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瑜伽師地論略纂 13.97

English (machine translation) 13.97

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English

13.97

The treatise says, "Among the distinctions of the aggregate of perception, concerning the distinction of inversions: namely, the foolish who have no understanding... up to: this is called the inversion of perception," and so forth. Ignorance, as stated in fascicle eight, is the root of these inversions. Herein, judging by perception, it is the mental factor of perception; yet it generally refers to the inversions arisen by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, all being generally named inversions of perception, among which they are divided against inversions of mind and inversions of view. If non-Buddhists who have renounced the household life give rise to the three views in their entirety and a small portion of one view associated with perception, these are inversions of view and also inversions of perception. If householders give rise to craving toward objects associated with inverted perception, these are also inversions of perception and also inversions of mind. However, fascicle eight in the first case says: craving is of two kinds, namely, the inversion of the impure as pure and the inversion of suffering as pleasure. But because non-Buddhists uphold false precepts and cling to false views as clinging to precepts and views, seeking rebirth in heaven and so forth, and this craving is predominant, these two are exclusively named the mind inversion of craving; other attachments such as the eternalist view are common to all sentient beings, and because their meaning is hidden, they are not mentioned. If according to this text, when external ordinary beings give rise to the inversions of permanence and self, these are also inversions of mind, then inversions of mind are commonly arisen by both classes of householders and renunciants. But now, in this text, householders giving rise to inverted perceptions toward sense objects of desire is named inversion of mind, because craving is predominant; for non-Buddhists, it is named inversion of view, because the activity of views is predominant. Yet an inversion of view cannot be said to be arisen by the class of householders. Thus, this differs from the text of fascicle eight. Another interpretation: the class of householders, according to this text, genuinely gives rise to inversions of mind regarding permanence and self; however, non-Buddhists and the like also grasp at permanence and self, because such grasping is shared. The preceding text only stated pleasure and purity as inversions of mind arisen by the class of householders, while the view inversions of permanence and self are commonly arisen by both classes of householders and renunciants; hence it did not separately mention pleasure and purity. For householders, the sense of craving is predominant, so it is spoken of as inversion of mind; this agrees with this text where householders give rise to inversions of mind and renunciants give rise to inversions of view. The former interpretation is superior. However, reasoned in principle, it is acceptable that what householders do does not give rise to inversions of view, and renunciants do not give rise to inversions of craving, because false craving for the two attachments to precepts and views is the cause for birth in heaven and liberation. If one makes this interpretation, inversions of perception are eradicated by both seeing and cultivation, because they serve as the support for both inversions of mind and views; inversions of view are eradicated only by the path of seeing, because they are arisen by renunciant non-Buddhists. Therefore, if inversions of mind are commonly arisen by the classes of householders and renunciants, they are eradicated by both seeing and cultivation. Alternatively, they are eradicated only by seeing, because they arise through conceptual discrimination.

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