瑜伽師地論略纂 13

English (machine translation) 13

Language: English

"The First of the Bhūmis Associated with the Fivefold Sensory Consciousness and the Mental Bhūmi in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī": This single treatise as a whole has five divisions. The preceding fifty fascicles have already explained the substance and meaning of the seventeen bhūmis, which is the first Maulī Bhūmi; the four divisions below re-examine what precedes in meaning, and each begins with the word "saṃgraha" (compilation/gathering). This division is the first among the four lower divisions; because it gathers and resolves, it is called the "Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī." In some cases, text gathers text: what was present in the preceding division is now re-explained, making up one division. In other cases, text gathers meaning: although the preceding division spoke of the substance of dharmas, where their meaning was not fully clarified, it is now clarified here, making up one division. This is like saying the eye-element gathers the eye-element, where its own nature gathers itself. Furthermore, it differentiates the differences among the various bhūmis by means of the wisdom of decisive selection which is what is expressed; yet the meaning of decisive selection is equal, mutually gathering each other, which is gathering meaning by meaning. This one division of teaching is capable of expressing decisive selection, taking its name from what is expressed, and is therefore called "Saṃgraha." It can also be understood by analogy to the Abhidharmakośa being called the treasury of Abhidharma: because the ultimate meaning in the Abhidharmāvatāra/Abhidharma treatises is gathered into this, it obtains the name "treasury"; or because this relies on that, being produced from that, and is what is contained in that, it is therefore also called "treasury." Since that has two meanings, this is also like that: because the ultimate meaning in the preceding Maulī Bhūmi is gathered into this division and explained with decisive selection; or because this relies on that, being derived from the Maulī, and is the meaning contained in that gathered by this division, it is therefore called the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī. This also means text gathering text, hence it is called "gathering." This clarifies the meaning of "saṃgraha." Regarding "Viniścaya-bhāga": "viniścaya" means decisive determination, namely deciding others' doubts. It can also mean decisive comprehension, being able to comprehend on one's own. "Śaya" means selection, which can be called selecting the right from the wrong. Now, this clarifies what is right and refutes what is wrong, hence it is called decisive selection. Wrong views deny existence; although ultimate and conventional are determined, they do not select right from wrong. Doubt, though it selects right from wrong, is not decisive determination. Stating "decisive" sets aside hesitation and doubt; speaking of "selection" distinguishes from wrong views. The preceding Maulī Bhūmi directly set forth the characteristics of meaning; now it re-examines questions and answers to resolve doubts and select essentials, hence it is called decisive selection. The old rendering as "Treatise on the Treasury of Determination" is incorrect. Their word "niyama" might be translated as "determination," but since the Sanskrit says "viniścaya," which means decisive selection, how could it be called the "Treatise on the Treasury of Determination"? "Among" has the meaning of selection and retention: among the seventeen bhūmis, it sets aside the remaining fifteen bhūmis and retains and explains these two bhūmis; therefore it says "among." "Division" means scope, discrimination, or classification: after the Maulī Bhūmi and before the Saṃgrahaṇī-vyākhyā, it constitutes one scope. Regarding "the Bhūmis Associated with the Fivefold Sensory Consciousness and the Mental Bhūmi": this has been explained in the Maulī Bhūmi. Question: Why does it not say mental consciousness? Because the name would be ambiguous. This explains citta, manas, and vijñāna, and therefore does not insert vijñāna. Question: The meaning of association is not limited only to the five; why does the opening heading not say that the mental bhūmi has it? Answer: In reality both have it, but it is omitted for brevity. Furthermore, citing the first displays the latter, so the mental bhūmi does not mention association. Moreover, based on the superior dharma to explain that the five consciousnesses have no appropriation and so on, their objects being narrow and few, it cites association without mentioning faculties and dusts; the mental bhūmi additionally clarifies the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, and faculties, dusts, and so on are all clarified, so one cannot exclusively say association, hence it is omitted. Question: Since the preceding Maulī Bhūmi opened them into two bhūmis, why are they explained together here? Exposition: There are two intentions. First, the six consciousnesses have distinct bases, namely the six faculties; and a common basis, namely the mūlavijñāna. Now, this division first clarifies that the eighth consciousness is the common basis of the five and sixth consciousnesses, which is why they are explained together; the previous division was based on intrinsic nature, karmic function, and so forth, which is why they were opened separately as two bhūmis. Second, the distinct seed-bases of the six consciousnesses: although the Maulī Bhūmi explained the ālaya, it only explained the seed-basis, spoken according to the six consciousnesses, their functions being distinct; therefore they were opened separately as two bhūmis. Now, this division additionally explains the active functioning, and the eighth is the common basis of the six consciousnesses; since it is a common basis, they cannot be opened as two separate bhūmis to explain, and are therefore stated together. Following the eighth consciousness, they are thus united and explained as one. Furthermore, based solely on performing action, since the actions performed are distinct, they must be opened and explained separately. However, both rely on faculties and cognize dusts, their modes of activity being similar, which is why they are explained together. Furthermore, as the sixth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: "Question: By which consciousness is the ālayavijñāna gathered? Answer: It is gathered by the six consciousnesses." The preceding was a distinction according to seeds; now it is according to being gathered by the six consciousnesses, which is why they are explained together. The decisive selection of this bhūmi comprises seven fascicles in total; this is the very first, hence it says "the first." That is to say, the heading states: "The First of the Bhūmis Associated with the Fivefold Sensory Consciousness and the Mental Bhūmi in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī." Within this division there are three parts: first, concluding the preceding and introducing what follows to initiate the treatise; second, explaining the reason for the division's arising; third, the main explanation based on the bhūmis. The first and second are as in the text. Third, the main explanation: the five consciousnesses and mental bhūmi are explained together, and the three bhūmis of vitarka and vicāra are combined, which yields fourteen divisions. Within this third section there are two parts: first, selecting and distinctly explaining one bhūmi; second, the main explanation based on the bhūmis. This can be understood from the text. Now, in explaining this bhūmi, there are seven fascicles in total: the first three and a half fascicles explain the five skills (kauśalya), and the lower three and a half fascicles explain the six skills. The first has multiple sections; now, at the beginning of the treatise, it is provisionally combined into two: first, restating what was previously explained and raising three questions; second, the main answer according to the questions. Within the questions there are three parts: first, restating the preceding mūlavijñāna as that to be decisively selected; second, opening the three question topics as the rationale for the questions; third, directly posing the three questions to give rise to decisive selection.

