; because the manas consciousness is subtle and they do not have the knowledge of all aspects, it is likewise not taught.

13.54

Question: Does the path of contemplation of the Hīnayāna take the manas as an object or not?

13.55

Answer: When non-conceptual wisdom contemplates and severs defilements, the contemplation of specific characteristics arises, contemplating the principle of the manas. As for the contemplation of subsequent wisdom, because it is not the knowledge of all aspects, they have no knowledge regarding the distinctions among concrete facts, and therefore it also cannot be taught.

13.56

From "Furthermore, the uddāna says:" downward, it answers the second question. Within this, the text has two parts: first, the verse and prose state and introduce the eight characteristics; second, they are explained in sequence, making eight sections.

13.57

(Tai says:) Among the eight characteristics, the second and third are established on account of external objections, and are not direct proofs. (Bei says:) The first characteristic directly analyzes the ālaya-consciousness to prove that the fundamental consciousness exists; the latter seven characteristics do not directly analyze the ālaya-consciousness, but establish the proof by speaking of conditions.

13.58

In now explaining the text of the eight characteristics, the general meaning is drawn from Ji's commentary.

13.59

Within the first section, there is first the question, next the explanation, and finally the conclusion. In the explanation, the five causes are different, making five sections.

13.60

The intention of the first cause is: among the various Hīnayāna schools, they do not establish a fundamental consciousness; for instance, the Sautrāntika masters take the six consciousnesses to hold the body. The present intention is not this; it means that what arises from past karma is able to appropriate and hold the body, whereas what arises from present conditions is not able to appropriate and hold it. This is explained in terms of the longitudinal continuity; it does not allow that the six consciousnesses in a single thought-moment might arise as vipāka minds. Refuting them, one should set up the formal proof (prayogavākya): The transitioning consciousnesses such as the eye [consciousness] are not capable of appropriation (thesis), because they are generated by present conditions (reason), like the arising of sounds and the like (example). Moreover, if someone holds and defends it by saying: 'Within my eye consciousness and the others there are also vipāka minds arising from past karma that are able to hold [the body]; why do you say that the transitioning consciousnesses such as the eye are not capable of holding, and broadly exclude me?' Now one should refute this, as in the inference of the third cause below. If so, one should not refute it again in the third cause below, because this defense would have already been refuted here; since there is a refutation later, we clearly know that here it is refuted only by the principle of longitudinal continuity, as explained previously; this is the first cause. The word 'cause' (因) means reason, which is the 'reason' of thesis, reason, and the like; named after this, they are called the five causes.

13.61

The general refutation of the six consciousnesses having ended above, below, relying on distinct citations, the treatise refutes them individually. First, it refutes [them] by citing minds of wholesome and unwholesome nature; hence the second reason. As for "Furthermore, groups of six consciousnesses of wholesome and unwholesome natures are observed" being the second reason: wishing to refute them, one first excludes distinct dharmas that lack being appropriated to serve as homogeneous examples (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) that can exclude those wholesome and unwholesome [minds]. Suppose it is posited that nirvāṇa can sustain the defiled support; now one formulates the syllogism: 'The two kinds of nirvāṇa definitely are not appropriated (thesis), because they are unconditioned (reason), just like space (example).' This point having been established, one turns to refute the truth of the path (mārgasatya). Suppose it is separately posited that the truth of the path can sustain [it]; one should formulate the syllogism: 'The taintless wholesome mind cannot appropriate defiled sense-faculties (thesis).' This phrasing is to exclude the Great Mirror Wisdom conforming to that worldly realm which can sustain the body. If one merely spoke generally of the taintless wholesome mind being unable to appropriate, there would be the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika): would it be that just as nirvāṇa is taintless, so the taintless wholesome mind cannot appropriate, or would it be that just as the Great Mirror Wisdom is taintless, it can appropriate? To avoid this fault, one therefore makes this statement: 'because it is taintless (reason), just like nirvāṇa (example).' This point having been established, one must turn to refute the defiled wholesome mind. One should formulate the syllogism: 'The defiled wholesome mind should not appropriate defiled sense-faculties (thesis), because it is wholesome (reason), like taintless wholesome [mind] (example).' Wholesomeness having been refuted, unwholesomeness must be eliminated. One separately formulates the syllogism: 'Unwholesome minds should not appropriate (thesis), because they are morally determined (reason), like that class of wholesome [minds] (example).' Although moral determination has been refuted, among indeterminate [minds] there are four kinds of indeterminate [mind]. Setting aside maturation (vipāka) in the third reason, the other three, such as [minds of] magical apparition, should now be refuted separately. The syllogism is: 'The three indeterminate minds should not appropriate (thesis), because they are interrupted (reason), just like sound and lightning (example).' Alternatively, the homogeneous example states: 'because of not being of a maturation nature, like wholesome and unwholesome minds'—this reason is also good, whereas the previous reason suffered the fault of inconclusiveness due to minds arisen from maturation. Now the treatise states: 'wholesome and unwholesome nature' and does not mention indeterminacy; since there is the word 'etc.', it is clear that there are distinct refutations. Although it also distinctly cites the indeterminate retributive mind among the six consciousnesses, here some posit it as the sustainer, and that posited view must be refuted; hence the third reason excludes this posited view.

