瑜伽師地論略纂 2.135

2.135

體是依處，義稱為因，義依體立，故說十因依十五處。　出體性者，初語依處，體唯是語。《成唯識》云：謂法、名、想所起語性，由隨見等能說眾義，此語名因，顯義果故。語體之上有能詮用，體為依處，用則稱因，故言隨說因依語依處立。觀此文意，乍似依他之語，自言說轉，理實不然。初語是依，後語是因。以語說於所見聞等，名為因故；因想起語，名依處故。欲顯依因，所望各別。領受依處，此所觀待能所受為性，能受則受數，所受則一切法。受是遍行，能領納境分位差別勝餘法故，故對所受獨立為性。有得能受而有所受，以能受為依處；有待所受而有能受，以所受為依處；有待能受而有能受，以所得為依處；有待所受而有所受，亦以所待為依處性。總以能待為因之果，即以此義釋今論文，以所觀待而為因也，故《唯識》云謂所觀待能所受性。此中論云：於彼生緣，於彼斷緣，或為遠離，或為求得等者，遠離彼生緣，求得彼斷緣。論文但有染淨二因，略無無記。　習氣依處以有漏無漏內外所有實種、假種未成熟位而為自性，去果遠故。此文唯依雜染種說之，淨不淨業引內外果故，不依無記、清淨因說。《唯識》寬通。　有潤種依，體同習氣，但成熟位與前不同。此亦唯說染，染中唯說業，不說名言種，乘前以說故。亦應如《唯識》。攝受因中，無間滅、境界依處即是二緣，根則六根。　依用依，謂作具作業，即除因緣所餘疎助作具作用。　士用依，以除因緣外，親作現緣作者作用。此五皆通有漏、無漏故。《唯識》云：具攝受六，辨無漏法。此唯說有漏，辨有漏法故。　真見依處以無漏見為性，除引自種，於相應法能助，於後無漏能引，於無為能證，故疎緣攝受，皆除種子。　隨順依處以三性有為有漏、無漏若現若種，自界、他界、同品、勝品、有為、無為自性生，自乘相引，能引為性。此中論云：欲繫善法能引無色界繫及不繫法者，此依波羅蜜多聲聞、獨覺、諸大菩薩超禪之位得相引生，《對法》第五、《顯揚》十八許相生故。下第十二唯云：第三劫菩薩及如來能超一切地。據勝者說，亦不相違。　又言無記法能引三性，名隨順依處者，謂諸種子略有二性：攝用歸性，可言無記；將因屬果，性乃通三。《唯識》依後義，說此依處其性必同；今依初義，無記生三性。除斯以外，現行諸法種望種，更無別性成隨順因故。彼此文不相乖返。差別功能依，以一切有為各於自果有為能起、無為能證而為自性。此等同性及得異性，異熟無記果故，今論總說，不違餘文。前隨順依，論性即狹，各自性故；談界即寬，引三界故。此差別依，論性即寬，招異熟故；談界即狹，唯各自界，各定別故。前隨順依，望劣非依；此差別依，一切皆得。和合依以第二領受依，乃至差別功德依處為體。此說果寬，通生和合故。《唯識》等，因果俱寬，彼說生、住、成、得四果。成有二種：一、立；二、辨。攝此成、辨，無此作因。住，謂金輪依風輪等，此論所無，義各別故，所望別故。彼依作用，離體無故，所以不論；此無住者，疎故不論。亦不相違也。　障礙、無障礙二果，皆通二因，寬遍順違有異，法體並同。因依於處，如論自陳；處體既然，因體可悉。「依種子緣依處，施設因緣」等者，《唯識》有兩說。一云：十五依處中，第三、習氣，第四、有潤，十一、隨順，十二、差別，十三、和合，十五、不障礙，此六依處中，諸因緣種並名種子緣依處，依之立因緣。除第三、四外，餘四依處所有現行多斷，故不說。或亦名種，能辨果故。「無間滅」者，諸依處中，第五、無間滅，第十、真見，十三、和合，十五、不障礙，此四依處中，無間緣義皆名無間滅依處，依之立等無間緣。「境界依處」者，諸依處中，第六、境界依處，第十、真見，十三、和合，十五、不障礙，此四依處中，境界緣義並名境界依處，依之立所緣緣。此之二緣非唯五、六，餘依處中有二緣故。除此，餘處皆增上緣。二云：種子唯屬第四有潤種子依，依之立因緣。親能生果，顯故偏說；餘名等疎隱故，略而不論。無間唯第五，境界唯第六，如名自顯。餘依處中雖有此二，隱故不說。此三已顯初之三緣故，餘十二處皆增上攝，非唯增上。「依習氣、隨順因緣依處，施設異熟果及等流果」者，《唯識》別配，此中論云：習氣依處得異熟果，隨順依處得等流果。各別得果，有勝功能，故離別說，非習氣處不得等流。《唯識》釋此得五果中有二說。一云：習氣處者，即顯第三、第四、十二、十三、十五，此五依處得異熟果。隨順處者，即顯第三、第四、第九、第十、十一、十三、十五，或并第八作用，如是或八或九，此諸依處得等流果。真見處者，即顯第十、十一、十二、十三、十五，或第八、第九，如是或五或七，此諸依處得離繫果。　士用依處復有兩義：一、五蘊假者；二、別別法，如前果中說。若依初義，即顯第二、第九、十三、十五，此四依處得士用果；若依後義，即顯第二、第三、第四、第八、第九、十、十一、十二、十三、十五，此十依處得士用果。所餘處者，即顯第一、第五、第六、十四，此四依全，餘十一中隨應少分，得增上果，得前四果之所餘故。不爾，便應大寬大狹。二云：習氣唯第三得異熟果，隨順唯第十一得等流果，真見唯第十得離繫果，士用唯第九得士用果，所餘十一得增上果。若隨義增，其名後顯，獨說得果，非餘不得。得果所由及諸義門，論及別章皆如彼說。

The substantial entity is the ground, while the functional sense is called the cause; since the functional sense is established based on the substantial entity, it is said that the ten causes are based upon the fifteen grounds. Regarding the presentation of their essential natures: First, the ground of speech: its essential nature is solely speech. The Cheng weishi lun states: "It refers to the nature of speech arising from dharmas, names, and concepts; because it can express various meanings in accordance with what is seen and so forth, this speech is called a cause, since it manifests the fruit of meaning." Above the substantial entity of speech there is the function of being able to express: the entity is the ground, while the function is termed the cause; hence it is said that the cause of conventional expression is established based on the ground of speech. Observing the import of this text, it might momentarily seem to be the speech of other-dependence acting as self-discourse, but in reality it is not so. The former speech is the basis, and the latter speech is the cause. Because expressing what is seen, heard, and so forth through speech is called the cause; and giving rise to speech because of concepts is called the ground. It is intended to show that the basis and the cause are distinct in their respective references. The ground of reception: this has as its essential nature the active and passive reception that are depended upon; the active receiver is the mental factor of sensation (vedanā), while the passively received encompasses all dharmas. Sensation is an omnipresent factor (sarvatraga); because its distinct states in apprehending objects surpass other dharmas, it is independently established as the nature in contrast to what is received. There are cases where, having the active receiver, there is the passively received, taking the active