瑜伽師地論略纂 14

English (machine translation) 14

Language: English

In the treatise's explanation of the abiding of consciousness: "In the desire realm, it is treated solely in terms of external dust (sense objects)" because, due to habitual propensities (vāsanā), there is much craving for sense objects. Furthermore, although the internal body also gives rise to love and abides in it, because births are from wombs, eggs, and so forth, it is not an abiding of superior strength. Here it is discussed according to what is predominant. The form realm is spoken of solely in terms of the internal body, because it is of apparitional birth and without habitual propensities; the formless realm only discusses abiding in the name born of karma, not discussing the form transformed by meditative concentration. This is the meaning of this text. Now, what is spoken of as "grasping" refers to cognitive grasping, not upātta (appropriative attachment), because name is not what is upātta. Among the defilements: first, the consciousness defiled by enjoying sense realms; second, the consciousness defiled by birth and so forth. It is now explained: the first is defilement by affliction, and the latter is defilement by birth. Alternatively, the latter is defilement by karma; because of defilement by karma, future birth and so forth become defiled.

14.3

Regarding the intent of establishing the four stations of consciousness in the treatise's explanation: it is done in order to refute non-Buddhists. Why is this? All non-Buddhists grasp at the four aggregates, thinking, "The self abides within them." Now it is stated that consciousness abides within them, not that a self abides. "Essential nature": that is, the four aggregates serve as the essential nature. Question: Why is the consciousness aggregate not taken as the essential nature? Explanation: As the text below states, there is no separate cognitive grasping of consciousness that gives rise to craving and attachment as there is with form, feeling, and so forth; hence consciousness is not spoken of as a station of consciousness, because it is not predominant like the other four aggregates, upon which one distinctly gives rise to craving and so forth. Furthermore, the Buddha taught that the nature of mind is originally luminous and pure, unlike craving and so forth, whose nature as defiled covers it; hence it is not below the stations of consciousness. This is the first interpretation, an appositional compound with a numeral (digu) among the six compound types, or named by taking the meaning from the number, and so forth. Question: Are these stations of consciousness internal sentient beings, or should they also apply to insentient things? Explanation: They also apply to insentient things. Why is this? As in the Hīnayāna treatises, five meanings are used to establish a station of consciousness: namely, a station of consciousness is established by the meanings of support (āśraya), engagement (ākāra), objective condition (ālambana), association (saṃprayoga), and portion (aṃśa). Now, this is not the case here; that which is the objective condition in which consciousness abides is called a station of consciousness, as in the treatise immediately below. Furthermore, a Hīnayāna treatise says: some say that because it is not multiple, it is a station of consciousness—this is not so, because a station of consciousness is established by the meanings of engagement, objective condition, association, and portion. Here the characters should be stripped away; it should say "because it is only sentient beings." This is not so; among the five meanings, it is not necessary that all five must be complete; having one among the five meanings is sufficient. These Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna texts differ and cannot serve as proof. For example, in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, in the Chapter on the World, the four stations of consciousness are explained within the world of sentient beings, and many Dharma masters establish them solely as the category of sentient beings. This is not so; who said it is thus? How could its explanation here mean it is exclusively sentient beings? Therefore, we know that establishing the stations of consciousness in terms of the objective condition extends to both sentient and insentient beings. Question: Is the undefiled consciousness aggregate established as a station of consciousness or not? Explanation: It is not so. As the text below says, undefiled consciousness is not, because that which can benefit consciousness and give rise to craving and aversion is a station of consciousness. Now, this undefiled [consciousness] ruptures cyclic existence; where consciousness is stilled does not serve as a station of consciousness. It is present throughout the three realms, as the text below says, because it can give rise to craving.

14.4

The treatise says, "As the sūtra states: there are four supports of clinging taken as objective conditions, causing consciousness to abide," and so forth. As the eighteenth fascicle of the *Prakaraṇāryavācā* says: abiding in accord with form refers to grasping the support; abiding by taking form as an objective condition refers to apprehending the objective realm; abiding depending on form refers to dauṣṭhulya. This corresponds to these supports of clinging; namely, there are four abidings, from form up to karmic formations. The four are the fruits of consciousness, because they are the objective realms of consciousness. "Supports of clinging" refers to the clinging that arises dependently based on these; the essence of clinging is the afflictions themselves. Therefore, the text below explains the stations of consciousness and their causes and conditions: the essence of the stations consists of the four, namely form and the rest, and the causes and conditions are the craving and so forth that arise. "Whether they are matters of afflictions, or belong to those afflictions": matters of afflictions refers to the active manifestations of defilements; belonging to those afflictions refers to their seeds. What is called "causes and conditions" refers to the causes and conditions for consciousness to abide in form and the like. "Causes and conditions" speaks of the reason: why it abides within the four such as form, is because these supports of clinging serve as the reason; therefore they are named causes and conditions. Various masters say: because the four supports of clinging are used as relying conditions for objective support, they cause consciousness to abide in form and the like, up to the extensive explanation. Now I say: the four are the fruits of consciousness, and based on them clinging arises; because these are used as relying conditions for objective support, they cause consciousness to abide in form and the like. Two meanings are contained in "objective condition": if it has the meaning of a relying condition for an objective support, it extends to both internal and external; if it has the meaning of an objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya), it also applies. The meaning of the text does not necessarily require the condition of a relying support; that was the intent of the first explanation above. If this explanation is adopted, the intent not only clarifies the stations of consciousness, but also completely explains the causes and conditions. The above is the first passage of text, explaining the stations and the causes and conditions.