13.62

The treatise says: "Furthermore, among the groups of six consciousnesses, a uniform class subsumed under uncontaminated-indeterminate maturation is not observed"—this is the third reason. This means that although there is maturation within the six consciousnesses, it arises only for a single thought-moment or is interrupted by various minds; an invariant class of maturation nature from prior to posterior can definitely never be found. An invariant class of maturation nature from prior to posterior that undergoes no alteration could possibly sustain [the body], being true maturation. Now, the retributive mind within the six consciousnesses arises only for a single thought-moment and is not uninterrupted; since it is not of an invariant class, being merely arisen from maturation, it cannot be called capable of appropriating. One should formulate the syllogism: 'The six evolving consciousnesses are not arisen from true maturation (thesis), because they are interrupted (reason), like wind and sound (example).' This syllogism not yet being fully clear, one should further formulate separately: 'Because an invariant class of uncontaminated-indeterminate maturation cannot be observed in the six evolving consciousnesses, they cannot sustain the body (thesis), because they have the meaning of being interrupted (reason), example etc. as before.' Alternatively, one should formulate the syllogism: 'Among the six evolving consciousnesses, the mind of maturation cannot appropriate (thesis), because it is interrupted (reason), like wind, sound, etc. (example).' That the treatise says 'a class of maturation is not observed' is precisely the word for the reason 'because they are interrupted' here. To pursue the objection against them: 'The retributive mind among the six consciousnesses is arisen from maturation, not true maturation, and cannot sustain [the body]. Why then does your school say that neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling arises from maturation? Since it is arisen from maturation, it should not appropriate.'

13.63

The commentary states: There are two kinds of 'arisen from maturation': first, arising from the seeds of maturation; second, arising from the continuum of maturation. Within the sixth consciousness, it arises from the seeds of maturation and is called provisional maturation, just as the eye-faculty is not true maturation. The eighth consciousness arises from the continuum of maturation, because both the prior moment and the posterior moment are maturation. Now, that in which both the prior moment and the posterior moment are maturation can sustain [the body], not the six consciousnesses; hence there is a difference. Relying precisely on this text, one master says: 'In the desire realm, there is a retributive mind of the sixth consciousness'; another master says: 'This is merely to reject that posited view.' Furthermore, that outsider posits: 'In your school, the seventh consciousness should be able to sustain the body; what need is there to labor with the eighth?' One should formulate the syllogism: 'My seventh consciousness cannot sustain the body, because it is not of the nature of maturation, like the six evolving consciousnesses, etc.'

13.64

Furthermore, that outsider posits that it is not that a single consciousness can sustain all faculties, but that each causal consciousness can sustain its own faculty; this must now be refuted. Therefore, the fourth reason states: 'Furthermore, the groups of six consciousnesses evolve individually... up to... is the fourth reason.' Herein there are two parts: first, directly refuting according to the posited view; second, conceding the posited view to pursue the objection. This means: for instance, when the visual consciousness arises, the remaining faculties such as the ear, lacking consciousness, should rot and disintegrate (thesis), because they lack a sustaining consciousness (reason), since in the Hīnayāna school the various consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, just like a corpse (example).

13.65

"Even if appropriation is granted, it is also illogical": this cites the posited view to pursue the objection. This means that outsider posits that when the visual consciousness arises, it not only sustains the eye-faculty alone, but can also sustain the other faculties such as the ear. Now, conceding this hypothetically, it is said: 'Even if appropriation is granted, it is also illogical, because consciousness is distant.' Now one formulates the syllogism: 'The visual consciousness definitely cannot sustain the other faculties such as the ear (thesis), because consciousness is distant (reason), like another person's consciousness being unable to sustain one's own faculties, etc., like a corpse, etc.' There is also an intended compound syllogism: 'The various faculties of mental consciousness should lack appropriation (thesis), because consciousness is distant (reason), just like a corpse (example).' Having already raised the objection of lacking appropriation, they should become subsumed under the non-sentient. Formulating the syllogism: 'The faculties lacking consciousness should be subsumed under the non-sentient (thesis), because they lack appropriation (reason), just like a corpse (example)'—as previously posited, one's own consciousness sustains one's own faculty.

13.66

If so, the fault of repeated appropriation would result; hence the fifth reason states: 'Furthermore, the support would incur the fault of repeated appropriation, etc.' Herein the syllogism states: 'Since there is appropriation and non-appropriation, at the time of non-appropriation it should be subsumed under the non-sentient, because it lacks appropriation, like a corpse, etc.'

13.67

Due to the above five reasons, since the six consciousnesses sustaining [the body] is illogical, the eighth is accepted as being able to sustain the body. The concluding text can be understood.

13.68

In the second characteristic, first is the question, followed by the direct explanation. This characteristic is not directly establishing [the thesis], but simply taking occasion from the outsider's objection to refute Hīnayāna attachments and establish our own school. Within the question, if assessed according to the preceding and succeeding explanations, this text slightly conflicts. Why is this? Take the preceding text, for instance: if there is the eighth, the appropriation of the support is observed; if there is no eighth, the appropriation of the support is not observed. Now, if assessed according to that explanation, one should say: if there is the eighth, initial arising is observed; if there is no eighth, initial arising is not observed—such a statement would be faulty. One should merely say in general that in the Hīnayāna there is no eighth and the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously; while the Mahāyāna principle says that when faculty, object, and conditions are complete, the five consciousnesses are all so—for what reason would only one consciousness arise initially? When there is an eighth consciousness, simultaneous arising of the consciousnesses is accepted; hence having the eighth and having no initial arising is logical; since you lack the eighth, having an initial arising is illogical. Now the Hīnayāna asks: why is it that if there is no eighth, an initial arising is illogical? One may adhere directly to the text, and not generate an interpretation by analogy with what precedes and follows. This concludes the question.

13.69

Directly regarding the explanation, there are two parts: first, hypothetically positing an external objection; second, directly explaining in response to the objection. Since in the Hīnayāna the consciousnesses arise separately, the text is easy to understand. Within the reply there are three parts: first, a general reply; second, examining and explaining the reason, where the textual phrasing is evident; third, the explanation stating: 'It is possible that two consciousnesses evolve at the same time,' meaning that in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, consciousnesses also arise at distinct times; the remaining text is easy to understand. Herein one should formulate the syllogism: 'When visual consciousness arises with the three conditions complete, the other ear and other consciousnesses with the three conditions complete should also manifest (thesis), because the three conditions are complete (reason), like the manifesting visual consciousness (example).' As objected before, for fear that consciousnesses would arise simultaneously, they did not accept that the eighth exists; now having established that the consciousnesses arise simultaneously, they should accept that there is the eighth; this confirms [it] by inverted exposition.

13.70

In the third characteristic, the initial question etc. is divided as in the preceding text. This reason is also not a direct reason establishing the eighth; because when the outsider interpreted the meaning and raised an objection, the outsider then counter-questioned, and taking occasion to resolve the objection, the basic consciousness is conversely established. This means that the external Hīnayāna posits that consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, and mental cognition of visible form occurs after visual consciousness. Now this is refuted: this consciousness cognizing past visible form as an object should be unclear. One should formulate the syllogism: 'The distracted mental consciousness following visual consciousness etc., cognizing the immediately past visible form of the object introduced by the eye etc., should be unclear (thesis).' This phrasing excludes the meditative mind and the solitary mental consciousness that now cognize at a distance; here it specifically refutes the immediately past mental consciousness and excludes the distant mental consciousness (reason), stating: 'because it is subsumed under the non-meditative state and cognizes the past.' This phrasing again examines the meditative mind, like cognizing matters of hundreds of thousands of kalpas in the past within a distracted mind; this also excludes the meditative mind. (Tai says:) The mental consciousness of the Sarvāstivādins etc., cognizing the immediate sphere of the five consciousnesses, is subsumed under direct perception (pratyakṣa) and is clear cognition, because it cognizes what is immediate.

13.71

A master criticizes: Since it cognizes the past, it should not be present.

13.72

Question: Does solitary mental consciousness cognize only the past, or also the present?

13.73

The Tripiṭaka Master gives two explanations: One says: it may cognize the present yet be unclear, because the five consciousnesses are absent. The second says: it cognizes solely the past.

13.74

In the fourth characteristic, the meaning is that the Sautrāntikas etc. posit that the six evolving consciousnesses can hold the seeds. Now, with the minds being distinct, how could they hold the seeds? One should formulate the syllogism: 'The six evolving consciousnesses cannot hold the seeds (thesis),' the reason stating: 'because they are mutually distinct, just like the sound produced by a drum, etc.' It also states: 'The six evolving consciousnesses should not hold seeds, because they are interrupted by the three natures, like physical and vocal karma.' (Tai says:) Among realms, the excellent realm means desire, form, and formless [realms]. Furthermore, lower wholesomeness is called realm, middle wholesomeness is called middle, and superior wholesomeness is called excellent. What is the difference between defiled and taintless, mundane and supramundane? Taintless pervades both wisdoms; the subsequent wisdom is called mundane, and fundamental wisdom is called supramundane; their distinct aspects are like this. As for 'Furthermore, those consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time; they should not flow in continuous succession for a long time, etc.': again, if you posit that the six consciousnesses hold the seeds, when one enters the state of the mindless absorption, the six evolving consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time; since there is no consciousness capable of holding, it is improper that the held seeds could flow in continuous succession for a long time without arising and ceasing. One should formulate the syllogism: 'Upon entering the mindless absorption, the seeds should be lost (thesis), because there is no consciousness to hold them (reason), like entering the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder.'

13.75

Furthermore, one should say: When entering the absorption of cessation, the six consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time; this means that with no consciousness holding the seeds, the seeds are already lost; it is improper that upon emerging from the absorption there could be continuity and then further flow for a long time—by using what seed would it arise?

13.76

Furthermore, in this, what consciousness is taken to hold the body? Although the refutation is under the approach of lacking a seed-consciousness that holds seeds, it concurrently refutes that when entering the absorption of cessation, the six consciousnesses being interrupted, the body should not be able to flow for a long time and endure through many periods; lacking a consciousness to hold it, it would rot and disintegrate. 'Continuum' means the body.

13.77

If so, how does this differ from the seventh refutation below? Since it is so, taking the first explanation is better.

13.78

Regarding the fifth characteristic, this also does not directly establish the eighth [consciousness] while refuting another; rather, it responds to the objection of another, and because of resolving that objection, the eighth is consequently established. There are four kinds of activities: first, the activity of cognizing the receptacle, which refers to the external receptacle world; second, the activity of cognizing the support, namely the internal five sense faculties, the five external sense data supporting the faculties, the internal seeds, and so forth, because these two are activities of the eighth consciousness. As the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: 'One's own body and the implements of living are cognized at once simultaneously.' This first activity is that the eighth only manifests and thus cognizes; because it arises from seeds, it is called 'only manifesting', and because that is its object, it is called 'cognizing that'. Its activity of [cognizing] the internal support has two meanings: first, manifesting and thus cognizing; second, appropriating and thus cognizing. 'Manifesting and thus cognizing' is understood as above; 'appropriating and thus cognizing' is designated as what pertains to sentient beings. Third, the activity of cognizing the self, namely the manas constantly conceiving the eighth to be the self. Fourth, the activity of cognizing external objects, namely the other six consciousnesses each cognizing its own object. The intended meaning here is that when the fourth activity regarding external objects of a single consciousness arises, moment by moment all four activities turn together; it is not that at all times—such as during mindlessness, fainting, and so on, or upon entering mindless concentrations—one can possess all four, for one possesses only the first three. As the sūtra states, if an activity regarding an object arises, then necessarily moment by moment the four activities are obtainable; if there were no eighth, the various consciousnesses could not co-arise, and these four activities could not exist simultaneously at one time in a single consciousness. Would this not contradict both sūtra and reason? If the Hīnayāna believed in the Mahāyāna teaching and that these four activities exist within a single moment, they could raise such an objection; but since the other does not believe in the sūtra and does not accept that the four activities are presently obtainable within a single moment, how could they raise such an objection in this way?

13.79

The commentary explains: However, pursuing it with reason, one must accept that these four activities exist and, by having faith in the Mahāyāna teaching, they can be established. Regarding pursuing it by reason: first, one establishes the syllogism of consciousness-only, stating: 'Phenomena such as form are all not separate from consciousness (thesis), because they are what is cognized (reason), just like consciousness (example).' Since phenomena such as form are not separate from consciousness and appear from consciousness, when there is no consciousness, these objects should not exist. Take, for instance, entering mindless concentration or solely taking nirvāṇa and other such objects as intentional objects; at that time, form and the rest have no cognizing consciousness, so the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should necessarily be cut off.

First 79 of 449 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

瑜伽論記 — Classical Chinese