瑜伽師地論略纂 3.26

3.26

理中，「若法自相安住，此法真實是有」者，總結諸法安住自相，此法真有；不安住自相，此法成無，如龜毛等。以去來世住自相故，法體成有，不同龜毛。若未來無者，應未受自體，應不即未來。量云：大乘未來應非未來，未受自體相故，如龜毛等。若過去無者，應失過去自體相，應不名過去。量云：大乘過去應非過去，失自體相故，如龜毛等。若如是者，三世諸法，自相不成；自相不成故，亦非真實。量云：大乘現在自相不成，或亦非真實，世所攝故，猶如去來。現在既不爾，去來云何然？或有為自相實不成，無三世故，如兔角等。

Under the reasoning, "If a phenomenon abides in its own characteristic, this phenomenon is truly existent": this summarizes that when phenomena abide in their own characteristics, these phenomena truly exist; if they do not abide in their own characteristics, these phenomena become non-existent, like the hair of a turtle. Because past and future times abide in their own characteristics, the substances of the phenomena are existent, unlike the hair of a turtle. If the future were non-existent, it would not yet have received its own substance, and it should not be the future. The formal inference is: "The future in Mahāyāna should not be the future; because it has not received the characteristic of its own substance; like the hair of a turtle." If the past were non-existent, it would lose the characteristic of its own substance in the past, and it should not be called the past. The formal inference is: "The past in Mahāyāna should not be the past; because it has lost the characteristic of its own substance; like the hair of a turtle." If it were like this, phenomena across the three times would not have their own characteristics established; because their own characteristics are not established, they would also not be real. The formal inference is: "The present in Mahāyāna does not establish its own characteristic, or it is also not real; because it is subsumed under the temporal periods; just like past and future." Since the present is not so, how could the past and future be so? Or: "Conditioned phenomena do not truly establish their own characteristics; because they lack the three times; like the horns of a hare."