瑜伽師地論略纂 3.50

3.50

破第三計中，若蘊外餘處，汝處計我應是無為。此難乍似相扶極成，彼計常故，今此無過。六十五云：無有變異，是其常相。我既無變，當來、現在有二因緣皆不應理。若當來無變者，便無生、老、病、死、損等，為人天等五趣流轉。若現在世無變者，便於愛非愛等諸境界中，應無苦、樂、愛、恚、癡等之所變異，乃至不應由此等故行法非法。我既有此現當變異，即是無常，體即是蘊，故實蘊有，便無此相；此相無故，應是無為；若是無為，便無此相。量云：汝受蘊我應無此等變異之相，許無為故，猶如虛空。此言應是無為者，顯我應無變異相義。或此中意難成虛空：汝我應是虛空無為，許異蘊故，如空無為。其真如等，非定異蘊，無不定過。

In refuting the third position: if it is elsewhere outside the aggregates, the self you posit in that place should be unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). This objection might appear at first glance to be arguing for what is already established (siddhasādhana), since they posit it as permanent, but here there is no such flaw. Fascicle 65 states: being devoid of mutation is the characteristic of permanence. Since the self is devoid of mutation, both future and present causal conditions are unreasonable. If it were devoid of mutation in the future, there would be no transmigration through the five destinies such as humans and gods via birth, old age, sickness, death, deterioration, and so forth. If it were devoid of mutation in the present, then amidst all agreeable and disagreeable objects, it should not undergo mutations caused by suffering, pleasure, attachment, anger, ignorance, and so forth, nor should it engage in dharma and adharma because of them. Since the self does undergo these present and future mutations, it is impermanent and its substance is precisely the aggregates; hence, if it really existed among the aggregates, it would lack this characteristic [of unconditionedness]; and since it lacks this characteristic, it should be unconditioned; and if it were unconditioned, it would lack these characteristics [of mutation]. The syllogism is: "Your self of the aggregate of sensation should lack these characteristics of mutation; because you accept that it is unconditioned; just like space." Stating that it "should be unconditioned" shows that the self should lack the characteristic of mutation. Alternatively, the intention here is to prove that it is space: "Your self should be unconditioned space; because you accept that it is different from the aggregates; like unconditioned space." True suchness (tathatā) and so forth are not definitely different from the aggregates, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika).