瑜伽師地論略纂 9.24

9.24

論云「由是因緣，若前所斷，若今所斷，總集說言樂斷苦斷，先憂喜沒」者，樂斷名今斷，餘受根名先所斷，故下中覆治云乃至入初靜慮時，憂受沒故。此中，如前第十一卷云：何故苦根初靜慮中說未斷耶？彼品麁重猶未斷故，若身在下界，可爾；何緣生在初靜慮者，苦根未斷而不現行？由其助伴相對憂根所攝諸苦，彼已斷故，但彼麁重而未能斷；若初禪中苦根斷者，是則行者入初二靜慮，受所作位差別應無，由二俱有喜及樂故，應無差別，但以麁重而未斷故，說有差別；而經中說由出諸受，定有差別。　問曰：但以尋伺斷不斷，豈不得差別？何故要須斷苦根而說有差別？義曰：尋伺望喜樂，非相障故，不得為斷尋伺說喜差別。其初禪喜有苦根故，未說勝利；第二禪喜已斷苦故，其喜淨勝。若以有無尋伺而說差別，有無之法無量不同，其禪可別？今反難樂喜受應無差別，以苦根同喜樂等，是受相障故。若不以斷苦根為初二禪喜別，初二禪喜樂等受應無差別，前初禪時已斷苦故。此斷麁重，其種子不說斷，羅漢由有。

The treatise states: "Owing to these causes and conditions, whether what was abandoned previously or what is abandoned now, they are collectively stated as 'abandonment of pleasure, abandonment of suffering, the previous cessation of grief and joy.'" The abandonment of pleasure is called "abandoned now"; the remaining feeling faculties are called "abandoned previously." Therefore, in the repetitive counteraction below, it states that even upon entering the first dhyāna, the feeling of grief ceased. Here, as in the eleventh fascicle above: Why is the faculty of suffering said not to be abandoned in the first dhyāna? Because that category of dauṣṭhulya has not yet been abandoned. If the body is in the lower realm, that is admissible; but for what reason, when born in the first dhyāna, is the faculty of suffering not active even though it is not yet abandoned? Because the various sufferings subsumed under its counterpart companion, the faculty of grief, have already been abandoned by that [stage], yet that dauṣṭhulya cannot yet be abandoned. If the faculty of suffering were abandoned in the first dhyāna, then when the practitioner enters the first two dhyānas, there would be no distinction between the states effected by feeling; since both have joy and pleasure, there would be no distinction; but because dauṣṭhulya is not yet abandoned, a distinction is said to exist; and the sūtra states that by emerging from the various feelings, there is definitely a distinction. Question: Merely by the abandonment or non-abandonment of vitarka and vicāra, would one not obtain a distinction? Why must it require the abandonment of the faculty of suffering to state that there is a distinction? Meaning: Vitarka and vicāra, relative to joy and pleasure, are not mutual obstacles; thus one cannot state a distinction in joy based on the abandonment of vitarka and vicāra. The joy of the first dhyāna possesses the faculty of suffering, so superior benefit is not yet spoken of; the joy of the second dhyāna has already abandoned suffering, so its joy is pure and superior. If one were to state a distinction based on the presence or absence of vitarka and vicāra, the presence or absence of dharmas would be boundlessly varied—could its dhyāna be distinguished? Now, turning the objection around: the feelings of pleasure and joy should have no distinction, because the faculty of suffering, being the same [nature] as joy, pleasure, and so forth, is a mutual obstacle of feeling. If one does not take the abandonment of the faculty of suffering as the distinction between the joy of the first and second dhyānas, the feelings such as joy and pleasure of the first and second dhyānas should have no distinction, because suffering was already abandoned earlier at the time of the first dhyāna. This abandonment is of dauṣṭhulya; its seeds are not said to be abandoned, for an arhat still possesses them.