瑜伽師地論略纂 16.76

16.76

論云「若實物故、事故、義故」等，有解：第一因證依他有此，第二因證圓成有，如此等名真如之別義名，更無別目也。又解：此三故字亦證依他。實物故，簡似法；事故，體事也；義故，差別義也。皆依他起。待所餘，名假實等，如《對法》第三，初如即於色等為依為待，我等是假；亦待依色等名，色等蘊者亦是假有，待別色等成總蘊故。

The treatise says, "Whether by virtue of being real entities, by virtue of things, or by virtue of meanings..." One explanation is: the first reason proves that the dependent (*paratantra*) exists in this way; the second reason proves that the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*) exists. Terms such as these are different names for suchness, with no other referent. Another explanation is: all three instances of "by virtue of" also prove the dependent. "By virtue of being real entities" excludes simulated phenomena; "by virtue of things" refers to the substantial things; "by virtue of meanings" refers to differentiated meanings. All are dependently arisen. In relation to the remainder, they are called nominal, real, and so on, as in the third fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: first, taking rūpa and so forth as basis and referent, the self and such are nominal; also in dependence upon the name of rūpa and so forth, the aggregates of rūpa and the rest are also nominally existent, because they form the collective aggregate in dependence upon distinct instances of rūpa and so forth.