receiver as the ground; there are cases where, depending on the passively received, there is the active receiver, taking the passively received as the ground; there are cases where, depending on the active receiver, there is the active receiver, taking what is obtained as the ground; and there are cases where, depending on the passively received, there is the passively received, likewise taking that which is depended upon as the nature of the ground. In general, taking that which depends as the fruit of the cause, it is through this meaning that the present text of the treatise is explained, taking that which is depended upon as the cause; hence the Weishi says that it refers to the nature of the active and passive reception that are depended upon. In this context, the treatise says: "with respect to conditions of arising, with respect to conditions of cessation, either for abandonment, or for attainment," and so on; [this means] abandoning those conditions of arising, and seeking to attain those conditions of cessation. The text of the treatise contains only the two causes of defilement and purification, briefly omitting the indeterminate. The ground of vāsanā takes the unripened stage of actual seeds and provisional seeds, both internal and external, contaminated and uncontaminated, as its intrinsic nature, because it is far removed from the fruit. This passage is stated solely based on defiled seeds, because pure and impure karma lead to internal and external fruits; it is not stated based on indeterminate or purified causes. The Weishi is broad and all-pervading. The ground of moisturized seeds is identical in substance to vāsanā, but its stage of ripening differs from the former. This is also stated solely regarding defilement; within defilement, it speaks solely of karma and does not mention seeds of nominal designation, because it speaks following the preceding [context]. It should also be understood as in the Weishi. Within the cause of adoption: the ground of immediate cessation and the ground of the cognitive object are the two conditions [equal-immediate condition and objective condition]; "faculties" refers to the six faculties. The ground of reliance and function refers to instruments and actions, namely, the remaining remote assisting instrumental functions apart from the direct cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya). The ground of human effort (puruṣakāra) refers to the agent's function acting as the direct present condition, excluding the cause-condition. Because these five all pervade the contaminated and uncontaminated, the Weishi says: "Fully possessing the six of adoption, it differentiates uncontaminated dharmas." Here it speaks solely of the contaminated, because it differentiates contaminated dharmas. The ground of true view takes uncontaminated view as its nature; excluding the induction of its own seeds, it can assist associated dharmas, induce subsequent uncontaminated states, and realize unconditioned dharmas; thus as remote conditions of adoption, all seeds are excluded. The ground of conformity takes the capacity to induce—arising from the intrinsic nature of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, whether actual or seeds, of one's own realm or another realm, of the same class or superior class, among the three natures, conditioned, contaminated, or uncontaminated, mutually inducing within one's own vehicle—as its nature. Where the treatise says here: "wholesome dharmas bound to the desire realm can induce dharmas bound to the formless realm and unbound dharmas," this is stated based on the stage of leaping over dhyānas by pāramitā śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and great bodhisattvas, where they are admitted to mutually induce and arise, because the fifth [fascicle] of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya] and the eighteenth of the Prakaraṇārya permit mutual arising. Below, the twelfth [fascicle] merely says: "Bodhisattvas