13.3

The treatise states: "Question: Earlier it was stated that the support of the seeds is the ālayavijñāna..." This is the first part. That is to say, earlier in the Maulī Bhūmi, it was already explained that the eighth consciousness is the support of all seeds, because the seeds all exist in dependence upon it. As for "the various treatises of the Hīnayāna have not spoken of its existence, the causes and conditions of its existence, or its extensive discrimination," this is the second part, which opens the three lines of inquiry, serving as the motivation for the questions. Regarding "yet they have not spoken of its existence": although earlier in the Maulī Bhūmi the Mahāyāna accepts the eighth [consciousness], the Hīnayāna sūtras have not spoken of its existence. This is the first question. Question: As cited in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, a Hīnayāna sūtra states: "They delight in, enjoy, rejoice in, and cleave to the ālaya." Other sūtras also speak in this way. This wording already exists in Hīnayāna sūtras; why then say it has not existed? Explanation: There are two meanings. As for those for whom it does not exist, this refers to schools such as the Sarvāstivāda. Furthermore, although that sūtra speaks of its existence, its substance is merely the sixth [consciousness]; there is no distinct referent nor other distinct meanings, namely its causes and conditions, extensive discrimination, and so on. Now when it is said that it has not existed, it means that it does not exist as a distinct substance, not that its name did not exist.

13.4

Regarding "the causes and conditions of its existence": this is the reason why this eighth exists. Although it is stated to exist, one does not yet know the reason for its existence; once the reason for its existence is known, the eighth is established, and it functions concurrently with the mental factors of the present moment such as sensation (vedanā). "The extensive discrimination of its meaning" constitutes the third question.

13.5

From the treatise's statement "Why is it not taught?" onward, it is the third part, properly raising the three questions to prompt the decisive explanation. Regarding "Why is it not taught?": this merely asks the reason for its absence in the Hīnayāna; the rest of the text is clear.

13.6

The treatise states: "Answer: Because this establishment is... by the Lord Buddha..." below, which is the second part, the answers. In the answers, following the questions, there are three answers. This answers the first question. In answering the first question: first, the prose generally answers the deepest, most esoteric intention regarding the reason it was not taught; second, it cites a sūtra directly stating that it was not taught.

13.7

The verse of the treatise states: "The ālayavijñāna is profoundly deep and subtle." Below, it cites a sūtra to directly explain why it was withheld and not taught. This single line universally reveals its depth and subtlety; the second and fourth lines directly explain the reasons it was not taught; the third line directly states that it was not taught. Question: Why do the fourth and second lines explain the reasons it was not taught? It was not taught for two reasons: because it is deep and subtle, it was not taught—this is the second line, directly explaining the meaning of depth and subtlety; second, fearing that afflictions would arise, it was not taught for them—this is the fourth line. The earlier claim that both the seventh and eighth are called ādāna is incorrect; that is, the verse in the older translation of the treatise says: "The grasping consciousness is deep and subtle." Since it says "grasping," how could the seventh consciousness be capable of grasping and maintaining? The Sanskrit is kliṣṭamanas, which is translated here as "defiled manas." What is now called ādāna conveys the meaning of grasping and maintaining of the eighth. This single line universally presents the depth and subtlety of the eighth consciousness. Question: The older translation has "The grasping consciousness is deep and subtle"; why is it translated differently now, and what is the reason? Explanation: The term "grasping" is correct in its meaning, yet the distinction is different, and the meaning does not differentiate the same way. Why is that? The previous [version] said "deep and subtle," which only excluded ordinary beings and did not yet exclude the two vehicles, because the meanings relied upon by ordinary beings are all coarse and shallow. If one simply says "deep and subtle," this only excludes ordinary beings, but the teachings and meanings of the two vehicles are also deep and subtle, and this would be equal to them; therefore, "profoundly" is now used to distinguish it from the two vehicles. Because the sūtra teachings of the two vehicles are deep and subtle but not profoundly so, this distinction is fully complete, and hence it had to be different. Therefore it is said below: "Only the noble ones who have seen the truths are able to understand it; others cannot yet know it." Prior to the path of seeing, the sixth consciousness does not engage in the contemplation of mere-cognition and has not seen the eighth; only upon entering the path of seeing does one know it. Therefore, it is said to be "profoundly deep and subtle."

