瑜伽師地論略纂 13.16

13.16

The treatise says: "Why is it that without the simultaneous operation of the various consciousnesses, the differences in activity would not be reasonable?" and so forth. This fifth [reason] also does not directly establish the eighth to refute others; rather, it is also on account of others' objections: by explaining the reason for the objection, it ultimately establishes the eighth. There are four kinds of activities: First, the activity of cognizing the receptacle, referring to the external receptacle world. Second, the activity of cognizing the āśraya, which is the internal five sense faculties, the five sense objects that support the faculties, the internal seeds, and so forth. These two are the activities of the eighth consciousness; hence the Śrīmālā-sūtra says: "One's own body and the requisites of life are all distinguished simultaneously and suddenly." Regarding this first activity, the eighth consciousness only takes them as objects because it transforms. Because it is produced from seeds, it is called "transforming"; because it is its object, it is called "taking it as an object." Its activity toward the internal āśraya possesses two meanings: first, taking it as an object because it transforms; second, taking it as an object because it appropriates it. The meaning of taking it as an object because it transforms is understood as above. Taking it as an object because it appropriates it is called "sentient category." Third, the activity of cognizing the self: this is the manas constantly clinging to the eighth as the self. Fourth, the activity of cognizing cognitive objects: that is, the remaining six consciousnesses each cognizing their respective objects. The meaning here is: when one consciousness of the fourth activity of objects arises, in moment after moment all four activities operate simultaneously; it is not that at all times—such as during mindless stupor and so forth, or upon entering the mindless absorption—all four are present, for only the first three are present. As the sūtra states: when one activity of objects arises, in moment after moment the four activities are invariably found. If there is no eighth consciousness, the various consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously; and these four activities cannot be possessed simultaneously and suddenly by a single consciousness. Would this not contradict both sūtras and reasoning? If the Hīnayāna believed in the Mahāyāna teaching and that these four activities exist within a single moment, such an objection could be raised. But since the other school neither believes in the sūtra nor concedes that four activities can be directly found within a single moment, how could an objection be raised in this way? Explanation: However, if one pursues them with reasoning, they must concede that these four activities exist, and by believing in the Great Teaching, it is established. To pursue them with reasoning, let us first formulate the Consciousness-Only syllogism: Entities such as visible forms are all not separate from consciousness (thesis); because they are cognized (reason); just like consciousness (example). Since entities such as visible forms are not separate from consciousness and appear from consciousness, when there is no consciousness, these cognitive objects should not exist. For instance, when entering the mindless absorption, or when taking exclusively nirvāṇa and so forth as objects, at that time, since visible forms and so forth lack a cognizing consciousness, the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should be severed. One should formulate a syllogism: At times such as entering the mindless absorption, the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should be severed (thesis); because consciousness is absent (reason); like the consciousness that has been extinguished (example). Again: When taking nirvāṇa and so forth as objects, the eye and other faculties must be severed (thesis); because the intrinsic nature of the consciousness that can cognize them does not exist (reason); just like the unproduced consciousness that takes the eye and so on as objects (example). This establishes that the first two kinds of activity exist. Next, the third activity is established. The two vehicles only say that there is an activity of cognizing the self; they do not say that cognizing the self constantly arises at all times. Now one should formulate a syllogism: When ordinary beings generate minds of wholesome and other states, they must possess the view of self (thesis)—this has qualifications, which should be considered; because they are ordinary beings (reason); just like at other states when the view of self arises (example). Once the meanings of these three kinds of activity are established, they must constantly exist at all times; when the activity of objects arises, all four must exist; otherwise, only the former three exist. The activity of cognizing cognitive objects is commonly accepted by the two vehicles; since the meanings of the former three activities are already established, the four activities can be found at one time. A general syllogism is formulated for the former three activities: When defilement-free minds and so forth appear before an ordinary being's body, the former three kinds of activity must be present (thesis); because it is the state of an ordinary being (reason); just like when the three kinds of cognition mutually accepted by both appear before them (example). On this basis, one knows that the four activities are understood, and by reasoning one then establishes the preceding Consciousness-Only syllogism. Furthermore, what the Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] established says: In ultimate truth, universally established visible form is not separate from visual consciousness (thesis); because it is accepted by oneself as included in the first three and not included in the eye (reason); just like visual consciousness (example). Although the former was admissible, its exclusion of fallacies was not exhaustive. The exclusion of fallacies here is as in the Yinming-chao. Although it has been refuted by reasoning above, how about contradiction of scriptural authority? As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha extensively establishes that the Mahāyāna is truly the Buddha's word, after believing the Buddha's word, there is the fault of contradicting scriptural authority; this fault does not exist prior to having faith. As stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. These are also the faults of contradicting direct perception, as in the text.