14.5

The treatise says, "...up to: I ultimately do not say that this consciousness goes to the east, up to the four intermediate directions." The "up to" encompasses the intermediate [phrases]. The explanations below of quiescence, having no abode, non-arising, doing nothing, contentment, abiding, and so forth, are what is included in this "up to". Dharma Master Tai says: this refutes the words of non-Buddhists. Various non-Buddhists conceptualize that after death the self goes to the east, west, and so forth; this is now refuted. As the treatise below says, these are the two extremities of the stations of consciousness and of causes and conditions: in the form realm there is coming and going, while consciousness in the formless realm has no coming and going; hence it does not speak of going to the four intermediate directions. Thus we know these are the two extremities. Because the stations of consciousness do not depart from the three realms, the meaning of abiding is spoken of; exhausting them completely, they are therefore called extremities. This completes the second passage of text, explaining the two extremities.

14.6

The treatise says, "Yet I only say that in the present life one is certainly freed from craving and shadows, being extinguished, tranquil, cooled, and pure." This third passage explains the cessation and quiescence of the two kinds—the stations of consciousness and causes and conditions. Explanation: because his disciples practice and cultivate extensively, in the present life they can sever the four bodily ties (kāyagantha). The four bodily ties exist solely in the mental domain, because they are produced by conceptual discrimination; at the time of the path of seeing, these four are severed. "Craving" refers to seeking after a future body and so forth. "Shadow" refers to feeling; it is called so because it is the shadow of the tree of consciousness. These feelings and so forth will certainly be extinguished, not giving rise to craving and so forth; as the text below says, the defiled five aggregates will no longer continue in succession. "Tranquil" refers to the undefiled state of those in training (śaikṣa). "Cooled" refers to the undefiled state of those beyond training (aśaikṣa). "Pure" refers to the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder. The above has collectively cited the sūtra text, and below it will be explained in sequence. The treatise master himself divided the preceding text into three parts, which can be understood from the text of the treatise in sequence.

14.7

The treatise says: 'In this context, whether it is the bases of the defilements, or what belongs to those defilements, this is termed "grasping the support" (āśraya-upādāna).' Here, it first explains the cause and condition, and afterwards explains the abodes; that is, it brings out the essential nature of grasping the support. 'Bases' refers to active manifestations; 'belongs to' refers to seeds—both constitute the essence of grasping. If according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, grasping takes only sensual craving as its essence; therefore, when it is said to be predominant, this means that here, according to the ultimate meaning, it applies generally to all defilements. Furthermore, 'supports' refers to the four objects, whether with or without defilement. It should be understood that in this context they are also termed 'cognitive objects' (ālambana), because they have the nature of being cognitive objects and because they have something that is manifested; both active manifestations and seeds are called cognitive objects. Seeds strictly serve as conditions for other [dharmas], while active manifestations are able to have cognitive objects; hence they are termed cognitive objects. 'Nature of being a cognitive object' strictly refers to the seeds. 'Having a cognitive object' refers precisely to active manifestations. Because all the defilements and so forth are called the entities clung to (parikalpita-vastu), with greed as the root, the arising of all defilements is termed 'tending toward the entities clung to.' The Great Master says: greed and so forth cause consciousness to tend toward the four cognitive objects; the four objects are termed 'what is clung to,' and they cause the momentum of karma to take greed as the condition for defilement, thereby causing consciousness to abide in the four objects. Therefore, the subsequent text states: because the bonds of greed subsumed under craving for form and craving for formations can be eternally abandoned, there is detachment from them. 'With the four bodily ties, such as greed, serving as the condition for generating karma, this is termed "taking as an object the entities that are cognitive objects"': the essence of karma is precisely the fruit of the cognitive object, because it is the essence of the cognitive object and because it serves as the condition for the fruit. These four ties are conditions for karma and are capable of generating karma; hence it is called 'taking as an object the entities that are cognitive objects.' As for the 'four bodily ties,' according to the Abhidharma[samuccaya], greed is taken as their essence; interpreting this passage, here only four kinds are taken, which are precisely the objects of greed. That [text] relies on the grasper, whereas this relies on the grasped; they are generated solely by conceptual discrimination and do not extend to the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). Ill will and so forth are unwholesome and do not extend to the higher realms; therefore, greed, which is the grasping [agent], extends through the three realms, as explained previously. 'Accompanied by the two latencies (anuśaya)' refers to the seeds of greed and the four ties. Up to here, the cause and condition have been broadly set forth, but this is not yet the sequential explanation. How is this known? Because below it does not repeat 'cause and condition,' it is known to be as before. From 'If all ordinary persons...' onward, it explains the abodes, and immediately below that it explains the causes and conditions; therefore, what was previously presented broadly set forth the causes and conditions, but did not yet explain the sequential meaning of the abodes of consciousness and their causes and conditions.

14.8

The treatise says: 'Consciousness in the form realm has coming and going; consciousness in the formless realm has death and birth.' The form [realm] has a body, while the formless [realm] has no body; being born in this place, one dies right in this place. This clarifies that in the lower two realms, consciousness abides in four aggregates; in the higher formless [realm], it abides in only three aggregates. Moreover, 'the form [realm] having birth' means that it has intermediate existence (antarābhava); the formless [realm] has no intermediate existence, and therefore it has death and birth. If so, why is it said that these two abodes last until the end of life? The former explanation is superior. 'Furthermore, these two abodes last until the end of life' clarifies that in both the form and formless abodes, consciousness abides until life ends. This is the culmination (paryanta) of the abodes. 'Furthermore, the meanings of growth, increase, and vastness of these two' explains the causes and conditions of the abodes whereby they achieve vastness. This is the culmination of the causes and conditions. The meaning of culmination is as explained before.

14.9

In the treatise's explanation of the expedients of calming, it says: 'Furthermore, the pure consciousness subsumed under the antidote is called "having no abode." By reason of that cause and condition, it is called "not growing or increasing."' Because consciousness is uncontaminated (anāsrava), the abode of consciousness is calmed and greed and so forth are eternally severed; therefore it is called 'not growing or increasing.' This is the meaning here.

14.10

The treatise says: 'Furthermore, all feelings are the shadow of the tree of consciousness.' Because consciousness exists, feeling exists; feeling is spoken of as a shadow. Why does it speak only of feeling? Because taking feeling as the root, craving for sensory objects arises.

14.11

The treatise says: 'With respect to uncontaminated consciousness, the cessation of the remaining bases of the faculties is called "purity."' This refers to attaining nirvāṇa without remainder. In the vajropamasamādhi, that consciousness is spoken of as pure; after entering the single dharma of the [dharmakāya], it can no longer be spoken of as pure. Furthermore, because there is no consciousness, it is called pure; it is called pure because it does not exist.

14.12

The treatise says: 'The desire realm has four minds.' Among its five consciousnesses, there are only three minds; there is no veiled indeterminate (nivṛtāvyākṛta) mind, because its characteristics cannot be obtained. In the higher realms, this indeterminate [mind] exists among the five consciousnesses. This veiled indeterminate [mind] exists only in the mental ground; on the path of seeing it is exclusively unwholesome, while on the path of cultivation, that which generates bad conduct is unwholesome, and what remains that moistens rebirth is indeterminate. The rest can be known. When it says among the twenty minds that the unveil-unobscured indeterminate (anivṛtāvyākṛta) has four kinds, as other places have five kinds, why does it not discuss intrinsic indeterminate (prakṛty-avyākṛta)? The explanation is: intrinsic indeterminate consists of corporeal dharmas such as nourishing and flowing forth; here it clarifies mind, which is why it is not included. If so, under what indeterminate mind is conceptual clinging to dharmas subsumed? According to the Buddhabhūmisūtra-śāstra, because it is of the category of fruition-born (vipākaja), it is subsumed under fruition indeterminate. Deportment, crafts, and so forth can be known. Although the desire realm has mind of manifestation (nirmāṇa-citta), it is not the fruition of supernormal power (abhijñāphala), because it lacks preparatory exertion (prayogābhāva). Because a mind that is the fruition of supernormal power must arise through preparatory exertion, and because when entering meditative concentration it is not a preparatory exertion of the desire realm, therefore the mind that is the fruition of supernormal power is not bound to the desire realm. There are only the transformations of devas, nāgas, yakṣas, and the like, which are strictly born by acquisition—that is, being able to transform into various manifest classes such as human forms, not fruition-born. If so, when the four dhyānas and so forth make transformations in the desire realm, manifesting various things such as human beings, to what realm are these transformed forms bound? The explanation is: following the mind of the perceiving aspect (darśanabhāga), they are bound to the form realm. If so, how can the coarse eyes of a lower ground see the subtle form of a higher ground? The explanation is: taking the form of the higher ground as condition, based on the higher realm, it separately transforms into form of the category of the desire realm, enabling people of the desire realm to see it with their lower eyes. This form of the desire-realm category is transformed by the seeing of the form realm, yet it is still bound to the form realm and remains a subtle dharma; how can it be seen? Because it is made into a coarse category, it can therefore be seen. The formless realm has no body, nor does it have deportment.