13.8

The treatise states: "All seeds are like a rushing torrent." This line presents the profound and subtle nature of the eighth consciousness as the reason it was not taught; that is, the first reason: because it is deep and subtle, it was not taught. When water has not been struck by the wind, it is called a calm flow; only when it meets the wind and waves do surging waves arise. This consciousness is also like this: when the wind of the active perfuming has not stirred, it flows calmly thought-moment after thought-moment; when the wind of the active perfuming stirs, it forms seeds and immediately resembles waves. Or, seeds producing actualities are like waves: the cause of one wave arrives and one wave is born; the causes of many waves arrive and many waves arise. Question: The earlier translation rendered it "seeds are like an enduring flow (gaṅgodaka/constant stream)"; how does it differ now? Although it said "seeds," one did not know what they were, and the wording was feared to be restrictive; now saying "all," the meaning is comprehensive. Furthermore, as for the expression "enduring flow," what meaning is this? If it means flowing like the Gaṅgā River, that is incorrect. If it means flowing constantly, how could this refer to the meaning of perfuming as a cause? Now saying "rushing torrent," the meaning lies precisely here.

13.9

The treatise states: "I do not disclose or expound it to ordinary beings and fools." This line is the third part, directly explaining that it was not taught. For the Hīnayāna, the name existed, but not the substance and meaning; this is "I do not expound it to fools," for only the name was disclosed to them. For those who are ordinary beings, even the name was not yet disclosed; that is "I do not disclose it to ordinary beings." If the name already existed for the Hīnayāna, it was merely not expounded for them; if even the name did not exist, it was not disclosed either. Question: Since it was neither disclosed nor expounded to the two vehicles and ordinary beings, why is it taught now so that ordinary beings may hear it? There are two kinds of people among those who hear it here. Among Śrāvakas there are two kinds: first, those whose faculties are not mature; second, those whose faculties are not yet mature. The former are of determinate nature; the latter are of indeterminate nature; hence it was not disclosed or expounded to them. If those of indeterminate nature have mature faculties, why would it not be expounded to them? Ordinary beings are also like this: first, those whose faculties are not mature, people devoid of gotra; second, those whose faculties are not yet mature; hence it was not taught to them. Now, regarding those who hear it, their faculties are all already mature, and therefore they can hear it. Now, when it says "I do not disclose or expound it to ordinary beings and fools," the meaning lies precisely here. Question: Previously it said "To the ordinary I do not speak"; how does this differ? Explanation: That statement was incorrect. It only excluded ordinary beings and not the two vehicles, so the present intention is not like that.

13.10

The treatise states: "Fearing that they would conceptually discriminate and grasp it as a self." This is the fourth line, explaining the second reason it was not taught: fearing the arising of afflictions. Ordinary beings have not yet severed the two graspings, and it is feared that grasping of the two selves would arise; although the two vehicles have eliminated the self of persons, the self of phenomena still remains, and it is feared that they would give rise to this. There are two kinds of self: first, conceptually discriminated; second, innate. The innate self arises spontaneously, whereas the conceptually discriminated self arises only dependent on teachings. Fearing that ordinary beings would, dependent on teachings, conceptually discriminate and the two selves would arise, and that the two vehicles would, dependent on a teacher, conceptually discriminate and the self of phenomena would arise, it was not taught. Question: Previously it said "Lest they grasp it as a self"; how does this differ? Explanation: That statement did not universally exclude the spontaneously existing self; its meaning is clear. Question: The eighth consciousness is continuous and appears as one and permanent; fearing the arising of the view of a person-self, ordinary beings do not hear it. The root consciousness has substance and characteristics that are real; considering the grasping of phenomena, the Mahāyāna would not teach it? Explanation: Although teaching the eighth consciousness gives rise to the grasping of phenomena, eliminating the grasping of phenomena must depend on mere-cognition. Since the eighth consciousness is the true causes and conditions of all phenomena, this is the root of mere-cognition; therefore, the root consciousness can be taught for those of great faculties. (There are further successive objections; reflect upon them). As for the meaning of this consciousness: when the Buddha teaches the essentials of the Dharma, he takes benefiting beings as the foundation; if teaching this Dharma causes them initially not to fall into saṃsāra and ultimately enables them to attain nirvāṇa, the Buddha teaches it. However, if ordinary beings hear this consciousness, they give rise to the conceptually discriminated two selves; if the two vehicles hear it, they give rise to the grasping of phenomena, and because they cannot perform the contemplation of mere-cognition, it is harmful in the beginning and hearing it is useless in the end. Question: Mere-cognition is not the sphere of the Hīnayāna, so the eighth is not taught to them; but manas is eliminated by the path of contemplation of the two vehicles, so it should be taught to the two vehicles. Explanation: The afflictions of manas obstruct the contemplation of persons, which can be eliminated by the path of contemplation of the two vehicles; the consciousness of person-grasping is subtle, and the two vehicles do not possess the knowledge of all aspects (sarvākārajñatā), which is why the seventh is not taught to them. Just as the path of seeing eliminates the fruition of the three miserable realms, yet because the eighth is subtle it is not taught; because the manas consciousness is subtle and they do not have all-aspect knowledge, it is also not taught to them. Question: Does the path of contemplation of the Hīnayāna take manas as an object? Answer: In non-conceptual wisdom contemplation, when severing afflictions, because it is a contemplation of specific characteristics, it contemplates the principle of manas; in subsequent attainment wisdom contemplation, because they do not have the knowledge of all aspects, they have no wisdom regarding the distinctions of phenomena, so there is also no need to take it as an object. Because of this principle, the Dharma Master stated that the eight consciousnesses are distinguished through nine gates, while Master Bei used seven gates to distinguish the eight consciousnesses, all as detailed in the earlier commentary.

