瑜伽論記 20

English (machine translation) 20

Language: English

20.3

In explaining the three natures, there are three verses; the previous fascicle has already finished explaining the seven gates of the first verse.

Now at the beginning of this fascicle, the second verse is explained, which has nine gates: subsumption is the first; naturelessness, the second; knowing and so forth is the third; hidden intention and so forth, the fourth; domain, the fifth; comprehension, the sixth; entry, the seventh; distinction, the eighth; and reliance, the ninth meaning.

20.5

Explaining them in sequence: in explaining the first gate, first, subsumption is correctly differentiated; second, through question and answer it differentiates the reason why correct cognition is paratantra.

20.6

Jing says: Now this treatise states that the first intrinsic nature is not subsumed under the five dharmas, the second intrinsic nature subsumes four dharmas, and the third intrinsic nature subsumes only tathatā. Fascicle Two of the older translation of the Buddha-Nature Treatise also states: The first nature is not subsumed under the five dharmas at all, because it is devoid of substance; the second nature subsumes four dharmas; the third nature subsumes only suchness. Also, Fascicle One of the Treatise on the Three Types of Naturelessness states: The first nature has no substantial mark and is not subsumed under the five receptacles; if a dharma exists, it does not exceed the five receptacles. Question: If so, why does the Laṅkāvatāra state: Marks and names are the first nature; discrimination is the second nature; correct cognition and suchness are the third nature? Furthermore, the Madhyāntavibhāga states that the first nature subsumes names, the second nature subsumes marks and discrimination, and the third nature subsumes tathatā and correct cognition. How are such texts reconciled? Solution: Although the texts differ, their meanings are not contradictory. Why is this? When the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states that the first nature subsumes names and marks, it is based on grasping at definitive natures in names and marks as ultimately devoid of substance, which accords with the meaning of the first nature being devoid of substance, and thus they mutually subsume each other. Conditioned names and marks arise from the mind and are not separate from the mind, so they are generally called discrimination; therefore it says that discrimination subsumes the paratantra nature. In the Madhyāntavibhāga, marks and discrimination, based on conditioned dharmas, subsume the paratantra nature; names, based on the meaning of being devoid of substance through erroneous conceptualization, subsume the first nature. The single item of correct cognition, according to this treatise, the Buddha-Nature Treatise, and others, is precisely paratantra, because being conditioned, it relies on causes and conditions, and because its substance undergoes modification, it is not pariniṣpanna. The Laṅkāvatāra and Madhyāntavibhāga subsume both suchness and correct cognition under the third nature based together on the meaning of non-perversion, belonging to pariniṣpanna. Furthermore, according to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī below, correct cognition also belongs to the pariniṣpanna nature. If one understands the reconciliations and distinctions expounded hitherto, people of the world should not recklessly raise difficult objections, saying that the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra makes the single item of correct cognition belong solely to paratantra and takes the parikalpita nature as devoid of substance to be an error. Moreover, the newly translated commentaries on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha by Asvabhāva and Vasubandhu both state that suchness and correct cognition belong to pariniṣpanna. That heterodox critic refutes them, saying: 'The newly translated sūtras and treatises explain that correct cognition belongs purely to paratantra, which entails the fault of being destructible and false'—how could this not be a reckless and careless mistake? Furthermore, he says: 'If based on the five dharmas not subsuming the first nature, then the five dharmas do not exhaustively subsume dharmas.' This meaning is incorrect. The parikalpita nature is merely the fabrication of inverted consciousness, an ultimately non-existent dharma; for this reason it is said that the five dharmas do not subsume it. How could one say that there is the fault of these five dharmas not exhaustively subsuming dharmas? Therefore it is said: Just as delicious fruit in the world attracts many flies, so profound and wondrous wisdom often invites slander.

20.7

Tai says: Herein, in the question and answer differentiating the reason why correct cognition is paratantra, two masters of the Western Region offer different explanations. The first master says: This text refers only to the paratantra nature of the objective domain of the image-aspect manifested by the grasped nature, taking the parikalpita intrinsic nature as an object. The second master says: It does not speak exhaustively of the principle, because tainted wholesome minds are not parikalpita.

20.8

In the second gate explaining naturelessness, the three types of naturelessness are differentiated with respect to those three natures: 1. Due to naturelessness of marks, the parikalpita nature is said to be without intrinsic nature; 2. due to naturelessness of production and naturelessness of the ultimate truth, the paratantra nature is said to be without intrinsic nature.

20.9

Below, the reason is explained. When it says 'because it does not exist spontaneously', this differentiates the intended meaning of non-production: paratantra arises from causes and conditions, which is termed having production; because it lacks spontaneous production, it is termed non-production. When it says 'because its nature is not manifested by purity', this explains the intended meaning of lacking the ultimate nature: non-Buddhists grasp at the bodies of humans, devas, and so forth as the ultimate nirvāṇa, which is a dharma of permanence and bliss. Now it clarifies that the paratantra dharmas of suffering and origination, being defiled, lack the ultimate nature; because they are not the pure object of realized cognition, paratantra is called natureless in the ultimate sense. 3. Solely through the nature of naturelessness of the ultimate truth, the pariniṣpanna nature is said to be without intrinsic nature. This has two meanings: first, that pariniṣpanna is free from verbal marks and is not a dharma of definitive nature apprehended by conceptualization, yet beginners adhere to the teaching, grasping that there is an ultimate pariniṣpanna nature. Now it clarifies that pariniṣpanna is devoid of that grasped ultimate nature, and hence is called natureless in the ultimate sense.