14.13

The treatise says: 'Just as the form realm lacks crafts, and does not mention deportment and manifestation, this is an abbreviation without discussion. The higher realms likewise lack them.' In this treatise, just as the eighteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states that the formless [realm] excludes manifestation and deportment, it is known that this is an abbreviation. Some say: by this it is proven and known that the formless realm possesses minds of manifestation and deportment. For instance, because the mind in formless concentration attains great mastery over all forms, it also has a mind of manifestation. There are bodhisattvas who, relying on that concentration, engage in walking and standing, such as bodhisattvas from the eighth bhūmi onward; what obstacle is there to their also possessing a mind of deportment? These are all wholesome and uncontaminated. If so, they are subsumed under the minds of trainees and so forth, being similar to manifestation and the like, and are thus called minds of manifestation, just as the indeterminate mind of manifestation that is the fruition of supernormal power. As for the indeterminate minds that generate fruition and deportment, they do not exist in that ground. This applies to the statements regarding the three vehicles and ordinary persons, and does not refer to the inconceivable; hence it is said to be likewise.

14.14

In the section differentiating the various minds of differing characteristics, the treatise further states that there are three grades: 'First, the grade of those who have not tended toward concentration,' referring to persons in the desire realm who have not sought concentration; 'Second, the grade of those who, though having set out, have not attained concentration,' namely persons seeking concentration who have not attained it; 'Third, persons who have already attained concentration. This again has two kinds: 1. not completely purified; 2. exceedingly purified.' The first refers to attaining threshold concentration (anāgamya-dhyāna) without having attained the root [dhyāna]; the second refers to having attained the root. The rest is according to the text, which can be understood upon reflection. In the second grade, when one is not calmly settled in that, the mind becomes agitated; according to the eight entanglements and five hindrances, there is also regret (kaukṛtya), because when cultivating calming (śamatha), gloom and sleepiness (styāna-middha) are obstacles; the same applies when cultivating insight (vipaśyanā), though here it is abbreviated and not discussed. If 'non-tranquillity' has agitation and sinking as its essence, why is it mentioned again? Because it obstructs equanimity (upekṣā); tranquillity is equanimity. Alternatively, one may further take envy (īrṣyā) and stinginess (mātsarya) as its essence, because they are spoken of thus among the entanglements and hindrances. At the end of the third fascicle, in the detailed analysis of the six skills: up to here, the analysis of the meanings of the five aggregates in sequence has concluded; this second part clarifies the reasons for such a sequence of the five aggregates. As in the Hīnayāna treatises, the Vibhāṣā and the Kośa, there are many alternative explanations which cannot be fully enumerated. Although there are five meanings here, among the reasons for the sequence of form first and consciousness last, only the latter three are valid. Second, in the sequence of antidotes, in order to eliminate the third error among the four inversions, which takes mind to be the self, and in other places taking dharmas to be the self, it is as harmonized in the notes to the tenth fascicle of the Abhidharma[samuccaya] and the record on the Bodhisattvabhūmi. This is based on the majority, taking what is conceptually discriminated to be the self; if one takes dharmas to be the self, this is based on innate [grasping], which grasps [them] as the self at all times. Both of these are admissible, yet taking dharmas to be the self is identical to the Hīnayāna and others. The first two sequences resolve the objection regarding contradictory sequences. Why is it that in the twelve [links], form conditions the existence of consciousness, whereas among the four inversions, form comes first, followed by feeling, then consciousness, and finally dharmas? The resolution of the objection is as in the text.

14.15

In the treatise's explanation of the mutual subsumption of the six skills: for the aggregate of form, 'a portion of six links of existence' refers to formations, name-and-form, the six sense bases, existence, birth, and aging-and-death; since the base and non-base applies to all, there is a portion of it, and the remaining text below should be understood according to this explanation; the physical faculties are completely [included]. For the aggregate of feeling, one link of existence is completely [included], namely the link of feeling; three are partially [included], namely name-and-form, birth, and aging-and-death, because they all have the nature of the five aggregates, and below follows this; the five feeling faculties are completely [included], and a portion of the three uncontaminated faculties. For the aggregate of perception, it comprises a portion of the three including name-and-form. Because it is obscured by prajñā, it is not a faculty. For example, when remembering an event, one says that prajñā remembers it; because its characteristics are obscured, it is therefore not a faculty. Furthermore, it is not a faculty because of the meaning of predominance: predominance in worldly defilement and predominance in the defilement of saṃsāra. This should be reflected upon according to the sūtra. For the aggregate of formations, four links of existence are completely [included], namely ignorance, contact, craving, and grasping, because they are all subsumed under the aggregate of formations; five are partially [included], namely the links of formations, name-and-form, existence, birth, and aging[-and-death]. For the aggregate of consciousness, one link is completely [included], namely the link of consciousness; four are partially [included], namely name-and-form, the six sense bases, birth, and aging-and-death—existence is not mentioned because it is based on karmic existence; the mind faculty alone is completely [included]; and a portion of the three uncontaminated faculties.

