瑜伽師地論略纂 14.55

14.55

論云「又不應謂能生之因即是滅因，其相異故」者，如薩婆多部，立生滅皆有其因，然即以生因亦是滅因。今大乘及經部等，唯生有因，滅即無因，是故生已更無因故，尋即滅壞。然薩婆多以其比量立道理成立滅亦有因，立比量云：滅必有因，是有為故，猶如生相。又破大乘及經部師云：滅若無因，應非有為，以無因故，猶如虛空。此是遮比量也。今大乘等破云：汝立滅若有因，後應更滅，以有因故，猶如生相。又立量成立滅不由因，後不滅故，猶如虛空。本比量也。亦即更破云：汝有因之滅，應非是滅，以有因故，等是有為故因，猶如生相。若爾，汝以有為故因，乃與有法自相相違也。又汝立生滅兩相同共一因，我今難汝：今應生滅兩相不同一因，其相異故，如苦樂等，或善惡，或色心等。此一比量正當此文，本比量也。然此比量有不定之過。何者？且大乘亦許一想數得與心王為因，亦得自所變色為因；小乘亦許即此想數不遮色生，亦不遮心生，即是一因能生心色。若爾，為如色心，其相異故，即同一因？為如善惡，其相異故，不同一因？并須曰此據因緣說者，如賴耶中一色種子能生現行色，亦能生自類種子，而得言色與種子其相亦異，然此一種能生色非色法俱是因緣。約此亦有不定過，亦可更以比量破生滅兩相其有一因。應立量：汝有因之滅，應非是滅，以不異生故，猶如其生。應更覆量破之。

The treatise says: "Moreover, one should not say that the cause capable of producing is the cause of ceasing, because their characteristics are different." As the Sarvāstivāda school establishes that both arising and ceasing have their causes, yet they take the cause of arising to also be the cause of ceasing. Now the Mahāyāna, the Sautrāntika, and others hold that only arising has a cause, while ceasing has no cause; therefore, because once arisen there is no further cause, it immediately ceases and is destroyed. However, the Sarvāstivādin establishes through an inference and reasoned argument that cessation also has a cause, formulating the inference: "Cessation must have a cause, because it is conditioned, just like the characteristic of arising." Furthermore, they refute the Mahāyāna and Sautrāntika masters, saying: "If cessation has no cause, it should not be conditioned, because it lacks a cause, just like empty space." This is a reductio inference. Now the Mahāyāna and others refute them, saying: "If the cessation you establish has a cause, it should cease yet again later, because it has a cause, just like the characteristic of arising." Further, they formulate an inference establishing that cessation does not depend on a cause: "[Cessation does not depend on a cause], because it does not cease later, just like empty space." This is the primary inference. They also further refute them: "Your cessation that has a cause should not be cessation, because it has a cause, which is a reason equivalent to being conditioned, just like the characteristic of arising." If so, your reason of 'being conditioned' contradicts the intrinsic nature of the subject. Furthermore, you establish that the two characteristics of arising and ceasing share a single cause; I now challenge you: Now the two characteristics of arising and ceasing should not share the same cause, because their characteristics are different, like pleasure and pain, or good and bad, or matter and mind. This single inference directly corresponds to this text and is the primary inference. However, this inference has the flaw of being inconclusive. Why? First, the Mahāyāna also admits that a single mental factor of saṃjñā can serve as a cause for the primary mind, and can also serve as a cause for the matter transformed by itself; the Hīnayāna also admits that this very mental factor of saṃjñā does not obstruct the arising of matter, nor does it obstruct the arising of mind; that is, a single cause can produce mind and matter. If so, is it like matter and mind, which share the same cause because their characteristics are different? Or is it like good and bad, which do not share the same cause because their characteristics are different? It must also be said that this is spoken in terms of direct causes: just as in the ālayavijñāna a single seed of matter can produce active matter and can also produce seeds of its own kind, yet one can say that matter and seed also have different characteristics, but this single seed capable of producing material and non-material dharmas are both direct causes. In this respect there is also the flaw of inconclusiveness; one may also further use an inference to refute that the two characteristics of arising and ceasing have a single cause. One should formulate the inference: "Your cessation that has a cause should not be cessation, because it is not different from arising, just like its arising." One should further formulate counter-inferences to refute it.