of the third kalpa and the Tathāgatas can leap over all bhūmis." Being stated based on the superior ones, there is also no contradiction. Furthermore, regarding the statement that indeterminate dharmas can induce the three natures, being called the ground of conformity: it means that all seeds briefly have two natures: subsuming function into nature, they may be called indeterminate; assigning cause to fruit, their nature then pervades all three. The Weishi relies on the latter meaning, stating that the nature of this ground must be identical; here it relies on the former meaning, where the indeterminate produces the three natures. Other than this, among active dharmas, when seeds are viewed in relation to seeds, there is no other distinct nature that constitutes the cause of conformity. Thus the texts do not contradict each other. The ground of differentiated capacity takes the capacity of all conditioned dharmas, each with respect to its own fruit, to produce the conditioned and to realize the unconditioned, as its intrinsic nature. These, having the same nature and obtaining a different nature, result in the indeterminate fruit of vipāka; therefore the present treatise speaks of them generally, without contradicting other texts. As for the preceding ground of conformity, in terms of nature it is narrow, because each has its own nature; but in discussing realms it is broad, because it induces the three realms. This ground of differentiation, in terms of nature is broad, because it attracts vipāka; but in discussing realms it is narrow, being solely in their respective realms, because each is definitely distinct. The preceding ground of conformity is not a ground with respect to the inferior; this ground of differentiation obtains all. The ground of harmonious combination takes the second ground of reception up to the ground of differentiated virtues as its substantial entity. Here the fruit is described broadly, universally applying to harmonious combination in production. In the Weishi and other texts, both cause and fruit are broad: they speak of four fruits—production, abiding, establishment, and attainment. Establishment has two kinds: first, institution; second, accomplishment. Subsuming this institution and accomplishment, there is no such productive cause. "Abiding" refers to the gold disk resting on the wind disk, and so on; this is absent in this treatise, because the meanings are distinct and the perspectives are different. There it is based on function, and since it does not exist apart from substance, it is not discussed; here, the absence of abiding is because it is remote, hence not discussed. There is also no contradiction. The two fruits of obstruction and non-obstruction both pervade the two causes; though there are differences between broad and pervasive, conformable and contrary, their substantial dharma entities are entirely the same. The causes being based on the grounds is as the treatise itself sets forth; the entity of the grounds being such, the entity of the causes can be understood. Regarding: "Based on the ground of the seed condition, the cause-condition is posited," and so forth: the Weishi has two explanations. One says: Among the fifteen grounds, the third (vāsanā), fourth (moisturized), eleventh (conformity), twelfth (differentiation), thirteenth (harmonious combination), and fifteenth (non-obstruction)—within these six grounds, all seeds of cause-condition are collectively named the ground of the seed condition, and based on them the cause-condition is established. Except for the third and fourth, all active manifestations in the remaining four grounds are mostly severed, hence they are not mentioned; or they are also named seeds, because they can accomplish the fruit. Regarding "immediate cessation": among the grounds, the fifth (immediate cessation), tenth (true view), thirteenth (harmonious combination), and fifteenth (non-obstruction)—within these four grounds, the meaning of equal-immediate condition is collectively called the ground of immediate cessation, and based on it the equal-immediate condition is established. Regarding "ground of the cognitive object": among the grounds, the sixth (ground of the cognitive object), tenth (true view), thirteenth (harmonious combination), and fifteenth (non-obstruction)—within these four grounds, the meaning of the objective condition is collectively called the ground of the cognitive object, and based on it the objective condition is established. These two conditions are not only in the fifth and sixth, because the two conditions exist in the other grounds as well. Apart from these, the remaining grounds are all the sovereign condition (adhipati-pratyaya). The second says: Seeds belong solely to the fourth ground of moisturized seeds, and based on it the cause-condition is established; directly capable of producing the fruit, it is stated exclusively because it is prominent; the other names and so forth are remote and concealed, hence briefly omitted from discussion. Immediate cessation is solely the fifth; the cognitive object is solely the sixth, as is evident from their names. Although these two exist in the other grounds, they are concealed and therefore not mentioned. Since these three have already clarified the first three conditions, the remaining twelve grounds are all subsumed under the sovereign condition, and are not solely sovereign. Regarding: "Based on the grounds of vāsanā and conformity as cause-conditions, the vipāka fruit and niṣyanda fruit are posited": the Weishi assigns them specifically; here the treatise states: the ground of vāsanā obtains the vipāka fruit, and the ground of conformity obtains the niṣyanda fruit. Each distinctly obtains a fruit and has superior capacity, so they are stated separately; it is not that the ground of vāsanā cannot obtain the niṣyanda. The Weishi's explanation of obtaining these five fruits has two explanations. One says: the ground of vāsanā indicates the third, fourth, twelfth, thirteenth, and fifteenth—these five grounds obtain the vipāka fruit. The ground of conformity indicates the third, fourth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, and fifteenth, or together with the eighth (activity)—thus eight or nine—these grounds obtain the niṣyanda fruit. The ground of true view indicates the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fifteenth, or the eighth and ninth—thus five or seven—these grounds obtain the visaṃyoga fruit. The ground of puruṣakāra again has two meanings: first, the nominal person of the five aggregates; second, distinct individual dharmas, as explained above regarding the fruits. If according to the first meaning, it indicates the second, ninth, thirteenth, and fifteenth—these four grounds obtain the puruṣakāra fruit; if according to the second meaning, it indicates the second, third, fourth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fifteenth—these ten grounds obtain the puruṣakāra fruit. The remaining grounds indicate the first, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth—these four grounds completely, and partial aspects as appropriate among the other eleven, obtain the adhipati fruit, because they are the remainder after obtaining the former four fruits. Were it not so, it would be excessively broad or excessively narrow. The second says: Vāsanā solely as the third obtains the vipāka fruit; conformity solely as the eleventh obtains the niṣyanda fruit; true view solely as the tenth obtains the visaṃyoga fruit; puruṣakāra solely as the ninth obtains the puruṣakāra fruit; and the remaining eleven obtain the adhipati fruit. If according to the prominence of meaning, their names are manifested subsequently; they are stated exclusively as obtaining the fruits, but it is not that the others do not obtain them. The reasons for obtaining the fruits and the various doctrinal approaches are all as stated in that treatise and the separate chapter.