瑜伽論記 8.494

8.494

基云：此中釋前五樂應思擇可與不可與眾生義，若第一因樂中取順樂業，第三第四第五之樂應一向與眾生不應思擇，其因樂中根境二品及第二受樂應觀可與不可與方與眾生，此中有妨，如第三苦息除樂，有一眾生先為貧苦不獲造罪，菩薩為息除苦授與財寶，現獲財寶乃至放逸造諸罪等，豈不授與此樂時能生諸罪能生諸染，又無惱害樂中出離樂寂靜樂是色界定亦通有漏是有為法，若授與眾生眾生得之不癈，雖生色界起貪定味不學內法計為涅槃，復還生惡趣，眾生得之非無有罪非無有染，何故不同受樂觀彼眾生可與不可與乃言於諸眾生一向授與耶？又樂受自性中通漏無漏，何故不言有漏者簡擇思惟無漏者一向授與，如彼因樂順樂果之業一向授與根塵因樂即不授與，彼因樂有二種有與不與，受樂既有二種亦應與不與。

Ji says: Here, the text explains that concerning the previous five pleasures, one should deliberate on the meaning of what can and cannot be given to sentient beings. If in the first, causal pleasure, one takes karma that accords with pleasure, the third, fourth, and fifth pleasures should be bestowed unconditionally on sentient beings and should not be deliberated upon; within causal pleasure, the two categories of faculties and objects, as well as the second, the pleasure of feeling, should be observed as to whether they can or cannot be given before bestowing them upon sentient beings. Here there is an objection: as with the third, the pleasure of pacifying suffering, suppose there is a sentient being who was previously poor and suffering and unable to commit misdeeds; the bodhisattva, to pacify suffering, bestows wealth and treasures, and having obtained wealth and treasures in the present, they become negligent and commit misdeeds, etc. When bestowing this pleasure, does it not give rise to misdeeds and defilements? Furthermore, among pleasures without affliction and harm, the pleasure of renunciation and the pleasure of tranquility are dhyānas of the form realm, and also pertain to what has taints and conditioned phenomena; if bestowed upon sentient beings and they obtain them without abandoning them, although born in the form realm, they may generate craving for the taste of absorption, fail to learn the internal Dharma, consider it nirvāṇa, and fall back into bad destinies; when sentient beings obtain them, it is not without fault and not without defilement. Why is it not like the pleasure of feeling, observing whether those sentient beings can or cannot be given [them], but instead stated that they are unconditionally bestowed upon sentient beings? Furthermore, within the intrinsic nature of pleasurable feeling, it pertains to both with-taints and without-taints; why not say that one discriminates and considers those with taints and unconditionally bestows those without taints? Just as with that causal pleasure, karma yielding pleasurable fruit is unconditionally bestowed, while the causal pleasure of faculties and objects is not bestowed; that causal pleasure has two kinds—giving and not giving; since the pleasure of feeling also has two kinds, it should likewise have giving and not giving.