瑜伽師地論略纂 14.89

14.89

論云隨煩惱相應中，如別抄云不信、懈怠、放逸、忘念、散亂、惡慧六，與一切染污心相應，《對法》第六云惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸五，於一切染污品中恒共相應，如此論下五十八文云，依今下文，更如惛沈、掉舉、邪欲、邪勝解為十，與一切染心俱起。何以此三相違者？且一釋云：此五十五文與《對法》五六及下十種不同者，今此文據信等五根及善中翻來者，即說相應，所以不信等五及放逸六說染品俱。其沈、掉二法雖恒通有障之定慧，生麁相相違法，沈下掉高故，非善中翻來。故此文有六，三同《對法》，三不同之，無彼沈、掉。其下文十中，邪欲、邪勝解據別境中一分來故，所以此處不論。此處唯二十隨惑，無欲、解故。　若爾，何故言妄念、散亂、惡慧三法與諸心俱？此別境故。答曰：此通別境分，應亦是癡退本分，故下文云妄念、散亂、惡慧是癡分故，所以亦說相應。　若爾，即下文覆、誑、諂、眠、惡作是癡分故，何不說相應？義曰：分別境生故，此要別緣污境生故，不說俱起。欲、解亦爾，有二分俱，此中不論故，所以全無欲、解是。此中唯六意，《對法》五者，不信等三同此論釋。然沈、掉二法，麁細相相違，此論不說；《對法》約定慧俱起，所障同時，故其細能障，亦體得同時生，所以說其沈、掉。然彼妄念、散亂、惡慧三法，彼論是別境分故，所以彼論不說。彼論又無邪欲、邪勝解故，唯立二十隨惑。所以無欲、解二法，唯二十者，如前已會。此上一釋若染心俱，如後文十法為定，由前義故，所以諸論或六或五。又解：下文雖言與十法俱，未必即一切俱，如何等？欲緣希於未來，念緣串習過去，如何二法可得並生？沈相惛下，掉相舉高，二法相違，如何並生？欲、解、沈、掉四法既不得齊生，據此處云唯六為勝，要必並生故。《雜集》亦爾，未必並生，所障定慧同時沈、掉說俱時起，所翻善染既並不信等三法說俱所障，所翻現俱所以，故說五法，其實未必並生。此六文為定，餘十、五者，各據別義。此會為勝。眠、惡作等，亦善、不善三性相應者，此通三性故，是癡分者，纏中說故，唯不善性是說癡分。餘不相應者，如前忿、恨緣共住事生起，不相應耶？義曰：事境雖同，然過現別起，乃至餘一切如所應。此等如五十八二處起隨惱等。此文大別，勘之。

Regarding the association of upakleśas in the treatise: as the separate notes say, the six—unbelief, indolence, heedlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and incorrect discernment—are associated with all defiled minds; the sixth fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says the five—torpor, restlessness, unbelief, indolence, and heedlessness—are constantly associated together among all defiled classes; and like what the text below in the fifty-eighth fascicle of this treatise says, according to the text below, along with torpor, restlessness, wrong desire, and wrong resolve, there are ten that arise together with all defiled minds. Why do these three conflict? For now, one explanation says: that this text of the fifty-fifth fascicle differs from the five or six of the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the ten below is because this present text is based on the five faculties of faith, etc., and those flipped from among the wholesome, which it speaks of as being associated; therefore unbelief, etc., the five plus heedlessness, making six, are spoken of as co-arising with the defiled class. Although the two factors of torpor and restlessness constantly pervade samādhi and prajñā that have obstacles, they produce coarse, conflicting characteristics—torpor sinking low and restlessness leaping high—so they are not flipped from the wholesome. Therefore this text has six: three identical to the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and three differing from it, lacking its torpor and restlessness. Among the ten in the text below, wrong desire and wrong resolve are derived from a part of the particular-object factors, and therefore are not discussed here. Here there are only twenty upakleśas, without desire and resolve. If so, why does it say that the three factors of forgetful mindfulness, distraction, and incorrect discernment accompany all [defiled] minds, since these belong to particular-object factors? We reply: these belong partly to particular-object factors, and should also be parts derived from ignorance; hence the text below says that forgetful mindfulness, distraction, and incorrect discernment are portions of ignorance, so they are also spoken of as associated. If so, then since concealment, deceit, flattery, sleep, and remorse in the text below are portions of ignorance, why are they not spoken of as associated? The meaning is: because they arise by discriminating objects, and must be produced by specifically taking defiled objects as their conditions, they are not spoken of as co-arising. Desire and resolve are also like this: they co-occur in two portions, and because they are not discussed here, desire and resolve are entirely absent here. This is the intention behind having only six here. As for the five in the Abhidharma-samuccaya, the three including unbelief are identical to the explanation of this treatise. However, regarding the two factors of torpor and restlessness, which are mutually conflicting in their coarse and subtle characteristics, this treatise does not mention them; whereas the Abhidharma-samuccaya speaks from the perspective of their co-arising with samādhi and prajñā, where what they obstruct is simultaneous, and therefore their subtle forms capable of obstructing can also ontologically arise at the same time, which is why it speaks of torpor and restlessness. However, as for those three factors—forgetful mindfulness, distraction, and incorrect discernment—because that treatise considers them parts of the particular-object factors, that treatise does not mention them. Furthermore, because that treatise lacks wrong desire and wrong resolve, it posits only twenty upakleśas. Why it lacks the two factors of desire and resolve and has only twenty was already reconciled above. According to this first explanation above, if they accompany the defiled mind, the ten factors as in the later text are definitive; because of the preceding rationale, the various treatises speak of either six or five. Another explanation: although the text below says they accompany ten factors, they do not necessarily all accompany it together. How so? Desire has yearning directed toward the future; mindfulness has familiarity directed toward the past: how could these two factors arise together? The characteristic of torpor is sinking low; the characteristic of restlessness is leaping high: these two factors conflict, so how could they arise together? Since the four factors of desire, resolve, torpor, and restlessness cannot arise simultaneously, relying on this passage's statement that there are only six is superior, because they must necessarily arise together. The Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā is also like this: they do not necessarily arise together; because the obstructed samādhi and prajñā are simultaneous, torpor and restlessness are spoken of as arising together; and because the flipped wholesome and defiled are also spoken of as simultaneous, the three factors including unbelief are spoken of as co-arising with what they obstruct and what they flip as manifested together; therefore it speaks of five factors, but in reality they do not necessarily arise together. These six in this text are definitive; the other ten or five are each based on a distinct perspective. This reconciliation is superior. Sleep, remorse, etc., are also associated with the three natures—wholesome, unwholesome, and [unspecified]—because they pervade the three natures; as for their being portions of ignorance, this is stated in the context of the entanglements, so only when of unwholesome nature are they said to be portions of ignorance. As for the rest not being associated, as previously mentioned with anger and resentment arising based on co-dwelling, are they not associated? The meaning is: although the objective realm is the same, they arise separately in past and present, and so forth for all the rest as appropriate. These upakleśas arise in two places as in fascicle fifty-eight. This text differs greatly; investigate it.