瑜伽師地論略纂 10.43

10.43

論云「當知所有現法當來可愛果業所攝因樂，乃至是所宜者，於諸眾生即應授與」等者，此中釋前五樂應思擇可與不可與眾生義。若第一因樂中取順樂果業，第三、第四、第五之樂，應一向與眾生，不應思擇；其因樂中根境二品及第二受樂，應觀可與不可與，方與眾生。此中有妨。如第三苦息除樂，有一眾生先為貧苦，不獲造罪，菩薩為息除苦故，授與財寶，既獲財寶，乃至放逸造諸罪等，豈不授與此樂時能生諸罪，能生諸染？又無惱害樂中，出離樂、寂靜樂是色界定，亦通有漏，是有為法。若授與眾生，眾生得之不廢，雖生色界，起貪定味，不學內法，計為涅槃，後還生惡趣。眾生得之，非無有罪，非無有染。何故不同受樂觀彼眾生可與不可與，乃言於諸眾生一向授與耶？又樂受自性中通漏無漏，何故不言有漏者簡擇思惟，無漏者一向授與？如彼因樂，順樂果之業一向授與，根塵因樂即不授與。此因樂有二種，有與不與；受樂既有二種，亦應與不與。遠師云：順樂之業攝，彼決定應與者，故說之決定饒益。即有眾生起順苦業，菩薩不授；若起順樂業，決定應與。故彼受樂中，無漏受者攝彼決定應利益者不能盡故，不得偏說，所作無量故。如四禪，決定應與者與之，無漏受不然。　問：若有根熟，欲入見諦，堪與無漏者，亦是決定，何故不與？前解非也。義曰：若約實理，受自性中亦得如因樂分別，但以有性、無性別故，無漏受不應一向與。又可入一地、不可入地別故，不應一向說授與。設令入地人，一向應授，以與不令入相對故，故合為例。若爾，斷受樂、無惱害樂如何通？答：思惟漏無漏別受性故。以何不同？因樂體有三種，得作分別。又斷受樂等一向授與，唯約今得，人即知已，顯無漏受亦令授與。以文影顯，故不說受樂也。

The treatise says: "One should know that regarding all bliss of causes comprised of karmas with desirable fruits in the present or future, and so on up to what is appropriate, one should immediately bestow it upon sentient beings," and so forth. Here, it explains the meaning of how, among the five kinds of bliss mentioned before, one should deliberate on what may or may not be bestowed upon sentient beings. If in the first [kind], bliss of causes, one takes the karmas that accord with pleasurable fruits, and the third, fourth, and fifth kinds of bliss, these should be bestowed on sentient beings unconditionally, without needing deliberation; whereas the two categories of faculties and objects within the bliss of causes, as well as the second, bliss of sensation, should be scrutinized as to whether they may or may not be bestowed before giving them to sentient beings. Here there is an objection: As with the third kind, the bliss of the cessation of suffering, suppose there is a sentient being who was previously impoverished and unable to commit misdeeds; the bodhisattva, in order to cease his suffering, bestows wealth and treasures upon him; once he has obtained wealth and treasures, he becomes negligent and commits various misdeeds and so on. In bestowing this bliss, does it not produce various misdeeds and generate various defilements? Furthermore, regarding the bliss free from affliction, the bliss of renunciation and the bliss of tranquility are dhyānas of the form realm, which also extend to the contaminated and are conditioned phenomena. If one bestows them upon sentient beings, and sentient beings obtain them without abandoning them, even though they are born in the form realm, they will give rise to attachment to the taste of concentration, fail to learn the inner Dharma, imagine it to be nirvāṇa, and later fall back into the bad destinies. When sentient beings attain them, it is not without fault or without defilement. Why does one not, as with the bliss of sensation, examine whether they may or may not be bestowed upon those sentient beings, instead stating that they are bestowed unconditionally upon all sentient beings? Furthermore, the nature of pleasant sensation encompasses both the contaminated and the uncontaminated; why does it not state that one should select and deliberate over the contaminated, and bestow the uncontaminated unconditionally? Just as with the bliss of causes, where karmas according with pleasurable fruits are bestowed unconditionally while the bliss of causes of faculties and sensory dusts are not bestowed: since this bliss of causes has two types—to be given and not to be given—the bliss of sensation, having two types as well, should likewise be given or not given. Master Yuan says: Because what is comprised by karmas according with bliss is definitely to be given to them, it is spoken of as a definite benefit. If there are sentient beings who initiate karmas according with suffering, the bodhisattva does not bestow it; if they initiate karmas according with pleasure, it is definitely to be bestowed. Therefore, regarding that bliss of sensation, because uncontaminated sensation cannot encompass all of those who should definitely be benefited, it cannot be stated one-sidedly, as what is performed is immeasurable. Just as with the four dhyānas, one gives them to those who definitely should be given them, whereas uncontaminated sensation is not like that. Question: If there is someone whose faculties are ripe, who desires to enter the seeing of truth, and who is capable of being given the uncontaminated, this too is definite; why not give it? The previous explanation is incorrect. The meaning is: In terms of actual principle, within the nature of sensation one could also make distinctions as with the bliss of causes. However, because of the distinction between having the nature and lacking the nature [for awakening], uncontaminated sensation should not be bestowed unconditionally. Furthermore, because of the distinction between being able to enter a bhūmi and not being able to enter a bhūmi, it should not be stated to be bestowed unconditionally. Even granted that it should be bestowed unconditionally on those who enter a bhūmi, because it contrasts with not causing others to enter, they are combined as a single case. If so, how is the bliss of cutting off sensation and the bliss free from affliction resolved? Answer: Because one contemplates the distinct natures of sensation as contaminated or uncontaminated. Why is it not the same? The essence of the bliss of causes has three kinds, which allow distinctions to be made. Furthermore, that the bliss of cutting off sensation and so forth is bestowed unconditionally is stated only with respect to present attainment: when a person knows it, this indicates that uncontaminated sensation should also be bestowed. Because the text implies it, it does not explicitly speak of the bliss of sensation.