瑜伽論記 14.385

14.385

然此比量有不定過，何者？且大乘亦許一相實得與心王為因亦得自所變色為因，小乘亦許即此想實不遮色生亦不遮心生即是一因能生心色。若爾，為如色心其相異故，即同一因，為如善惡其相異故，不同一因，并須云此據因緣說者如賴耶中一色種子能生現行色，亦能生自類種子，而得言色與種子其相亦異。

However, this inference has the fallacy of indeterminacy (anaikāntika). Why? In the first place, the Mahāyāna also admits that a single real characteristic can serve as a cause for the primary mind and can also serve as a cause for the form manifested by itself; the Hīnayāna also admits that this very real conception does not obstruct the arising of form nor obstruct the arising of mind, which is a single cause capable of producing mind and form. If so, is it like form and mind whose characteristics are different yet they share the same cause, or is it like good and evil whose characteristics are different and do not share the same cause? Together it must be stated that this is said on the basis of direct cause (hetupratyaya): as in the ālayavijñāna, a single seed of form can produce manifest form and can also produce seeds of its own kind, and yet it can be said that form and seed are also different in their characteristics.