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瑜伽論記 8.494

English (machine translation) 8.494

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8.494

Ji says: Here, the text explains that concerning the previous five pleasures, one should deliberate on the meaning of what can and cannot be given to sentient beings. If in the first, causal pleasure, one takes karma that accords with pleasure, the third, fourth, and fifth pleasures should be bestowed unconditionally on sentient beings and should not be deliberated upon; within causal pleasure, the two categories of faculties and objects, as well as the second, the pleasure of feeling, should be observed as to whether they can or cannot be given before bestowing them upon sentient beings. Here there is an objection: as with the third, the pleasure of pacifying suffering, suppose there is a sentient being who was previously poor and suffering and unable to commit misdeeds; the bodhisattva, to pacify suffering, bestows wealth and treasures, and having obtained wealth and treasures in the present, they become negligent and commit misdeeds, etc. When bestowing this pleasure, does it not give rise to misdeeds and defilements? Furthermore, among pleasures without affliction and harm, the pleasure of renunciation and the pleasure of tranquility are dhyānas of the form realm, and also pertain to what has taints and conditioned phenomena; if bestowed upon sentient beings and they obtain them without abandoning them, although born in the form realm, they may generate craving for the taste of absorption, fail to learn the internal Dharma, consider it nirvāṇa, and fall back into bad destinies; when sentient beings obtain them, it is not without fault and not without defilement. Why is it not like the pleasure of feeling, observing whether those sentient beings can or cannot be given [them], but instead stated that they are unconditionally bestowed upon sentient beings? Furthermore, within the intrinsic nature of pleasurable feeling, it pertains to both with-taints and without-taints; why not say that one discriminates and considers those with taints and unconditionally bestows those without taints? Just as with that causal pleasure, karma yielding pleasurable fruit is unconditionally bestowed, while the causal pleasure of faculties and objects is not bestowed; that causal pleasure has two kinds—giving and not giving; since the pleasure of feeling also has two kinds, it should likewise have giving and not giving.

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