13.11

Where the treatise states: "Furthermore, the summary verse (udāna) says:" and below, this answers the second question. Herein there are two [parts]: first, reciting the verse to comprehensively reveal the eight meanings; second, the prose that explains them in detail. The initial text is clear. Within the prose, first, it lists the eight designations, corresponding them to the verse; second, it sequentially explains the summary verse (udāna). How does this differ from the udāna of the Udāna-sūtra? Within the sequential distinct explanation, there are eight differences, constituting eight sections. Within the first section, there are two parts: first the question, next the explanation. The question is clear. In the answer, because the five reasons are different, it forms five sections. Regarding the import of the first reason: in the various Hīnayāna schools and the like, the mūlavijñāna is not posited, as when the Sautrāntikas hold that the six consciousnesses sustain the body. The present intention is not this; it holds that what is produced from prior karma can appropriate and sustain the body, whereas what is produced from present conditions cannot sustain it. This is based on the enduring principle, not on the six consciousnesses occasionally producing a maturational mind (vipāka-citta) in a single moment. The refutation is evident from the text. Here, a formal inference (prayoga) should be established: 'The sensory evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) such as the visual consciousness are not capable of sustaining what comes after (thesis), because they are generated from present conditions (reason), like the arising of sound and the like (example).' Furthermore, if someone were to rescue [their position] by shifting, saying: 'Among our visual and other [consciousnesses], there is also a maturational mind produced from prior karma that is able to sustain; why do you say that the sensory evolving consciousnesses such as the visual consciousness cannot sustain, thus refuting us completely?'—the inference under the third reason below refutes this. If so, the third reason below would not be different in its refutation, for here it has already rescued and refutation has been made. Since there is a refutation later, one clearly knows that here it refutes solely based on the enduring principle and the logic of continuity, as explained previously. This is the first reason. 'Reason' (hetu) means cause or justification, that is, the hetu in thesis, reason, and so forth; it takes its name from this, hence it is said 'five reasons.' Having comprehensively refuted the six consciousnesses above, the reasons below singly cite and refute them in detail. First, the mind of wholesome and unwholesome natures is cited and refuted; hence this is the second reason. Furthermore, that the six collections of consciousness are observed to have wholesome, unwholesome, and other natures is the second reason: that is, wishing to refute this, one first excludes other phenomena that lack appropriation to serve as a concordant example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) capable of excluding those wholesome, unwholesome, and other [minds]. Supposing someone explains that the substance of nirvāṇa can sustain the defiled support, an inference is now formulated: 'The two kinds of nirvāṇa are definitively not appropriated (thesis), because they are unconditioned (reason), just like empty space (example).' This point having been established, one turns to refute the Path-truth. Supposing someone separately posits that the Path-truth can sustain, one should formulate the inference: 'An uncontaminated wholesome mind cannot appropriate the contaminated sense-faculties (thesis).' This phrasing is used to exclude the Great Mirror Wisdom, which can sustain its own body; if one merely spoke generally of an uncontaminated wholesome mind being unable to appropriate, there would be the fallacy of indeterminacy (anaikāntika). For would it be like nirvāṇa, which, being uncontaminated, an uncontaminated wholesome mind cannot appropriate; or would it be like the Great Mirror Wisdom, which, being uncontaminated, is able to appropriate? To avoid this fallacy, this statement is made: 'because it is uncontaminated' is the reason; 'just like nirvāṇa' is the example. This point having been established, one must turn to refute the contaminated wholesome mind. One should establish the inference: 'The contaminated wholesome mind must not appropriate the contaminated sense-faculties (thesis), because it is wholesome (reason), like uncontaminated wholesomeness (example).' Wholesomeness having been refuted, the unwholesome must be eliminated. One separately establishes the inference: 'All unwholesome minds must be non-appropriating (thesis), because they have a determinate nature (reason), like those wholesome categories (example).' Although the determinate nature has been refuted, among the indeterminate there are four kinds of indeterminate: putting aside vipāka which belongs to the third reason, the remaining three such as the transformational [indeterminate] must now be refuted separately. The inference states: 'The three kinds of indeterminate minds must be non-appropriating (thesis), because they are intermittent (reason), like sound and lightning (example)'; or the reason and example may state: 'because they are not of the nature of vipāka, like wholesome and evil minds.' This reason is also sound; the previous reason incurred the fallacy of indeterminacy due to minds produced from vipāka (vipākaja). Now the treatise says: 'Although it speaks of wholesome and unwholesome natures, it does not mention the indeterminate'; yet since the word 'etc.' is present, it is clear that there is a separate refutation. Although it again cites the indeterminate retributive mind among the six consciousnesses, some here hold that it performs the sustaining; that view must be refuted, and thus the third reason excludes this assertion.

13.12

Where the treatise states: 'Furthermore, a category subsumed under the non-obscured indeterminate maturation (vipāka) of the six collections of consciousness is not found: this is the third reason,' this means that although there is vipāka within the six consciousnesses, it arises only in a single moment. Alternatively, among various minds, that which is produced from vipāka as a uniform category throughout before and after is definitively not found; only that which is of a uniform category of vipāka before and after without alteration can perform the sustaining, and that is true vipāka. Now, the maturational mind within the six consciousnesses arises only for a single moment and is not uninterrupted; since it is not of a uniform category, it is vipākaja (produced from maturation) and cannot be designated as capable of appropriating. One should establish the inference: 'The six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses are not true vipākaja (thesis), because they are intermittent (reason), like wind, sound, and the like (example).' This inference not being clear, one should formulate another separately: 'Since a uniform category of non-obscured indeterminate vipāka cannot be found among the six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses, they cannot sustain the body (thesis), because they possess the meaning of being intermittent (reason); the example and so forth are the same as before.' Or one should establish the inference: 'The mind produced from vipāka among the six sensory evolving consciousnesses cannot appropriate (thesis), because it is intermittent (reason), like wind, sound, and the like (example).' The treatise saying 'a category of vipāka is not found' is precisely this statement of the reason 'because of being intermittent.' In response to their pressing objection: 'If the maturational mind within the six consciousnesses is vipākaja, not true vipāka, and cannot sustain, why does your school state that neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is born from vipāka? Since it is born from vipāka, it should not be appropriated'—the exposition says: vipākaja is of two kinds: first, born from vipāka seeds; second, born from a continuity of vipāka. That which pertains to the sixth consciousness and so forth is born from vipāka seeds and is called nominal vipāka. Like the visual sense-faculty, it is not true vipāka. The eighth consciousness is born from a continuity of vipāka, because the preceding moment and the succeeding moment are both vipāka. Now, that whose preceding moment and succeeding moment are both vipāka can sustain, not the six kinds of consciousness; hence there is a difference. Relying on this text, one master says: 'The desire realm possesses a sixth maturational mind.' Another master says: 'This is merely refuting an assertion.' Furthermore, regarding another external assertion: 'In your school the seventh consciousness should be able to sustain the body; what need is there for an eighth?,' one should establish the inference: 'Our seventh consciousness cannot sustain the body (thesis), because it is not of the nature of vipāka (reason), like the six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses and so forth (example).' Furthermore, another external assertion states: 'It is not that a single consciousness sustains all sense-faculties; each individual consciousness can sustain its own sense-faculty.' This should now be refuted, so the fourth reason says: 'Furthermore, the six collections of consciousness operate dependent on separate supports... up to... is the fourth reason.' Herein there are two: first, directly refuting according to the assertion; second, granting the assertion and pressing the objection. That is to say: when the visual consciousness arises, the remaining sense-faculties such as the auditory that lack consciousness would rot and decay (thesis), because there is no consciousness capable of sustaining them (reason)—for according to the Hīnayāna school, the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously—like a dead corpse (example). 'Even if appropriation were conceded, this too would be illogical': this cites the assertion and presses the objection. That is, the external opponent asserts that when visual consciousness arises, it does not merely sustain the visual sense-faculty alone, but can also sustain the other sense-faculties such as the auditory. Now, provisionally conceding this, it is said: 'Even if appropriation were conceded, this too would be illogical, because consciousness is distant and separate.' We now establish the inference: 'The visual consciousness definitively cannot sustain the auditory and other sense-faculties (thesis), because consciousness is distant and separate (reason), like another person's eight consciousnesses being unable to sustain [one's own] bodily sense-faculty and the like, or like a dead corpse and so forth.' Furthermore, an inference may be jointly established: 'The sense-faculties lacking consciousness should be without appropriation (thesis), because consciousness is distant and separate (reason), like a dead corpse (example).' Having already pressed the objection that they lack appropriation, they should consequently be subsumed under non-sentient things. The inference is established: 'The sense-faculties lacking consciousness should be subsumed under non-sentient things (thesis), because they lack appropriation (reason), like a dead corpse (example);' furthermore: 'When the visual and other consciousnesses arise, they should not mutually appropriate one another (thesis), because their supports are distinct (reason), just as when visual consciousness arises it does not rely on the other sense-faculties (example).' This inference has a fallacy: the fallacy of the non-establishment of what is to be proved in the concordant example (sādhyāprasiddha). As in the previous assertion that the body-consciousness sustains its own sense-faculty, if so, it would incur the fallacy of repeated appropriation (sakṛd-upādāna); hence the fifth reason should incur the fallacy of repeated appropriation. Its text is intelligible. Herein there is an inference: 'Since there would be appropriation and non-appropriation, during the time of non-appropriation it should not be subsumed under sentient beings (thesis), because of the absence of appropriation (reason), like a dead corpse and so forth (example).' It may also be said: 'The six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses should be non-appropriating (thesis), because the minds of the three natures are intermittent and not of a uniform category (reason), like sound, flame, and the like (example).' This also has a fallacy. By the above five reasons, since the sustaining by the six consciousnesses is illogical, one accepts that the eighth consciousness can sustain the body. The concluding text is clear.

13.13

The treatise says: "Why is it that without the ālayavijñāna, [it would not be reasonable that] consciousnesses do not operate simultaneously..." This second reason does not directly establish the eighth consciousness; rather, relying on external objections, it then refutes Hīnayāna attachments and establishes its own school. Here there are two parts: first, the question; second, the direct explanation. "Why is it that without..." and so forth is the first. If one interprets this in accordance with what comes before and after, this text seems slightly contradictory. Why is this? For example, in the preceding text: if the eighth exists, an āśraya that is upātta can be found; if the eighth does not exist, an āśraya that is upātta cannot be found. Now, if one follows that interpretation, one should say: if the eighth exists, initial arising can be found; if the eighth does not exist, initial arising cannot be found—then such a statement would arise. But in general one should say: in the Hīnayāna there is no eighth [consciousness], so the various consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously. The Mahāyāna doctrine, however, states that when the conditions of sense faculties and cognitive objects are complete, all five consciousnesses arise; on what condition would only one consciousness arise initially? If the eighth consciousness exists, one accepts that the various consciousnesses arise simultaneously; therefore, if the eighth exists, there is no initial arising, and this is reasonable. Since you [in Hīnayāna] have no eighth consciousness, yet hold that there is an initial arising, this is not reasonable. Now the Hīnayānist asks: "Why is it that without the eighth consciousness, initial arising would not be reasonable?" One should simply follow the text directly; one must not construct interpretations modeled on what comes before or after. This concludes the question. In the direct explanation there are two parts: first, positing a hypothetical external objection; second, providing the direct explanation based on the objection. Because the separate arising of the various consciousnesses in Hīnayāna is readily understood, its text is clear. In the reply there are three parts: first, a general reply followed by a challenge, explaining the reason. The first [part] and the challenge are clear. In the third, the direct explanation, it says: "It is possible for two consciousnesses to operate simultaneously," meaning that in the Mahāyāna the various consciousnesses also have occasions of arising separately. The rest of the text is readily understood. Here one should formulate a syllogism: At the time when the visual consciousness arises with its three conditions complete, the auditory and other consciousnesses whose three conditions are also complete should also appear and arise (thesis); because their three conditions are complete (reason); just like the visual consciousness that appears and arises (example). In your prior objection, fearing that consciousnesses would arise simultaneously, you did not accept that the eighth exists; now, having established that the various consciousnesses arise simultaneously, you should accept that the eighth exists. This explains and establishes it by turning [the objection] around. Regarding the third reason in the treatise, the opening question and so forth are as previously analyzed in the text. This reason is also not a reason directly establishing the eighth; when external opponents raised an objection in explaining the doctrine, the opponents turned back with a question, and through resolving their objection, [the treatise] turns back to establish the mūlavijñāna. That is, the external Hīnayāna posits that consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, and when the mental consciousness takes visible forms as its object, it does so after the visual consciousness. Now we refute this: this consciousness taking past visible form objects as cognitive objects should not be clear. One should formulate a syllogism: After visual consciousness and the like, the scattered mental consciousness taking as its object the immediately past visible forms introduced by the eye and so on should not be clear (thesis). This phrasing excludes the meditative mind and the solitary mental consciousness that takes distant objects as cognitive objects at present; here it refutes specifically the immediately past mental consciousness, excluding the distant mental consciousness. The reason is: Because it is included in an unstable state and takes the past as its object. This phrasing also excludes the meditative mind. Like the scattered mind taking as its object things from a hundred thousand kalpas in the past—this also excludes the meditative mind. Furthermore, because it is unclear, it should not be clear; the thesis, reason, and example are as before. The meaning of this text is as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā-chao.

13.14

The treatise says: "Why is it that without the ālayavijñāna, possessing the nature of seeds... would not be reasonable?" From here on, one cannot analyze the passages separately. Since the Hīnayāna posits that the six evolving consciousnesses can maintain seeds, now, since the various mental states are distinct and different, how could they maintain seeds? One should formulate a syllogism: The six evolving consciousnesses cannot maintain seeds (thesis); the reason is: Because they are mutually different; just like the sounds produced by a drum and the like. Again, one says: The six evolving consciousnesses should not maintain seeds; because they are interrupted by the three natures; like bodily and vocal karma. The rest of the text is readily understood.

