瑜伽師地論略纂 14.60

14.60

論云「又諸壞滅乃至過失」者，此破薩婆多義。彼立四相中，滅相是色等滅因，然彼復立未來色等生時，雖生相用，仍至滅相體隨。今論主約生時得有滅故，大可以滅為色等滅因，故言生俱不應理也。應立量云：未來滅相應當有因，汝許已有體故，猶如生相。問：如汝無為亦已有體，有何等用？此已有體因，為如無為已有體故無用，為如生相已有體故即有用耶？解云：薩婆多立三世名，自然不攝無為也。何者？未來世名已有，現在世名正有，過去名將有。但言已有體因，則簡非無為故，不可將無為為不定過，亦不可將現在法為不定過也。復應立量云：汝未來生相應當無用，未來攝故，猶如滅相。此比量與前比量因互用皆得也。

Regarding the treatise's statement, 'Furthermore, [the assertion that] all destructions... [incurs] faults,' this refutes the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. Among the four characteristics established by them, the characteristic of destruction is the cause of the destruction of matter and the like. Yet they also maintain that when future matter and the like arise, although the characteristic of arising functions, the substance of the characteristic of destruction nevertheless follows along. Now the author of the treatise points out that because destruction would obtain at the time of arising, destruction could very well serve as the cause of destruction for matter and the like; hence he says that [destruction] being simultaneous with arising is unreasonable. A formal proof should be established as follows: 'The future characteristic of destruction must possess a cause; / Because you accept that it already possesses a substance; / Just like the characteristic of arising.' Question: Just as unconditioned phenomena in your system also already possess a substance, what function do they have? Does this reason of 'already possessing a substance' mean that, like unconditioned phenomena, it already possesses a substance and is therefore without function, or does it mean that, like the characteristic of arising, it already possesses a substance and therefore has a function? The explanation is: The Sarvāstivāda establishes the designations of the three times, which naturally do not subsume unconditioned phenomena. Why? The future time is designated 'already existent', the present time is designated 'currently existent', and the past time is designated 'about to exist'. Merely stating the reason 'already possessing a substance' excludes unconditioned phenomena, so unconditioned phenomena cannot be used to allege the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika), nor can present phenomena be used to allege the fault of inconclusiveness. Furthermore, a formal proof should be established as follows: 'Your future characteristic of arising must be devoid of function; / Because it is subsumed under the future; / Just like the characteristic of destruction.' This inference and the previous inference can both be employed interchangeably with their reasons.