瑜伽師地論略纂 3.50

3.50

In refuting the third position: if it is elsewhere outside the aggregates, the self you posit in that place should be unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). This objection might appear at first glance to be arguing for what is already established (siddhasādhana), since they posit it as permanent, but here there is no such flaw. Fascicle 65 states: being devoid of mutation is the characteristic of permanence. Since the self is devoid of mutation, both future and present causal conditions are unreasonable. If it were devoid of mutation in the future, there would be no transmigration through the five destinies such as humans and gods via birth, old age, sickness, death, deterioration, and so forth. If it were devoid of mutation in the present, then amidst all agreeable and disagreeable objects, it should not undergo mutations caused by suffering, pleasure, attachment, anger, ignorance, and so forth, nor should it engage in dharma and adharma because of them. Since the self does undergo these present and future mutations, it is impermanent and its substance is precisely the aggregates; hence, if it really existed among the aggregates, it would lack this characteristic [of unconditionedness]; and since it lacks this characteristic, it should be unconditioned; and if it were unconditioned, it would lack these characteristics [of mutation]. The syllogism is: "Your self of the aggregate of sensation should lack these characteristics of mutation; because you accept that it is unconditioned; just like space." Stating that it "should be unconditioned" shows that the self should lack the characteristic of mutation. Alternatively, the intention here is to prove that it is space: "Your self should be unconditioned space; because you accept that it is different from the aggregates; like unconditioned space." True suchness (tathatā) and so forth are not definitely different from the aggregates, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika).