瑜伽師地論略纂 2.137

2.137

三復次解建立因中，初復次依因於果，有親疎義；次復次依因於果，有染淨義；後復次依因於果，有七相義。　初復次中，能生因、方便因攝十因盡。《唯識》二說。一云：牽引、生起、引發、定異、同事、不相違，此六因中若現若種皆名能生，親辨果故；所餘四因及六少分皆方便因，疎助起故。　二云：唯生起因名能生因，餘之九因名方便因。生起去果親近偏說，非唯因緣；餘多疎助，故作偏說。然〈菩薩地〉說：牽引、生起，此二種子名能生因，餘方便攝。彼亦兩說，恐繁且止。故此二因攝法周備，後之三因重顯此二。俱有一種，顯前方便雖攝三緣，所緣、增上二皆俱有。論據增上，且言如眼於眼識等，略不論餘，義顯方便攝三緣盡。其能生因雖因緣性，隱而難故，開之為二。被潤已去，種子得果，名無間因，俱時無間，非前後無間。或被潤已，轉成有支等，望後生支，亦成無間滅。未潤已前，名久遠。由隔潤位，其果方生，能所引等望果遠故，名久遠因緣。

In the three restatements explaining the establishment of causes: the first restatement is based on the cause having the sense of being direct or indirect in relation to the fruit; the second restatement is based on the cause having the sense of being defiled or pure in relation to the fruit; and the last restatement is based on the cause having the sense of seven marks in relation to the fruit. Within the first restatement, the productive cause (janaka-hetu) and the auxiliary cause (upāya-hetu) subsume all ten causes. The Cheng weishi lun presents two theories. The first says: pulling-inducing (saṃkarṣa), originating (udbhāva), bringing-forth (paribhāvana), determinate-difference (pratiniyama), co-working (sahakārin), and non-contradiction (avirodha)—among these six causes, whether actual or seed, all are named productive [causes] because they directly produce the fruit; the remaining four causes and parts of these six are all auxiliary causes, because they indirectly aid in giving rise [to the fruit]. The second says: only the originating cause is named the productive cause, and the other nine causes are named auxiliary causes. The originating [cause] is spoken of predominantly because of its close proximity to the fruit, and is not solely the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya); the others are mostly indirect aids, so they are spoken of secondarily. However, the Bodhisattvabhūmi states: pulling-inducing and originating—the seeds of these two are named productive causes, while the rest are subsumed under auxiliary [causes]. There are also two theories there, but for fear of prolixity I set them aside. Therefore, these two causes subsume all phenomena completely, and the latter three causes re-elucidate these two. The phrase "there is a co-existent type" shows that although the former auxiliary [cause] subsumes three conditions, both the object-condition and the empowering condition can be co-existent. The treatise relies on the empowering [condition] and tentatively speaks of "such as the eye with respect to visual consciousness," summarily not discussing the rest; in meaning, this demonstrates that auxiliary [causes] subsume all three conditions. As for the productive cause, although it is of the nature of a causal condition, because it is subtle and difficult [to comprehend], it is divided into two. From having been perfumed onward, seeds obtaining their fruit are called "immediate causes" (anantara-hetu)—simultaneously immediate, not temporally sequential. Or, having been perfumed, turning into the factor of existence (bhava-aṅga) and so on, with respect to the subsequent factor of birth (jāti-aṅga), it also constitutes an immediately-perished [cause]. Before being perfumed, it is called "remote." Because it is separated by the stage of perfuming before its fruit arises, the pulling and the pulled, being distant from the fruit, are called remote causal conditions.