瑜伽師地論略纂 3.26

3.26

Under the reasoning, "If a phenomenon abides in its own characteristic, this phenomenon is truly existent": this summarizes that when phenomena abide in their own characteristics, these phenomena truly exist; if they do not abide in their own characteristics, these phenomena become non-existent, like the hair of a turtle. Because past and future times abide in their own characteristics, the substances of the phenomena are existent, unlike the hair of a turtle. If the future were non-existent, it would not yet have received its own substance, and it should not be the future. The formal inference is: "The future in Mahāyāna should not be the future; because it has not received the characteristic of its own substance; like the hair of a turtle." If the past were non-existent, it would lose the characteristic of its own substance in the past, and it should not be called the past. The formal inference is: "The past in Mahāyāna should not be the past; because it has lost the characteristic of its own substance; like the hair of a turtle." If it were like this, phenomena across the three times would not have their own characteristics established; because their own characteristics are not established, they would also not be real. The formal inference is: "The present in Mahāyāna does not establish its own characteristic, or it is also not real; because it is subsumed under the temporal periods; just like past and future." Since the present is not so, how could the past and future be so? Or: "Conditioned phenomena do not truly establish their own characteristics; because they lack the three times; like the horns of a hare."