13.15

The treatise says: "Furthermore, those consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time, so they should not continue and stream forth for a long time..." and so forth. Furthermore, if you hold that the six consciousnesses maintain seeds, when one enters the mindless absorption, the six evolving consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time; since there is no consciousness that can maintain them, the seeds that are maintained should not be able to continue and stream forth for a long time without arising and ceasing. One should formulate a syllogism: Upon entering the mindless absorption, seeds should be lost (thesis); because there is no consciousness to maintain them (reason); just like entering the realm of parinirvāṇa without remainder (example). Again, one should formulate a syllogism: When entering the absorption of cessation, the six consciousnesses are interrupted for a long time; this means there is no consciousness maintaining the seeds. If the seeds are already lost, there should not be a continuation upon emerging from the absorption and once again being able to stream forth for a long time; from what seeds would it arise? Furthermore, by what would this be a consciousness maintaining the body? Under the approach of refuting the lack of a consciousness maintaining seeds, this also refutes that when the six consciousnesses are interrupted upon entering the absorption of cessation, the body should not be able to stream forth for a long time. Because it lacks a consciousness maintaining it for a long time, it should decompose. "Continuation" refers to the body. If so, how does this differ from the refutation under the seventh below? Since that is so, taking the first and second is preferable.

13.16

The treatise says: "Why is it that without the simultaneous operation of the various consciousnesses, the differences in activity would not be reasonable?" and so forth. This fifth [reason] also does not directly establish the eighth to refute others; rather, it is also on account of others' objections: by explaining the reason for the objection, it ultimately establishes the eighth. There are four kinds of activities: First, the activity of cognizing the receptacle, referring to the external receptacle world. Second, the activity of cognizing the āśraya, which is the internal five sense faculties, the five sense objects that support the faculties, the internal seeds, and so forth. These two are the activities of the eighth consciousness; hence the Śrīmālā-sūtra says: "One's own body and the requisites of life are all distinguished simultaneously and suddenly." Regarding this first activity, the eighth consciousness only takes them as objects because it transforms. Because it is produced from seeds, it is called "transforming"; because it is its object, it is called "taking it as an object." Its activity toward the internal āśraya possesses two meanings: first, taking it as an object because it transforms; second, taking it as an object because it appropriates it. The meaning of taking it as an object because it transforms is understood as above. Taking it as an object because it appropriates it is called "sentient category." Third, the activity of cognizing the self: this is the manas constantly clinging to the eighth as the self. Fourth, the activity of cognizing cognitive objects: that is, the remaining six consciousnesses each cognizing their respective objects. The meaning here is: when one consciousness of the fourth activity of objects arises, in moment after moment all four activities operate simultaneously; it is not that at all times—such as during mindless stupor and so forth, or upon entering the mindless absorption—all four are present, for only the first three are present. As the sūtra states: when one activity of objects arises, in moment after moment the four activities are invariably found. If there is no eighth consciousness, the various consciousnesses cannot arise simultaneously; and these four activities cannot be possessed simultaneously and suddenly by a single consciousness. Would this not contradict both sūtras and reasoning? If the Hīnayāna believed in the Mahāyāna teaching and that these four activities exist within a single moment, such an objection could be raised. But since the other school neither believes in the sūtra nor concedes that four activities can be directly found within a single moment, how could an objection be raised in this way? Explanation: However, if one pursues them with reasoning, they must concede that these four activities exist, and by believing in the Great Teaching, it is established. To pursue them with reasoning, let us first formulate the Consciousness-Only syllogism: Entities such as visible forms are all not separate from consciousness (thesis); because they are cognized (reason); just like consciousness (example). Since entities such as visible forms are not separate from consciousness and appear from consciousness, when there is no consciousness, these cognitive objects should not exist. For instance, when entering the mindless absorption, or when taking exclusively nirvāṇa and so forth as objects, at that time, since visible forms and so forth lack a cognizing consciousness, the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should be severed. One should formulate a syllogism: At times such as entering the mindless absorption, the eye and other faculties as well as the external receptacle and so forth should be severed (thesis); because consciousness is absent (reason); like the consciousness that has been extinguished (example). Again: When taking nirvāṇa and so forth as objects, the eye and other faculties must be severed (thesis); because the intrinsic nature of the consciousness that can cognize them does not exist (reason); just like the unproduced consciousness that takes the eye and so on as objects (example). This establishes that the first two kinds of activity exist. Next, the third activity is established. The two vehicles only say that there is an activity of cognizing the self; they do not say that cognizing the self constantly arises at all times. Now one should formulate a syllogism: When ordinary beings generate minds of wholesome and other states, they must possess the view of self (thesis)—this has qualifications, which should be considered; because they are ordinary beings (reason); just like at other states when the view of self arises (example). Once the meanings of these three kinds of activity are established, they must constantly exist at all times; when the activity of objects arises, all four must exist; otherwise, only the former three exist. The activity of cognizing cognitive objects is commonly accepted by the two vehicles; since the meanings of the former three activities are already established, the four activities can be found at one time. A general syllogism is formulated for the former three activities: When defilement-free minds and so forth appear before an ordinary being's body, the former three kinds of activity must be present (thesis); because it is the state of an ordinary being (reason); just like when the three kinds of cognition mutually accepted by both appear before them (example). On this basis, one knows that the four activities are understood, and by reasoning one then establishes the preceding Consciousness-Only syllogism. Furthermore, what the Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] established says: In ultimate truth, universally established visible form is not separate from visual consciousness (thesis); because it is accepted by oneself as included in the first three and not included in the eye (reason); just like visual consciousness (example). Although the former was admissible, its exclusion of fallacies was not exhaustive. The exclusion of fallacies here is as in the Yinming-chao. Although it has been refuted by reasoning above, how about contradiction of scriptural authority? As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha extensively establishes that the Mahāyāna is truly the Buddha's word, after believing the Buddha's word, there is the fault of contradicting scriptural authority; this fault does not exist prior to having faith. As stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. These are also the faults of contradicting direct perception, as in the text.