20.10

As for the question below having text, the second meaning is that the substance of pariniṣpanna is the ultimate truth, and being manifested through the naturelessness of marks and so forth, it is called natureless in the ultimate sense. From "Why is this?" below, it directly explains this meaning-gate. Why did the previous fascicle state that pariniṣpanna is not the three types of naturelessness? Solution: Based on the latter gate, its substance is the ultimate truth and not naturelessness; being manifested by the naturelessness of marks and so forth, it is called natureless, but the substance of the treatise is truly not the three types of naturelessness, because when non-conceptual wisdom realizes pariniṣpanna, it is free from existence and non-existence. The previous [fascicle] was based on this gate, and therefore said that pariniṣpanna is not the three types of naturelessness.

20.11

In the third gate explaining knowing and so forth, as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: What should be known are the three natures; the principle of the existence and non-existence of the three intrinsic natures should be thoroughly known by all trainees. If so, why does it ask below: 'Which cognition's domain is the parikalpita nature? Is it the domain of ordinary cognition or the domain of noble cognition?' and answer: 'It is not the domain of cognition, because it is devoid of marks'? Solution: That is based on the parikalpita nature having no substantial mark and failing to constitute an objective condition; it says that what is grasped is not at all the domain of ordinary or noble cognition. Since its essential nature is apart from non-existence, it is that which is investigated by trainees; therefore it was previously said to be what should be thoroughly known. Paratantra is defiled and possesses an unreal substance, and therefore should be permanently severed; pariniṣpanna should be realized.

20.12

In the fourth gate explaining hidden intention, there are two parts: first, it generally indicates that the inexplicit sūtras should all be resolved in accordance with the characteristics of the three natures.

20.13

Second, it briefly explains two gates: first, it cites sūtras speaking of the three kinds of non-production endurance, where the inexplicit sūtras should be resolved in accordance with the three intrinsic natures; next, it cites the inexplicit sūtras on the three liberations, which should be resolved in accordance with the three intrinsic natures.

20.14

Bei says: The three endurances are at the first stage and above; therefore it says 'without regression'.

20.15

In the fifth gate explaining domain, Tai recounts the words of Śīlabhadra: The intent here differentiates that an existent dharma is a condition, and because the substantial nature of a condition is capable of producing, it is called the domain of cognition. Since the parikalpita nature is a non-existent dharma and is not subsumed under the four conditions, it is not the domain of cognition, because it is devoid of marks. The previous text was based on the substance of cognition being a non-existent dharma, and thus said 'all should be known'.

20.16

Master Bei and others say: As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, 'The discriminated nature is the realm of ordinary persons; the true nature is the realm of noble ones; the dependent nature is the realm of both ordinary persons and noble ones'—this states the domain based on conceptual grasping. When the treatise and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha also say that the three natures are all called what should be known, it is called 'known' because cognition thoroughly knows parikalpita as non-existent. The paratantra nature is the domain of both ordinary and noble cognitions, but is not the object of correct cognition; pariniṣpanna is solely the object of correct cognition and not the domain of subsequently attained cognition, because as the treatise says, the image-aspect of tathatā is the paratantra nature. In accordance with this text, the various consciousnesses that are objects of the ālayavijñāna are not objective conditions.

20.17

In the sixth gate explaining comprehension: when worldly cognition contemplates that what is grasped is empty, an image of emptiness arises corresponding to the mind and cannot directly realize tathatā; this is called functioning with marks. When supramundane cognition comprehends the tathatā of what is grasped, this is called functioning without marks. One should know that comprehension of the other two natures is likewise.

20.18

In the seventh gate explaining entry: entering into what is grasped as originally non-existent is precisely entering into pariniṣpanna; following entry into pariniṣpanna and eliminating paratantra is because of realizing the severance of defilement.

20.19

In the eighth gate explaining distinction, there are three questions and answers.

20.20

In the first, Jing says: The paratantra nature is dharmas arisen from causes and conditions, pervading both sentient and non-sentient beings, filling the ten directions beyond measure; reliant on that paratantra, one grasps at the two differences of person and dharma, whose measure is identical to that paratantra.

20.21

Question: Does one also give rise to what is grasped with respect to the pariniṣpanna, such that grasping the existence of the pariniṣpanna is also [counted as] what is grasped in this way?

20.22

The explanation states: The pariniṣpanna is free from that grasping; when one wrongly grasps the pariniṣpanna, there is an image that does not resemble the pariniṣpanna, and that grasping arises upon an image of the paratantra. For this reason, when the treatise author explains the quantity of what is grasped, it is only like that of the paratantra, and he does not say it is like that of the pariniṣpanna.

20.23

Furthermore, with respect to the paratantra there are two kinds of conceptualization (parikalpa), existing conceptually in accordance with the manifest grasping of that cognitive mind. The first is conforming to cognition; the second is conforming to the dormant tendencies of habitual conditioning—perfumed into seeds by virtue of what is parikalpita. Tai says: For example, when human beings and the like, conforming to verbal expression and cognition, conceptualize the existence of dharmas, this is called 'conforming to cognition'—the grasping of the parikalpita nature. As for cattle, sheep, and the like, since beginningless time in the past they were once human beings and the like, habituated to nominal conventions, and their conceptualization conforming to cognition perfumed seeds, which are called 'habitual conditioning'. Through the power of dormant tendencies, although cattle, sheep, and the like do not cognitively comprehend nominal conventions, their grasping of dharmas is no different from those who do cognitively comprehend nominal conventions.

20.24

Bei says: This distinguishes that because there are two kinds of grasping, there is the grasped parikalpita nature. One Western explanation holds: Taking the grasped intrinsic nature as the parikalpita nature, if the cognitive mind that grasps is exclusively paratantra, then in this passage it repeatedly brings up the paratantra that conceptualizes in order to reveal the grasped nature. Here, the grasping of sentient beings who understand nominal conventions prior to the [bodhisattva] stages is called 'conforming to cognition'; as for the grasping arisen in beings incapable of language, although there is no active mind taking nominal conventions as an object, yet through dormant tendencies they comprehend blue and other dharmas, hence it is called 'habitual conditioning'.

20.25

Next, in distinguishing the varieties of the paratantra, Jing says: 'Varieties of the classes of marks' means that, as in the five dharmas, the varieties of the classes of marks are the paratantra. 'There are further two kinds,' and so on, means: first, the three matters generated from the perfuming of those who grasp through the eight conceptualizations, which is defiled paratantra; second, that arisen from the perfuming of hearing [the Dharma].

20.26

Tai says: First, defiled paratantra arises conforming to parikalpita grasping. This has two meanings: 1. the objective division (nimittabhāga) of the grasping mind arises from the subjective division (darśanabhāga) of grasping; if it is not the objective division, it is like ignorance giving rise to karmic formations of the three natures; 2. the pure portion of paratantra arises from what is free from grasping. This also has two meanings, which can be understood by analogy with the preceding.

20.27

Below, it explains that the pariniṣpanna has a single taste without manifold varieties or numbers.

20.28

The ninth [section] explains the gateway of reliance. The parikalpita relies on three dharmas, grasping fixed natures of person and dharmas. The two kinds of true conceptualization are that which grasps, while marks and names are what is grasped. By relying on what grasps and what is grasped, through false construction the parikalpita nature is established. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, relying on the intention of this passage, states: By what is there conceptualization, what is conceptualized, and how is the parikalpita nature established? The answer is that the mental consciousness is that which conceptualizes, the marks and names of the paratantra are what is conceptualized, and by these, through that which conceptualizes and what is conceptualized, the parikalpita nature is established. Question: In this [gateway of] reliance, it is stated that it relies on three dharmas; why did the previously explained gateway of conditions, when asking 'Through what condition should the parikalpita be known?', state in its answer that it conditions the mutual connection of those marks and names, excluding conceptualization? The explanation states: The previously explained gateway of conditions took only the object conditioned (ālambana); conditioning the fixed mutual connection of those marks and names, it thereby constitutes what is grasped, and did not take that which grasps, hence excluding conceptualization. Now, the gateway of reliance encompasses both mind and object: relying on the conceptualizing mind that grasps, and taking the two dharmas of marks and names that are grasped, only then is what is grasped established. Therefore, the gateway of reliance comprehensively relies on three dharmas. As for the paratantra, it should be said to rely on the parikalpita and its own outflow. Where the previous gateway of conditions said that the paratantra conditions the parikalpita intrinsic nature, it is because the gateway of reliance must rely on the grasping mind that grasps those persons and dharmas with fixed natures; this grasping mind in turn relies on nominal seeds of its own class and its manifest activity, with what follows relying on what precedes, hence it says 'and its own outflow'. In the previous gateway of conditions, it only said that the paratantra conditions the parikalpita intrinsic nature because it directly depends on conditioning those two data of fixed natures, perfuming seeds of the paratantra and generating the actively arisen paratantra; therefore it only said that it conditions the parikalpita intrinsic nature. One should know that the pariniṣpanna nature, being unconditioned and eternally abiding, has nothing to lean or depend upon, and therefore has no reliance; this is what the sūtras mean by 'without abode', which means without reliance. Where the previous gateway of conditions said that it conditions the parikalpita being completely unreal within the paratantra, this depends on preparation-wisdom (prayogajñāna) conditioning that parikalpita as having no intrinsic nature whatsoever, merely falsely constructed within the paratantra dharmas of causes and conditions; through the seeking, investigating, and discerning of preparation, one understands that the two grasped data are not [real], and through this one awakens to the pariniṣpanna nature; therefore it says that the pariniṣpanna conditions that parikalpita as unreal, which should be known.

20.29

Below, in explaining the third verse, there are eleven gateways: if it does not exist, the first; activity, the second; subtle and so forth, the third; lacking essence, the fourth; arising, the fifth; grasping and so forth, the sixth; understanding, the seventh; defilement, the eighth; suffering, the ninth; simile, the tenth; conceptualization, the eleventh.

20.30

In the prose commentary there are ten [sections], because the two gateways of defilement and suffering are explained in one place.

20.31

In explaining the first gateway, 'If there were no parikalpita, what fault would there be?', the answer states: 'In the paratantra nature, there would be no grasping of nominal conventions, etc.' From the past until now, grasping has always arisen with respect to nominal conventions on the paratantra; through the construction of grasping, the defiled dharmas of saṃsāra of that paratantra arise; by cutting off defilement, purity is attained. If this nature did not exist, there would be no grasping of nominal conventions. If this did not exist, defilement and purity could not be known. The faults regarding the absence of the latter two natures can be understood [accordingly].

20.32

The second [section] explains the gateway of activity. Jing says: The first nature has five activities: 1. It can generate the paratantra: by grasping the two data, the objective and subjective divisions of the paratantra are able to arise. This activity is general, and the latter four are explained specifically; looking generally at the generation of that paratantra, the five activities are explained. 2. Giving rise to verbal expression; 3. Generating the grasping of a person; 4. Generating the grasping of dharmas; 5. Being able to take in the crude heaviness of the habitual tendencies of those two kinds of grasping: through grasping the two data, the crude heaviness of the habitual tendencies of the two graspings is perfumed. The other two natures each have five activities, as can be known from the text.

20.33

Tai says: The five activities of the first nature are: 1. Although the parikalpita nature is not an objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) that produces [dharmas], the grasping mind internally and falsely presumes that there is a grasped image and a grasping mind, and hence it is said to be able to generate, though according to its nature it is not truly generated by the four conditions; 2. Due to the images of the two selves, person and dharma, it can generate verbal expressions of the two selves; through the verbal expressions of the two selves, it again arises conditioning the two selves; 3 and 4. The grasping of conceptualization conforming to cognition; habituating the third and fourth graspings conforming to cognition perfumes and forms habitual tendencies, and the crude heaviness of dormant tendencies then gives rise to the two graspings of dormant tendencies; these two graspings of dormant tendencies are also generated because of the parikalpita, and therefore the parikalpita can take in the crude-heaviness grasping of those two kinds of habitual tendencies.

20.34

As for the five of the paratantra: First, briefly explaining that the paratantra can generate defilement, there are two kinds of generation, which can be understood by analogy with the preceding, briefly omitting that it can generate purity; second, because based on the paratantra one conceptualizes the parikalpita nature, it can serve as the support for the parikalpita intrinsic nature. Furthermore, because one enters the real by relying on the conventional, it also serves as the support for the pariniṣpanna intrinsic nature; in terms of the conventional serving as the support for the ultimate truth, it is not spoken of in the parikalpita nature; third and fourth, the two graspings of person and dharma take the paratantra nature as their objective condition, and therefore it serves as the support for those two graspings; fifth, the ālayavijñāna serves as the support for the seeds of those two graspings.

20.35

Bei says: As for the five of the first nature: 1. Because of the two data of person and dharma, it can generate the conceptualizing mind of the paratantra; 2. If we consider the paratantra, since it is by nature free from verbal expression, it is ineffable, but that there is verbal expression is due to the parikalpita; 3 and 4 are as in the treatise; 5. Due to the parikalpita, the graspings of person and dharma arise, and through the two graspings it takes in those two kinds.

20.36

Another explanation states: Because it lacks seeds, it possesses the nature of crude heaviness in all contaminated dharmas. Among the five activities of the paratantra, the fifth itself has two approaches: according to the approach conforming to provisional reasoning, the principal mind and the five sense faculties and so forth can all hold seeds; if discussed in terms of being able to provide a support for crude heaviness, this generally clarifies all contaminated dharmas; according to the approach of true reality, only the ālayavijñāna can hold seeds. As for the pariniṣpanna, it is these five activities, because it is the objective condition of the antidote to the two sets of five.

20.37

The third [section] explains the gateway of subtle and so forth. Tai says: The parikalpita is difficult to penetrate, hence it is subtle; the paratantra is the object of the eight consciousnesses, and the paratantra sphere is constantly manifest before one, hence it is called coarse; the pariniṣpanna is seen only by the noble ones, hence it is called extremely subtle.

20.38

Bei says: Dharmas such as form and mind have substantial essence, hence they are called coarse; the parikalpita lacks substantial essence, hence it is called subtle.

20.39

The fourth [section] explains the gateway of lacking essence. First, that which lacks essence can transform that which has essence: through grasping that which lacks essence, the essence of the paratantra arises.

20.40

Question: A dharma lacking essence cannot constitute an objective condition; how can one say that by conditioning that which lacks essence, that which has essence is produced? Master Jing explains: This is a general statement. That which lacks essence per se belongs to what is grasped; that which can transform that which has essence is per se the objective division, an existent dharma of the paratantra, which can act as an objective condition to produce the subjective division. For example, when conditioning the eighteen realms and grasping the dharmas as definitely existent, there are objective divisions of the realms which serve as objective conditions when the mind of the subjective division arises; the aspect of grasping those objective divisions as definitely existent is itself without essence and belongs per se to what is grasped; that it can transform that which has essence refers specifically to the objective division. In the text it is spoken of generally, hence it says 'one nature lacks essence and can transform that which has essence'.

20.41

There is an explanation: Paratantra dharmas arise from deluded cognitive grasping; therefore it says that the parikalpita grasping can transform the paratantra, but not as an immediate cause-and-condition (hetupratyaya) or objective condition and so forth.

20.42

Second, one has essence and can give rise to existence and non-existence: the paratantra nature can generate its own class and give rise to the two data of person and dharma.

20.43

Third, one has essence but cannot transform: namely, the pariniṣpanna, because it is devoid of proliferation (prapañca).

20.44

The fifth [section] explains the gateway of arising and non-arising. The parikalpita is originally unarisen, hence it is called 'unarisen'; yet it can generate the paratantra, hence it is said to 'generate arising'. The paratantra nature is a dharma that arises, and it can generate the paratantra and the parikalpita.

20.45

Question: If it is said that the parikalpita is originally unarisen, why is it said to be generated by the paratantra?

20.46

The explanation states: According to the meaning of lacking essence, it is called unarisen; in accordance with its conceptualized nature, it is also called arisen. The pariniṣpanna nature, by virtue of the meaning of cessation, is not discussed in terms of being able to generate.

20.47

Question: How does this differ from the previous gateway, such that it needs to be repeated?

20.48

Master Jing says: The previous one distinguished the ability to generate one another based on having essence and lacking essence; this one distinguishes the ability to generate one another based on dharmas that arise and do not arise.

20.49

Master Jing says: 'Transforming' applies to both arising and ceasing: when deluded, it can generate the paratantra; if one awakens to what is grasped, the paratantra ceases.

20.50

The present explanation states: 'Transforming' has the meaning of transformation; 'generating' has the meaning of arising.

20.51

The sixth [section] explains the gateway of grasping and non-grasping. First, it explains the characteristics of grasping and non-grasping in the parikalpita nature. Jing says: First, cognitively awakened having-grasping and non-grasping: that is, persons from youth onward who understand nominal conventions give rise to cognitively awakened grasping; if they understand [reality], they do not give rise to that grasping.

20.52

Next, it explains dormant having-grasping and non-grasping: that is, infants, birds, beasts, and the like, although they do not understand nominal conventions, nevertheless possess grasping through the power of dormant tendencies; as for adults who have uprooted dormant tendencies, one should know they are without grasping.

20.53

Tai says: Here, the parikalpita nature, grasping, and non-grasping are distinguished in terms of the grasping of self. Discriminated self-view conceptualizes the existence of a self due to the verbal teachings of non-Buddhists and the like, hence it is called 'cognitively awakened grasping'. Innate self-view does not depend on verbal teachings, but arises spontaneously through the power of habitual conditioning, hence it is called 'dormant grasping'. In this there are two: if ordinary beings and trainees have not uprooted the habitual seeds of that innate self-grasping, one should know that they have dormant grasping with respect to it. If arhats and the like have not yet abandoned crude heaviness of habitual conditioning, although they have completely severed the dormant seeds of defiled innate self-grasping, nevertheless there remains the crude heaviness of the habitual tendencies of self-grasping upon good and indeterminate seeds; through the power of this crude heaviness of habitual conditioning, good and indeterminate minds conceptualize a personal self, all of which is called having-grasping. Only the Buddha alone has uprooted habitual conditioning, hence he is called without-grasping.

20.54

Bei says: Among the four kinds, the first two discern having grasping and lacking grasping in terms of conceptually arisen [grasping], and the latter two discern having grasping and lacking grasping in terms of innate [grasping]. Within the former, because conceptually arisen grasping exists prior to the stages, this is called 'having grasping'; above the first stage there is no conceptually arisen self, so this is called 'lacking grasping'. Within the latter two, because the two innate graspings exist from prior to the stages up to the tenth stage, this is called 'having grasping'; after the diamond[-like samādhi] the two graspings are severed forever, so this is called 'lacking grasping'. The general distinction is like this; if explained according to degrees, above the first stage there is also lacking grasping.

20.55

Next, the text clarifies paratantra's having grasping and lacking grasping. Jing says: Here there are also two. First, regarding 'due to the awakening grasping of the imagined nature', etc.: bringing up the imagined nature, he discerns the paratantra that can grasp; down to 'clearly understanding', one does not give rise to inverted grasping toward persons, dharmas, or sensory objects. Second, from 'if with respect to the bondage of signs' down to 'the second grasping': when one has apprehending with respect to the various objective spheres, it is called having the bondage of signs.

20.56

Next, the text clarifies lacking grasping. Lacking grasping has two [aspects]. First, clarifying the realized cognition: in the signless realm, having already uprooted the bondage of signs is called lacking grasping. Second, from 'or at a later time' downward, clarifying the subsequently attained cognition: as it exists, one should know it lacks grasping.

20.57

Tai says: Here, with respect to the dharma-self, he discerns having grasping and lacking grasping on the paratantra nature. This also has two kinds. First: if, due to conceptually grasping that there is an imagined dharma-self through awakening and discrimination following names and words, one further through awakening and discrimination following names and words imagines the nature of grasping at dharmas accomplished by it—such as the Hīnayāna verbal teachings grasping at dharmas having an intrinsic nature, and so forth—this is called the first grasping. However, because the text brings up the awakening imagining of personal grasping to explain analogously the awakening imagining of dharma grasping, it is not directly discerning the awakening of personal grasping, because that was already explained previously. Second: if one has not yet uprooted the seeds of the bondage of signs, when one has apprehending among the signs by the power of the seeds, it is called the second [grasping, which is] dormancy. As for the two kinds of lacking grasping in dharma grasping and so forth, they can be understood by examining the text.

20.58

Bei cites the Tripiṭaka Master's explanation: Here there are also four kinds, as explained in [the section on] parikalpita. What is different is that, because paratantra dharmas are free from the function of verbal expression, it is called grasping because there is no basis for clinging. Furthermore, among these four, the first two discern having grasping and lacking grasping in terms of the absence of discrimination; the latter two discern having grasping and lacking grasping in terms of the absence of the bondage of signs.

20.59

The Tripiṭaka Master also says: The two graspings in paratantra are precisely the two graspings in parikalpita; there is no separate entity. Just as regarding the five aggregates, clinging to the presence of a spiritual self is called personal grasping, while failing to comprehend the meaning of the aggregates is called dharma grasping. Here it is also like this: from the aspect of erroneously projecting a conceptualized nature it is called parikalpita grasping, while from the aspect of failing to comprehend the meaning of the paratantra nature it is called grasping a self in paratantra.

20.60

Below, the text clarifies pariniṣpanna's lacking grasping. Because this realm is not a foothold for grasping, if, while not yet having realized it in direct contact, one gives rise to the overweening pride of attainment, one should know that this is precisely the imagined grasping arising through constructing upon the paratantra nature. Although it takes tathatā as an object and gives rise to clinging, it still grasps what is transformed by the mind, giving rise to grasping by taking the image part of tathatā as paratantra.

20.61

The seventh [section] explains the gateway of fully knowing, which has three questions and answers.

20.62

First, the text clarifies that fully knowing the parikalpita nature has eleven characteristics. 1. Grasping merely by name; 2. signless nature; 3. absence of arising and ceasing; 4. absence of defilement and purity; 5. primordial nirvāṇa—former venerable masters explained these words as presenting the antidote to reveal the conceptualized nature that is to be antidoted. The present explanation is: It is not so. Precisely because it is utterly non-existent, it is an absence of intrinsic nature; it is not non-existence due to dispelling, etc., as the preceding text states, and primordial quiescence, etc., is stated in terms of the non-arising of signs; 6. not belonging to the three times; 7. not bound or unbound by the three realms; 8. neither bondage nor liberation; 9. not the three feelings; 10. being of only one flavor; 11. like empty space—because empty space lacks an entity, it is brought up as a simile. The first nine list the specific characteristics; the latter two are general characteristics.

20.63

Next, the text clarifies that fully knowing paratantra comprises all conditioned matters expressed by names; this is the general indication.

20.64

Below, it explains it separately. First, in terms of the characteristics of dharmas, there are fifty-eight. 1. The six skills; 2. matters of absence of karma; 3. matters of destinies and births; 4. matters of kinds of birth—Master Tai says: Generally speaking, the matter of the mutual production of dharmas is called the matter of bringing forth birth; the categories of dharmas are called the matter of material classes, not the matter of form such as faculties and objects. The present explanation is: this is the matter of parents producing various classes of forms; 5. the twenty-eight heavens; 6. matters of the expedients for entering sagehood; 7. matters of the paths of seeing and cultivation; 8. matters of the holy fruits of the two vehicles; 9. matters of the meditative attainment of cessation; 10. matters of reaching the other shore—Jing says: None. Another explanation says: it is the six perfections; 11. matters of the thirty-seven limbs [of awakening]; 12. matters of dhyāna; 13. matters of the four immeasurables; 14. matters of formless attainments; 15. matters of cultivating the ten perceptions; 16. matters of cultivating recollections—Tai says: Matters of the applications of mindfulness. The present explanation is: matters of the six recollections; 17. matters of the virtues of the three categories; 18. matters of the various virtues such as the powers and fearlessnesses.

20.65

Next, adducing the characteristics of similes, there are three types. 1. With respect to similes such as a dream: as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts explain there are five kinds, or three, down to seven such as madness, one may cite the Nirvāṇa Sūtra and so forth.

20.66

Explaining the 'friend who drinks urine', Jing and Bei both say: A man was beaten and lay unconscious on the ground; someone with malicious intent urinated into his mouth, and the man then revived. Having revived, he told him, 'You drank my urine, and therefore were revived.' When the man heard this, he entered the Ganges River and soaked for six months before he could enter the village. Because the people of the Western Country taboos touching feces and urine, how much less would they be willing to ingest it. What has traditionally been passed down as 'discarded old medicine' was said to be feces, so they took toilet runoff and ingested it, which is utterly absurd. What is called 'discarded old medicine' refers to taking the medicine dregs discarded by others, decocting them, and ingesting them; this is called discarded old medicine.

20.67

Tai says: It is like two friends who cross a desert path without water together; one obtains a little water and immediately drinks it all, and offers his own urine to the other person; hence he is called a friend who drinks urine. An 'adopted son' is like an adopted child in the worldly realm who is not one's own biological offspring. Externally appearing intimate and good, inwardly harbouring deceit and flattery, and vainly squandering the family property; this still requires further investigation.

20.68

Below, the discerning of characteristics in its own entity has six phrases: 1. Empty, because it lacks spontaneous arising; 2. wishless, because it is repulsive; 3. separated, because one should not delight in or cling to it; 4. non-grasping, because it lacks grasper and grasped; 5. deceptive, because it lacks a real entity; 6. unstable, because it swiftly perishes.

20.69

Third, the text clarifies fully knowing pariniṣpanna. First, it discerns the characteristics in its own entity, such as tathatā and the reality limit previously explained; later, it treats it in terms of what is absent, namely the ten kinds and so forth.

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The eighth [section] explains the gateway of defilement and suffering: first discerning its defilement, and later drawing an analogy to suffering.

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Because the parikalpita nature lacks an entity, it is not defiled; it merely causes paratantra to become defiled. Paratantra is defiled only in itself. Pariniṣpanna is pure in itself, and causes others to be pure as well.

20.72

The ninth [section] explains the gateway of similes: parikalpita is like empty space, identical in lacking an entity; paratantra is like an enemy, because it violates and damages the life of good dharmas; pariniṣpanna is like an inexhaustible, great hidden treasure, because when one realizes it, the benefit is boundless. However, regarding this simile of the treasure for the true nature, former masters understood it differently. Masters of the Southern Path cite the Laṅkāvatāra and other sūtras, saying: The tathāgatagarbha nature is fully endowed with all the virtues [as numerous as] the sands of the Ganges; it is inherently possessed from the beginning, not newly arisen today. Moreover, that sūtra itself says: The thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs sit cross-legged, yet are immeasurably obscured and concealed, not manifesting. Also, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: Great parinirvāṇa is inherently possessed from the beginning, fully endowed with all the virtues [as numerous as] the sands of the Ganges. Also, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'Disciples of the Buddha, all sentient beings possess the Buddha's tathāgatagarbha nature, fully endowed with all virtues.' Also, the Bodhisattvabhūmi says: 'As for the gotra by nature, the excellence of the six sense bases continues sequentially, inherently so from beginningless time.' Such sūtras and treatises all prove that it is primordially endowed with all virtues. If, as the Northern Path says, there are no primordially possessed virtues, then one commits the error of falling into the annihilationist view of the non-Buddhists. The masters of the Northern Path say: Positing all virtues as primordially existing, not arisen from causes, and inherently existing from before, entirely commits the fault of the Sāṃkhya self-entity. How is it known that there are no primordially possessed virtues? As in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Mahāmati addressed the Buddha: 'If the tathāgatagarbha nature is fully endowed with all virtues, why does the World-Honoured One further teach that all dharmas are empty, without arising and without ceasing?' The Buddha told Mahāmati: 'It is for the sake of sentient beings with annihilationist views that I taught that it is primordially endowed with all virtues.' They immediately take this passage to interpret the intent of all sūtras. Nowadays Master Tai says: Relying on this treatise proves that the principle of pariniṣpanna accomplishes the foundation of the myriad virtues; therefore it is spoken of as a hidden treasure, not that tathatā is fully endowed with the myriad virtues. Like Candragomin and others: although they establish the inherently taintless seeds of the three vehicles, these are conditioned and their entity is not tathatā; hence it does not agree with the explanation of the Southern Path; yet because of the primordial existence of taintless seeds, it does not agree with the explanation of the Northern Path.

20.73

Master Bei, stating the text on being fully endowed with all primordial virtues, says: Primordially existent tathatā is precisely the nature that constantly gives rise to all virtues; it refers to the primordially existent constant nature. There is an explanation saying: 'Because there is no ignorance upon tathatā, it is called wisdom; because there is no distraction, it is called samādhi'—this is not so. If it were like this, inanimate dharmas also lack ignorance, so they should possess wisdom and samādhi. Another explanation says: 'Being inseparable from conditioned virtues produced through cultivation is called being endowed with virtues'—this reasoning is also not so. If it were like this, being inseparable from non-existence should be called non-existence.

20.74

The tenth [section] explains the gateway of discrimination. Within it there are two: first, explaining that each of the three natures has its cause; second, by expanding on the words, discerning non-discriminative cognition.

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In the former: Parikalpita arises due to paratantra, because based on paratantra there is parikalpita. Paratantra arises due to causes and conditions, because it is named paratantra because result-dharmas are able to arise based on causes and conditions. Pariniṣpanna is due to not being intermingled or defiled by any afflictions and manifold sufferings, which means it is called real because it is non-erroneous. Furthermore, due to permanence, it is called real due to non-alteration.

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Regarding the latter section, its meaning corresponds to the passage on the five characteristics of non-discriminative cognition in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: first it objects, and later it resolves.

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In the objection, it first establishes the thesis with five meanings, and next poses five objections. First: if it is due to non-attention, the sūtra teaches that non-discriminative cognition is associated with proper attention, and to say it is due to non-attention does not stand to reason; moreover, if it is named non-discriminative cognition due to non-attention, sound sleep, madness, and drunkenness would have the fault of becoming this cognition. Second: if it is named non-discriminative cognition due to surpassing the discrimination of investigation and reflection, then all minds and mental factors above the second dhyāna should be non-discriminative cognition; if they were, this would contradict the scriptural teaching that all minds and mental factors of the three realms are discriminative. Third: if it is due to having nothing, why would this wisdom not become non-mind? Fourth: if it is due to being of a dull and stupid nature, why would this wisdom not become material nature and lack the characteristic of penetration? Fifth: if it is due to making subtle preparations toward the object, then one slanders this cognition as being free from the characteristic of preparation.

20.78

In the reconciliation below, Jing says: Regarding 'because it is free from effort with respect to the cognitive object,' this means that when this wisdom directly realizes [tathatā], its mind is free from the effort of seeking; thus it explains that wisdom is non-conceptual. The statement from 'this cognitive object' up to 'is free from conceptualization' distinguishes that the object is non-conceptual; it adduces the object to clarify that wisdom is non-conceptual. The statement that 'when the wondrous wisdom associated with samādhi arises, it can directly illuminate and grasp the sign of the cognitive object, etc.' means that the wondrous wisdom of samādhi can directly illuminate tathatā free from the five signs, which is called non-conceptual. Bei says: According to the intention of the opening text of the Madhyāntavibhāga, before the stages [of the bodhisattva] one first eliminates the objective aspect (nimittabhāga), next eliminates the subjective aspect (darśanabhāga), and enters the first stage possessing only the self-substance [aspect] (svasaṃvittibhāga); this treatise is likewise. Thus, when the treatise says 'this cognitive object is free from the marks of existence and non-existence,' it intends to explain the meaning of being free from the objective aspect; when it says 'is free from all conceptualizations,' it intends to explain the meaning of being free from the subjective aspect; and when it says 'the wondrous wisdom of samādhi can directly illuminate and grasp,' it intends to explain that because it is induced by the wisdom free of subjective and objective [aspects] prior to the stages, from the first stage onward there is only the self-substance [aspect]. Because it is free from the two obscurations of subjective and objective [aspects], it is able to realize tathatā. Based on the former Mahāyānasaṃgraha, at the stage of patience one practices the contemplation of signlessness, and at the stage of the highest worldly dharmas one practices the contemplation of non-arising. Because of the contemplation of signlessness, one is free from the objective aspect; because of being free from the subjective aspect, one practices the contemplation of non-arising. Therefore, from the first stage onward there is only the self-substance aspect. Therefore, in the Western country they made an analogy, saying: Just like two horns of an ox, first one horn is knocked off, and then the second horn, so that only the head remains because they were broken off. However, in explaining this wisdom there are two interpretations in the Western region. One says: Fundamental wisdom cognizes tathatā without having an objective aspect, because it is internally realized by itself. The second says: There is no mind that cognizes an object without conceptualizing it; therefore, when this wisdom cognizes tathatā, it also produces an image. Now, relying on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the former explanation is superior.

20.79

Of the twelve sections resolving the Initial Holding Yoga above, the first four sections are concluded.

20.80

Next below is the fifth, the Viniścaya on the Chapter on Sovereignty. 'The division of the real meaning has already been explained' concludes the preceding. 'It should be known that sovereign power is inconceivable through five causes and conditions' adduces the number to generate what follows; it is entirely different from the unfocused mind. It also says: Regarding 'it is exclusively bound to the mind of the concentrated stage,' this also occurs from the eighth stage onward, but it mostly relies on the Buddha, because the Buddha has no unfocused mind.

20.81

Next below is the sixth, the Viniścaya on the Chapter on Accomplishment. Regarding the ten Dharma-practices: first, copying and upholding the sūtras and teachings; second, making offerings; third, bestowing wisdom on others; fourth, listening; fifth, reciting and studying; sixth, receiving and comprehending; seventh, chanting; eighth, explaining extensively for others; ninth, reflecting in solitary retreat; tenth, entering into the marks of cultivation accordingly. Such ten practices all have the meaning of supporting, so they are called merit. The ninth is the path of preparatory application, which is reflection; the tenth is the path of purifying obscurations, which is cultivation. Tracing the phrasing of this text, only the ninth is called preparatory application, so it may be said that the first eight are exclusively innate wholesomeness.

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The seventh is the Viniścaya on the Chapter on Bodhi. Herein, first it briefly presents the outline and promises that it will now be explained; thereafter, it sequentially explains the five aspects of bodhi.

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In the first, explaining its essential nature, it first designates the essential nature, which is the sublime āśrayaparavṛtti; thereafter, it distinguishes that āśrayaparavṛtti has four aspects. It first states the number and lists the names, and then separately explains them.

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瑜伽論記 — Classical Chinese