14.16

Where the treatise explains the ten kinds of inclusion: regarding "inclusion by characteristic: inclusion by specific characteristic and common characteristic," it means that manifestation is the specific characteristic of matter, etc., while the meaning of accumulation is the common characteristic of the aggregates. / Regarding "inclusion by non-separation," the Dharma Master says: it means that the gathering of subtle atoms is not separated, and thus there are as many elements, etc., included. Now it is explained: following the Abhidharmasamuccaya, all [existents] possess matter, which means mind is also not separated; thus all are matter, and mental factors are also called mind, and so on. / Regarding "inclusion by direction [and locus]," "arising based on this" means consciousness arising based on matter, and so on. / Regarding "total inclusion: that is, the aggregates, etc., included by the five, etc.," it means that the defiled and undefiled aggregates, as well as the aggregates of the three natures, etc., all fully possess inclusion by the five aggregates. / The treatise states: "The aggregate of matter functions dependent upon six bases": first, the "basis of establishment," which refers to the earth, the golden disc, etc.; second, the "basis of concealment," which refers to houses, walls, etc.; third, the "basis of provisions," which refers to clothing, beds, etc.; fourth, the "basis of the faculties," which refers to the pure faculties; fifth, the "basis of the faculties' dwelling," which refers to the physical support of the faculties; sixth, the "locus traversed by samādhi endowed with majesty," which refers to matter born of samādhi with supernormal powers. It does not mention unmanifest matter, etc., nor matter born of the mastery of samādhi, because unmanifest [matter] is distinct, and one might fear it could not be completely included. / In the functioning of the four aggregates in the seven bases, what is the difference between the initial "desire" and "hope"? The former applies to objects already obtained, and the latter to objects not yet obtained, which accordingly are based on future and past arisings. "Cognitive realm" refers to the present, spontaneously occurring cognitive realm. As for "applied and sustained thought," although the above states also have applied and sustained thought, their functions are distinct; this applied and sustained thought only arises through thinking on unobtainted and already obtained cognitive realms, and otherwise applied and sustained thought would not arise. Regarding "moreover, the conjunction of desire and hope," etc.: because of hoping for conjunction, those in the desire realm who leave the household are included within this cognitive realm and applied and sustained thought.

14.17

In the treatise's verse explaining the nominal meanings of the aggregate of matter, there are ten approaches, which can be understood from the text.

14.18

The treatise says: "If based on inclusion by non-separation, it possesses seven substances, namely this very eye," etc. This means that, for example, the seven subtle atoms belonging to a single eye faculty occupy the same locus at the same time without mutual obstruction. For instance, a subtle atom of the eye faculty is as large as a grape; within it, what is fine and minute can fully accommodate the remaining subtle atoms, and so on, turning successively up to the detailed explanation that within a single conglomerate there are those seven substances. If one speaks according to reality, since there is no separate substance of a subtle atom, why can there be seven substances? The meaning is: because the matter shaped like a grape is pure matter, serving the function of the eye, it is called "eye," up to: serving the function of touch, it is called "tangible"; each is separately broken down to subtle atoms, and therefore it is said that within one conglomerate there are seven subtle atoms, but it is not that seven substances exist as real subtle atoms. Is this not the second [kind], non-separation in the same locus? Just as an array of pearls collectively emits light, and each light does not obstruct another, this is also like that. Like stones ground into powder, this is called non-separation by combination, which is the first kind, as explained in fascicle three of the Maulī Bhūmi. Like a heap of beans and the like, this is called non-separation with separation, which is the third [kind of] matter, as explained in separate texts elsewhere. It does not speak of the six kinds of matter of the sphere of phenomena, the primary substance, and so on, which should be known by analogy with external things.

14.19

The treatise explains that there are nineteen kinds of tangibles; like the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which has twenty-two kinds, lacking the three tangibles of slackness, urgency, and inferiority. Why are they absent? It is an abbreviation. Moreover, tangibles, etc., are here to be separately investigated and discussed, like the reason in the Abhidharmasamuccaya Commentary for not positing birth as a tangible. Furthermore, as among the four characteristics, sickness and old age are a single combination, why are they divided into two here? Now, these are not the four characteristics and do not follow the analogy of the five births. This should be investigated and discussed together with the six uninterrupted ones, etc., against the text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. As for "death-tangible," it is named from its fruit: when the marman death-spots on the body are approached, they cause the body to die immediately; this tangible is named from its fruit. Old-age tangible is likewise: this tangible can generate old age, etc., and is called old-age tangible, as in the Maulī Bhūmi.

14.20

The treatise says: "These six stages are again opened into eight, if the six are equal." This means that the first two—pure and impure—make two, and firm and infirm make two, hence there are eight.

14.21

The treatise says, regarding all matter up to tangibles being cognized by two consciousnesses, that it is "either gradual or simultaneous": this means that when any single consciousness among the five consciousnesses arises, and mental consciousness cognizes together with it, this is called gradual; if the five consciousnesses arise side by side, and mental consciousness also cognizes identically, this is called simultaneous.