13.17

When the treatise explains the sixth, bodily feeling, saying "proper reflection... up to, there must certainly be an ālayavijñāna," here it directly discusses that the eighth exists. That is to say, when entering absorption, the five consciousnesses do not operate; if one suddenly hears a sound and it touches [the ear], one immediately generates an experience, as when Śāriputra heard the roaring sound. Since there is no auditory consciousness arising to experience the remaining sound, it is the eighth consciousness that generates the experience; if the eighth does not exist, how could this be accomplished? If the Hīnayāna does not concede that when an object arrives during absorption feeling arises, one should formulate a syllogism: In the state of entering absorption, when an object touches the body, feeling should arise; because it is a state possessing mental consciousness where an object touches the body; like a state of scattered mind. If they do not concede this, one turns back to refute other states, saying: In a state of scattered mind, when an object touches the body, feeling should not arise (thesis); because an object touches the body (reason); like entering the state of absorption (example). Here there are further objections and explanations, which need not be elaborated. The Dharma Master says: Bodily feeling is pliant calmness; touching the body, feeling arises.

13.18

The treatise says: "Proper reflection, improper reflection"—this is clear. "Or without reflection"—this is the mindless absorption. "Or possessing vitarka and vicāra"—this is the absorption with mind. "In absorption, not in absorption"—this is clear. The meaning here is that during these six states, the cognitive objects are not of one kind and the experiences are not single; since minds do not arise simultaneously, the mental consciousness takes any one of these objects as its cognitive object. Or if a sound arrives, they claim [consciousnesses] do not arise simultaneously; if there is no eighth, what experience would arise? If there is an eighth, the eighth experiences it. Even though one enters absorption and so on and lacks the remaining five consciousnesses, the experience of awareness still arises. If there is no eighth, this should not arise. This is the meaning here.

13.19

Regarding the treatise's statement, "abiding in the mindless absorption is unreasonable, [...] because [consciousness] does not depart from the body," there are two meanings: first, it contradicts inference; second, it contradicts sacred teaching. Among the various schools, some accept two types of mental consciousness: first, coarse; second, subtle. The subtle one is present in this absorption. Here, the refutation addresses those such as the Sarvāstivādins who do not posit a subtle consciousness. One should formulate an inference: "Entering the mindless absorption should be like abandoning life (thesis), because consciousness has departed from the body (reason), just like a corpse (example)." Furthermore, it contradicts sacred teaching, as is clear from the text. The Sarvāstivādins defend themselves: "The six consciousnesses do not depart from the body because the acquisition (prāpti) of consciousness does not depart." If it is called 'consciousness not departing from the body' on such grounds, then because the acquisition of consciousness does not depart from the body, it should also not be called 'the absorption of the cessation of mind'. One should formulate an inference: "The absorption of cessation that you posit should not be an absorption of cessation (thesis), because the acquisition of consciousness does not depart (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." Again: "Your mindless absorption must possess mind (thesis), because it has the acquisition of consciousness (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." This is not the Sarvāstivādin's correct defense. Their correct defense states: "Although there is no consciousness upon entering the absorption, when emerging from the absorption later, its consciousness will definitely arise; hence it is said that consciousness does not depart from the body." One should formulate an inference to refute them: "The absorption of cessation that you posit must possess mind (thesis), because it is said that consciousness does not depart from the body (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." They construct a counter-inference showing a conclusive contradiction (viruddha-avyabhicārin): "The absorption of cessation and the like are definitely devoid of mind, because of tranquility, just like nirvāṇa." Now, one should point out the fallacy of contradicting the essential nature of the subject (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) against them, rendering their argument unestablished: "The absorption of cessation that you posit should not be an absorption (thesis), because of tranquility (reason), just like nirvāṇa (example)." If they say that because the life-faculty and so forth remain, it is called 'undecayed', one should refute the life-faculty by saying: first refute the four characteristics [of conditioned phenomena]; the four characteristics are definitely not substantially existent, because they are not known through the two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), just like a rabbit's horns and the like. Using this as an example, one refutes their life-faculty. The above refutation of the Sarvāstivādins is complete. If someone posits that it has mind, one should refute them with the inference: "The sixth mental consciousness should be absent in the states of the absorption without conceptualization and the like (thesis), because, within this state, it is subsumed under any one of the six consciousnesses (reason), just like the five consciousnesses and so forth (example)." Furthermore, if there is consciousness, there is definitely contact (sparśa); if there is contact, there must be sensation (vedanā) and conceptualization (saṃjñā). How then can one say that this absorption possesses consciousness? Since this inference is established, the lesser vehicle's clinging is completely refuted; it contradicts both sūtras and reason, and therefore the eighth consciousness is established. Moreover, an inference such as whether the formless realm should have the absorption of cessation should be considered.

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瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese