瑜伽師地論略纂 3.75

3.75

第三難中，「若不異相者，由與彼因無差別故，亦應是常等」者，彼本計云：所生麁色不越因量。故難：因果二相既無差別，因亦應為果，無異相故如果；果亦應為因，無異相故如因，故無決定。　「若從離散，應一切時一切果生」等者，成劫之時，聚色若從散別極微生，即空劫時所有極微皆能生果，因恒有故，如劫成時，非但成時為因有果，故成因果無決定義。又麁聚色，性是無常；能生散極微，體是常住。麁細常住，二返相生，應一切時相違之因生一切果，故說應無因果決定，計異類法得相生故。已上設遮，下破本計。　「若言不過彼形質量」等者，因果二量，大小既同，云何極微名質分、麁形有分？《成唯識》云：所生果色不越因量，應如極微，不名麁色。為量如彼。《顯揚》第十四云：若不過者，麁質礙物應如極微不可執取，不見質礙不明淨物同在一處，故非道理。彼說量德合故，非麁似麁等救，皆如彼破。

In the third objection, regarding "If they do not have a different characteristic, because of having no distinction from that cause, they should also be permanent, and so forth": their fundamental proposition says: the produced coarse form does not exceed the measure of the cause. Therefore it objects: since there is no difference between the characteristics of cause and effect, the cause should also be the effect, because of lacking a different characteristic, like the effect; and the effect should also be the cause, because of lacking a different characteristic, like the cause; therefore there is no determinacy. Regarding "If [arising] from dispersal, all effects should arise at all times," and so forth: at the time of the eon of formation, if aggregated forms arise from distinct dispersed atoms, then all the atoms existing during the eon of emptiness should all be able to produce effects, because the cause is always existent, just as at the time of cosmic formation; it would not be that only at the time of formation do causes have effects; hence it establishes that cause and effect lack determinacy. Furthermore, coarse aggregated form is impermanent by nature; the dispersed atoms that can produce it are permanent in substance. The coarse and subtle, the permanent and impermanent, being two opposites producing each other, opposed causes should produce all effects at all times; hence it states that there should be no determinacy of cause and effect, because it is posited that disparate phenomena can produce each other. The above is a hypothetical rejection; below refutes their fundamental proposition. Regarding the passage beginning, "If it is said that it does not exceed the measure of that shape and mass," and so forth: since the two measures of cause and effect are identical in size, how can an atom be called a part of mass, and a coarse shape be called a whole possessing parts? The Cheng weishi lun states: "The produced effect-form does not exceed the measure of the cause, so it should be like an atom, not called coarse form." The logical formulation is as presented there. Chapter Fourteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: "If it does not exceed it, coarse obstructive objects should, like atoms, be impossible to grasp; one does not see obstructive, non-clear and impure objects occupying the same place; therefore it is unreasonable." Their rejoinders—such as claiming that due to conjunction with the quality of measure, it is not coarse though resembling the coarse—are all refuted as there.