瑜伽論記 20.6

20.6

Jing says: Now this treatise states that the first intrinsic nature is not subsumed under the five dharmas, the second intrinsic nature subsumes four dharmas, and the third intrinsic nature subsumes only tathatā. Fascicle Two of the older translation of the Buddha-Nature Treatise also states: The first nature is not subsumed under the five dharmas at all, because it is devoid of substance; the second nature subsumes four dharmas; the third nature subsumes only suchness. Also, Fascicle One of the Treatise on the Three Types of Naturelessness states: The first nature has no substantial mark and is not subsumed under the five receptacles; if a dharma exists, it does not exceed the five receptacles. Question: If so, why does the Laṅkāvatāra state: Marks and names are the first nature; discrimination is the second nature; correct cognition and suchness are the third nature? Furthermore, the Madhyāntavibhāga states that the first nature subsumes names, the second nature subsumes marks and discrimination, and the third nature subsumes tathatā and correct cognition. How are such texts reconciled? Solution: Although the texts differ, their meanings are not contradictory. Why is this? When the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states that the first nature subsumes names and marks, it is based on grasping at definitive natures in names and marks as ultimately devoid of substance, which accords with the meaning of the first nature being devoid of substance, and thus they mutually subsume each other. Conditioned names and marks arise from the mind and are not separate from the mind, so they are generally called discrimination; therefore it says that discrimination subsumes the paratantra nature. In the Madhyāntavibhāga, marks and discrimination, based on conditioned dharmas, subsume the paratantra nature; names, based on the meaning of being devoid of substance through erroneous conceptualization, subsume the first nature. The single item of correct cognition, according to this treatise, the Buddha-Nature Treatise, and others, is precisely paratantra, because being conditioned, it relies on causes and conditions, and because its substance undergoes modification, it is not pariniṣpanna. The Laṅkāvatāra and Madhyāntavibhāga subsume both suchness and correct cognition under the third nature based together on the meaning of non-perversion, belonging to pariniṣpanna. Furthermore, according to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī below, correct cognition also belongs to the pariniṣpanna nature. If one understands the reconciliations and distinctions expounded hitherto, people of the world should not recklessly raise difficult objections, saying that the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra makes the single item of correct cognition belong solely to paratantra and takes the parikalpita nature as devoid of substance to be an error. Moreover, the newly translated commentaries on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha by Asvabhāva and Vasubandhu both state that suchness and correct cognition belong to pariniṣpanna. That heterodox critic refutes them, saying: 'The newly translated sūtras and treatises explain that correct cognition belongs purely to paratantra, which entails the fault of being destructible and false'—how could this not be a reckless and careless mistake? Furthermore, he says: 'If based on the five dharmas not subsuming the first nature, then the five dharmas do not exhaustively subsume dharmas.' This meaning is incorrect. The parikalpita nature is merely the fabrication of inverted consciousness, an ultimately non-existent dharma; for this reason it is said that the five dharmas do not subsume it. How could one say that there is the fault of these five dharmas not exhaustively subsuming dharmas? Therefore it is said: Just as delicious fruit in the world attracts many flies, so profound and wondrous wisdom often invites slander.