瑜伽師地論略纂 14.59

14.59

論云「現可得故」者，現見薪為火依，火不能滅，何得將火為薪滅之因耶？　「變異生緣，說有作用」等者，但此火為薪之變異生因。　問：若火非滅因者，即此火所依之薪，為亦名薪，為從本為名為薪耶？若今名薪者，薪若未為變，可得名薪，既已為火之所變，即是異者，應不名薪，何得言火與薪俱生俱滅耶？若從本名薪者，此即所燒之薪，實非是薪，云何而言火與彼能為變異生緣耶？若言此初剎那火但與後念等為變異緣，不與初念火所依為變異緣者，若爾，初念之火應不燒薪，後念之煨常應生火，以所依非是薪故。答：此中，外人約世人共所知火能燒於薪為滅之因，今論主返以共所知火以為解釋，如世間人皆知別於餘處將火以燒彼薪。論主云：將火燒薪但能與彼薪為變異之因。何者？如世人共知薪有故火有，則是與薪俱生；薪無故火無，得知與薪俱滅。又世人共知薪由火故，則有煨燼之變。論主但約世俗道理以通此救。若約大乘實理，火等諸法纔生即滅，無有將火能燒彼物，但由外火為緣，引起自心所燒變異之相。故初念火後纔生，即時變異為所燒相，不得言初念火為緣，故與後念變異為生緣也。

Regarding the treatise's statement, 'because it is presently perceived,' since firewood is presently observed to be the support for fire, and fire cannot destroy [itself], how could fire be taken as the cause of the destruction of firewood? Regarding 'being spoken of as possessing an activity as a condition for the arising of alteration,' fire is merely the cause for the arising of the alteration of the firewood. Question: If fire is not the cause of destruction, is this firewood that is the support of fire still called 'firewood', or is it called 'firewood' retroactively from its original [state]? If it is presently called firewood: if the firewood has not yet undergone alteration, it can be called firewood; but once it has been altered by the fire, it is something different and should not be called firewood; so how can one say that fire and firewood arise together and perish together? If it is called firewood retroactively from its original [state], then this firewood being burned is in truth not firewood; so how can one say that fire is capable of being a condition for the arising of alteration with respect to it? If one says that the fire of the first moment is merely a condition of alteration for subsequent moments, and is not a condition of alteration for that upon which the fire of the first moment relies—if so, the fire of the first moment should not burn the firewood, and the embers of subsequent moments should constantly give rise to fire, because their support is not firewood. Answer: Here, the outsider takes the fact commonly known to worldly people—that fire burns firewood—as the cause of destruction. Now the author of the treatise, turning around, explains it by means of this fire as commonly known. For example, worldly people all know that fire is brought from elsewhere to burn that firewood. The author of the treatise says: bringing fire to burn firewood can only serve as the cause of alteration for that firewood. Why? Because worldly people commonly know that because firewood exists, fire exists—and thus it arises together with the firewood; because firewood does not exist, fire does not exist—hence it is known to perish together with the firewood. Moreover, worldly people commonly know that because of fire, firewood undergoes the alteration into embers and ashes. The author of the treatise merely resolves this defense in terms of conventional reasoning. If considered in terms of the ultimate truth of the Mahāyāna, all phenomena such as fire perish as soon as they arise; there is no bringing of fire that is able to burn that object. Rather, it is merely that with external fire as a condition, an altered appearance of what is burned is produced in one's own mind. Therefore, as soon as the fire of the first moment arises, it immediately alters into the appearance of what is burned; one cannot say that the fire of the first moment serves as a condition that gives rise to the alteration of subsequent moments.