14.22

The treatise says: "Furthermore, in the form realm there are no present odors or tastes, yet their elements, etc., exist... up to: because these two are absent, the nose and odor are also absent." This means that although in the form realm there are no odors or tastes, nor consciousness cognizing them, nonetheless these two faculties exist. Question: What is the use of these faculties? Answer: As in the Abhidharmakośa, they serve to adorn the body. Question: If they adorn the body, the physical support of the faculties would suffice; what is the use of the faculties? Answer: Because uttering sounds must rely on the physical support of the faculties; if there are the supported eye faculty and the supporting physical particles, the body acts as the support to utter speech. Otherwise it could not, hence the faculties are necessary. Up to: just as without the male faculty, there is also no physical locus for it. The objection that if the two faculties are absent, their physical loci would also be absent, should be pondered and inverted accordingly. / The treatise says: "Among all matter included within the aggregate of matter, nine kinds exist as real substances; among that included within tangibles, the four great elements exist as real substances, while the remainder should be known as existing merely as designations." If nine are real: in the text below, as in the sphere of matter, long and so forth exist as designations, while blue and yellow are real; in sound, that caused by seized great elements and unseized great elements is real, while the remaining agreeable ones, etc., are designations; in odor, agreeable odor is a designation, while the remainder arising from conditions, combinations, etc., are real; in taste, the six such as bitter, sour, etc., are real, while agreeable taste, etc., are designations. Since within each and every sensory object there are both nominal existence and real existence, why does it say here that nine all exist as real, and tangibles are divided into two? Answer: Because in the sphere of tangibles, the producing elements and the produced matter are distinct; the produced matter is entirely nominal existence and moreover is abundant, which is why it is singled out for explanation. Among the remaining nine, there are no producing elements, and furthermore all are produced matter; although there are designations among the produced matter, they are few and not many, and therefore not discussed. Fascicle eighteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: shape, shadow, and manifest [karma] are designations; reverberating sound and wholesome sound are designations, etc., as harmonized in the first commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Furthermore, in various spheres, designations separately generate mental consciousness, like birth, old age, etc.; here it is not so, and thus does not follow that analogy. Why is it that establishing birth, etc., on matter makes them non-concurrent [formations], and up to names relying on sound being likewise? Tangibles are spoken of as being established upon the great elements: because an entrance is opened, names, etc., are apprehensible and thus spoken of as non-concurrent. Tangibles must be apprehended in reliance upon the body, so they are included in the tangible entrance; apart from the four great elements, their apprehension cannot be attained. In the other nine spheres, separate apprehension can be attained apart from the four great elements. When touching produced matter, one only ever attains the great elements, and does not separately produce or separately attain shape-matter, which is merely established upon color-matter. This thoroughly clarifies the approach to the real. / Among matter of the sphere of phenomena, as in the five kinds in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, matter born of mastery in samādhi has two kinds of matter: that is, samādhi endowed with majesty and samādhi with mental image without majesty; here it only speaks of samādhi endowed with majesty. Thus, among the five kinds of matter of the sphere of phenomena, four are entirely [designations] and one part is designation, while one part is real. Why is it like this? Because it does not have the actual function of samādhi, which should be pondered in accord with principle. Why is it called "majesty" and said to be real? As the text below says, because it is undefiled, it is called majesty; because it is the Dharma of the noble ones, it is called majesty. This matter of samādhi can accomplish real activities, like truly formed matter; matter of samādhi without majesty merely causes others to see it, but does not accomplish real activities, not being like truly formed [matter]. / Question: Samādhi of undefiled matter is only attained upon seeing the truth, which is somewhat attainable; why can samādhi with defilements have such real activity? It is attained due to the noble ones' undefiled category, attained through predominant force as described in the text below. Furthermore, following the text below, when this matter is arisen by subsequent attainment through the predominant force of non-conceptual wisdom, samādhi with defilements cannot attain it. Here, based on its substance, it is truly undefiled, but resembles the defiled, and thus it is spoken of as undefiled and defiled. / Question: Yet among the undefiled, all three vehicles attain the undefiled; what person attains it? In the Mahāyāna there is samādhi endowed with majesty; although both the first bhūmi and the eighth bhūmi have this name, on which bhūmi does it depend? Furthermore, the great master of meaning says: this applies to the defiled; that which is defiled is not real, because it cannot be put to practical use. If it is not a contemplation of mental image, that which is put to practical use is also real existence. / Where it speaks here of "its fruit and its cognitive realm," the great master of meaning says: the fruit is that which, due to the power of samādhi, causes the fundamental consciousness to separately manifest and transform into the objective matter. That is, like entering a pure land, through the power of subsequent wisdom, it causes the fundamental consciousness to transform into sensory objects; this is the fruit of samādhi, and is real existence. Because it is spoken of as the fruit of the mind and is the object of samādhi, this matter of samādhi, with respect to samādhi, is both a fruit and a cognitive realm, yet is a single entity. Question: Only matter transformed by the single factor of samādhi exists as a real substance, because that transformed by the concurrent primary mind and mental factors also exists as a real substance.

14.23

The treatise says: "And the objective matter of consciousness, etc., concurrent with that samādhi exists as a real substance," which resolves and clears away doubts and objections. Here, the sphere of phenomena posits only three kinds; therefore, matter of moral restraint is entirely nominal, because it is established on the basis of volition, and so forth.

14.24

The treatise says: "Furthermore, with respect to form that is the sphere of concentration, if it is based on concentration bound to this [realm], then it is produced by the four primary elements bound to this [realm]." This is stated with reference to being only in the form realm, because concentration and prajñā are equally balanced and concentration is clear and acute; therefore the treatise says that being based on this concentration, it is produced by the primary elements bound to this [realm]. If it is also present in the formless realm, as in the text at the end of the previous fifty-third [fascicle], why does it not speak of the formless realm here? Because there is no physical body to rely on there, it is omitted and not discussed. Therefore, the subsequent text only [states that] it arises from the samādhi that cognizes those kinds of images; within concentration it also transforms into image-primary-elements producing form, which is called "produced," yet it is not called "produced" through being born relying on those fundamental primary elements. If one investigates it closely, the subsequent text says that first there are the primary elements, and afterwards there is the produced form, which means there are also primary elements; this is its meaning. However, they are not the original primary elements of the tangible base, and thus it is said that there are no such primary elements subsumed under the dharma base. This is stated in terms of the superior concentration capable of inducing them; hence the subsequent text says they do not rely on primary elements. Yet concentration itself transforms into the primary elements, because they are the fruit of the mind in concentration; in accordance with that to which the concentration is bound, it is said that they are produced by the primary elements bound to this [realm]. Even as this treatise says that when concentration bound to the formless realm induces an outflow-free concentration to give rise to this form, it is produced by formless primary elements. Originally there are no primary elements in the formless realm; how could they produce it? This is outflow-free, not outflow-bound; it resembles the outflow-bound, but its substance is outflow-free. Another explanation: Only in the form realm are there the primary elements of the concentration bound to the original realm that produce form. As for the formless realm, as stated in the sixty-sixth [fascicle]: if one takes the form of this realm as an object, then it is also produced by the primary elements of this realm; this is because there is form, and it is only in the form realm. Furthermore, the subsequent text says: "Just like a magical transformation," because it is absent in the formless realm. If it is as in the earlier explanation, the production is spoken of relying on the bound concentration, based on what it belongs to. Although it is a concentration of the formless realm, when it takes the form of the form realm as its archetype, it also transforms into primary elements. "Just like a magical transformation" is stated in terms of actual utility, because its function is identical to a magical transformation. The outflow-free form is spoken of relying on the concentration capable of inducing it; the primary elements of the formless realm are actually not bound to any realm, but are subsumed under the dharma base. What is the difference between this and the form produced by supernormal powers of a mind of magical transformation? There is the difference between outflow-bound and outflow-free; the difference between being cognized or not cognized by the eighth [consciousness]; and the difference between this cognizing conceptualization being outflow-bound or outflow-free, and so forth. However, concentration possessing majestic power actually transforms into the five sense organs as well, yet it transforms into their likeness and not the real ones; this is merely the substance of the dust that supports the organs, not the substance of the pure sense organs. Furthermore, this form is nominally designated as form. If one considers the function of the archetype, then as the sixty-sixth [fascicle] states: according as it cognizes that realm, it is produced by the primary elements of that realm. If one takes direct production, then it is produced by the primary elements transformed within concentration. If one takes what it is produced by, then it is the power of concentration, not caused by primary elements. Such various distinctions are based on the meaning. Furthermore, it also extends to the formless realm as having this form born of concentration possessing majestic power. Now, here it says that it accords with the exquisite realm to which the concentration is bound; although there are no four primary elements of contact, within concentration they can also be transformed into the four primary elements. Because the four primary elements accord with concentration, it is discussed in accordance with that to which the concentration is bound on the basis of having a physical body to rely on, and thus does not speak of the formless realm. If one considers subsequent texts and so forth, they comprehensively explain both concentration possessing majestic power and that not possessing majestic power. When the earlier text took concentration as that which is capable of producing, this was based on direct reliance across preceding and succeeding moments being called "producing"; it is not that in the same moment, as when arising in the form realm, it is called being produced by form. However, that subsequent superior concentration first acts as primary elements is explicitly stated within that which fictively relies on superior concentration. Where do the primary elements that produce the morality concomitant with concentration and with the path come from? The immediately preceding outflow-bound or outflow-free spontaneous concentration is able to give rise to this form; it is not that a concentration of strenuous contemplation is able to produce this form. If it is a bodhisattva, it is outflow-free; if it is the two vehicles, it is outflow-bound. Both are able to magically transform it so that others may enjoy it, which is called concentration possessing majestic power; the remaining concentrations of fictive imaginative contemplation are not like this, so they are not concentrations possessing majestic power and are not called actual form. As below, this will be explained more extensively in due course. / "The form of the form realm is pure, not the object of lower eyes": this is based on retribution-form operating spontaneously; as when Brahmā listens to the Dharma beside the Buddha, he also magically transforms coarse and subtle [forms] to let people of the desire realm see them, and so forth, so there is also a sense of coarseness.

14.25

The treatise explains that subtle nature is of three kinds: First, extremely subtle form; as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, this is causing the extremely abbreviated and the extremely remote to serve as the gateway for the forms concomitant with this concentration. Because that [text] distinguishes them into two kinds based on the difference between being obstructed and being obstructing, it does not contradict this. Because form arising from conceptualization is conceptualized and cognized by the sixth mind, there should be all minds and mental factors, and all would have form arising from conceptualization. That here it only speaks of form is stated because form is distinct and graspable, unlike formless dharmas. If so, why is there sound arising from conceptualization among sounds? The Dharma Master asked this, and it is resolved as in the Commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Second, form of its kind: is it of the kind of coarse form? If it is present in an intermediate state in this place, this is of the kind with that not being in an intermediate state. The five marks of an atom: consult the third fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmi.

14.26

The treatise says: "There are fifteen kinds of atoms: namely, the five beginning with the eye, the five beginning with form, the four beginning with earth, and one real form of the dharma base." Here, the dharma base is spoken of with particular reference to what is real. / If so, then since among form and the rest there are also fictive ones, they should be the same as the dharma base; furthermore, that produced by contact is entirely fictive, so why is it not mentioned? The meaning is: It is not so. Because they can be enjoyed and used, whereas the other fictive ones of the dharma base cannot be used. Although they are fictive among form and the rest, they are still separately cognized by those respective consciousnesses; within the dharma base, they are cognized only by the sixth [consciousness], so it does not serve as a parallel. Furthermore, because they rely on co-arising, it is not a parallel. Furthermore, if the tangible base is immediately concurrent with the primary elements, it is also not excluded; the dharma base is not like these, and therefore it is not discussed. / Question: For what reason do unobstructed dharmas dwell together in the same place without departing from one another, yet are not called having the nature of obstruction? Answer: Because they operate in compliance. That they give rise to one another in mutual compliance without mutual impediment means that because the various fragrances and so forth are extremely compliant with one another and do not impede each other, it is therefore like this. The establishment of partless atoms is as stated in the third fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmi, that atoms cannot be further distinguished into other finer [parts], and so on.

14.27

The treatise says: "Atoms are the object of only three eyes, not the flesh eye or the divine eye." Because these two eyes arise relying on light and darkness. What is the substance of the three eyes beginning with the wisdom eye? The Dharma Master says: The wisdom eye cognizes emptiness, and the Dharma eye cognizes existence; thus both are subsequently attained knowledge. The Buddha eye must have a separate substance, so it takes non-conceptual knowledge as the Buddha eye. The flesh eye is not like this, because it is only named at the stage of fruition. / If so, since this knowledge cognizes Suchness, how does it cognize atoms? That being so, since the wisdom eye cognizes emptiness, how does it cognize atoms? The meaning is: Because it cognizes the emptiness of atoms, it is also able to cognize atoms. That being so, this knowledge also cognizes atoms, just as non-conceptual knowledge is also able to cognize atoms, taking non-conceptual knowledge as the substance of the Buddha eye. The Dharma Master says: Furthermore, the Buddha eye is the eye of the Dharma eye that cognizes existence. Another meaning is: It is not so. Although there must be a distinction: the wisdom eye cognizes principle, which is fundamental knowledge; the Dharma eye cognizes both emptiness and existence, which is subsequently attained knowledge; the Buddha eye comprehensively subsumes the former two to serve as the Buddha eye. How is this known? As the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: Suchness is the object solely of the noble wisdom eye; hence we know that the wisdom eye cognizes Suchness. / If so, when the sūtras say that one obtains the purity of the Dharma eye, the Dharma eye should cognize principle. The meaning is: Although it says so because of purity, it cognizes Suchness; because the name "dharma" is general, one obtains the outflow-free Dharma eye, which is not the Dharma eye among the five eyes. If so, why does the end of this fascicle below say that the noble wisdom eye sees all forms, whether far or near, and so forth? That is another name for the Dharma eye; because it takes prajñā as its substance it is called the wisdom eye, not the wisdom eye among the five eyes. At the stage of the cause they are named wisdom [eye] and Dharma [eye]; at the stage of fruition they are collectively named Buddha [eye]. Differentiated in terms of function, there are three eyes in all, which the Buddha also possesses completely. This is explained as in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa itself. This is the definitive meaning. / "Just like a drop of water, it does not reach the atomic. And it also says, and the analogy of a drop of water reaching the smallest subtle form is not like that": Is this water a subtle form? Take the earlier interpretation.

First 27 of 110 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese