瑜伽論記 5.223

5.223

Master Ji explains: There are three layers here: First, it is said that the meaning established by the words of the proposition is called that which is established; therefore this is that which is established. Yet some hold: The words of the proposition that express it, as well as the words and meanings of the reason and the rest, are all called that which establishes; although the words of the proposition are also that which is established because they are proved by the reason and example, as stated below, it is also that which is established and not definitively that which is established in order first to display the meaning of the proposition that one cherishes; because it can establish the meaning, just like the reason and example, it is merely called that which establishes; the expressed meaning is definitively that which is established alone, and is solely called that which is established. Second, it is said that the totality of intrinsic nature and distinction across all dharmas, whether scriptural or rational, is that which is established; these are all called meanings as appropriate; a part of the totality presented against the opponent, whether in word or meaning, intrinsic nature or distinction, is collectively called the proposition, and is thus called that which establishes; although the distinct proposition is also that which is established, because it is the totality of that which establishes, it receives the name of that which establishes; therefore, Dignāga and others naming the proposition as that which is established does not contradict the principle in the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, because the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts state that the proposition is not exclusively that which establishes. Third, it is said that the meaning of the basis in which intrinsic nature and distinction combine is called that which is established; the combined proposition that is supported is said to be that which establishes, because the totality establishes the distinct; this combined proposition is not definitively that which establishes alone; because it is jointly presented against the opponent and proved by the reason and example, it is also that which is established; because it is not definitively that which is established, it gets the name of that which establishes; Dignāga merely uses commonly accepted reasons and examples to prove what the other has not yet accepted; that which proves what the other has not accepted is solely the combined proposition, which serves as that which is established; intrinsic nature and distinction are merely the bases of the proposition; since the intended meanings differ, there is no contradiction.