瑜伽師地論略纂 15

English (machine translation) 15

Language: English

The three kinds of possession in the treatise's explanation of acquisition are harmonized as in the second fascicle of this "Viniścaya" and the commentary on the second fascicle of the Samuccaya-saṃgrahī. Space is acquired by acquisition; non-analytical cessation is likewise. The meaning of this acquisition is as explained at the end of the fourth fascicle of the Kośa.

15.3

Regarding the absorption without ideation, where it says here: "First arising here, afterwards in the form realm," it means that it must first arise in the desire realm, and after being born into the form realm, it arises subsequently; because it is separated by a single lifetime in the form realm, the concentration entered in the desire realm is said to be karma of subsequent retribution. If one does not enter concentration again in the form realm, but merely experiences retribution after a single lifetime in another ground, the concentration of the desire realm could become subsequent retribution. If one enters concentration again in the form realm, it is clear that this person had already regressed in the desire realm; if they had not regressed, why would they give rise to concentration in the different ground of the form realm? Therefore, it is known that through giving rise to concentration again in the form realm and taking birth to experience retribution, and for non-regressing persons of the desire realm, this concentration should be understood as purely karma of retribution upon rebirth. If so, does the volitional karma of the previously attained concentration remaining in the body of a regressed person from the desire realm not experience retribution within this karma? Answer: If they do not experience retribution, then they would experience that fruit for one thousand kalpas. Because entering concentration in the form realm is retribution upon rebirth, inducing five hundred kalpas; before those kalpas are completed, the desire realm karma matures, and they would subsequently experience retribution for another five hundred kalpas, meaning they would experience the maturation of that fruit for one thousand kalpas. If the concentration of the form realm induces that retribution upon rebirth, and upon birth the desire realm karma and so forth simultaneously experience a separate retribution, then this desire realm karma would become retribution upon rebirth. Now, not experiencing this fruit, this karma is not yet mature in that birth because it is weak. If so, it would be karma of indeterminate retribution. This matter is not retribution upon rebirth in the Mahāyāna; all those experienced subsequent to rebirth are called subsequent, and even if one has already passed through hundreds of thousands of births before experiencing retribution there, it is still called subsequent retribution. If so, when wishing to be born there later, one must only then attain concentration; if one attains concentration, this concentration induces birth there and thus constitutes retribution upon rebirth; when does the previous karma experience retribution? The interpretation says: Precisely in that separate retribution; hence it is called subsequent retribution. If so, when born in the form realm earlier, does the retribution experienced upon entering concentration also receive the name of karma of subsequent retribution? The Dharma Master says: If a regressed person later arises in the form realm, the previous desire realm karma is subsumed under indeterminate retribution with determinate timing. Moreover, this text says "first arising here" refers to entering concentration; "afterwards in the form realm" means, reading continuously into the text below, subsequently taking birth in the form realm to experience that retribution, not subsequently entering concentration in the form realm. Hence there are two explanations. In the absorption of cessation, "afterwards arising in the form realm" restates the previous text. In this absorption, "first in the absorption of cessation, afterwards in the form realm" is harmonized as in the commentary on the first fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya].

15.4

The treatise says regarding non-ideational maturation: "After being born, these sentient beings then pass away from there." Here, following the method of reasoning, in the Mahāyāna, at the initial birth and at the end of life of that fruition, there is no mind. How is this known? The text below states: "A lifetime without mind possessing only form refers to birth in the Heaven without Ideation"; hence it is known that there is only form and no mind. There are texts stating that there is mind at initial birth; this text states there is no mind at a later time. In the Western regions, whenever concentrated karma induces [a fruit], it induces a mindless fruit and does not induce one with mind; therefore, they are without mind. This is explained extensively as in the Commentary on the Abhidharma[-samuccaya]. Later, this text should be read continuously as: if born in form, after passing away from there, abiding in the intermediate existence is called ideation having arisen, and that intermediate existence then passes away from there. This is the Mahāyāna tenet, not the Hīnayāna meaning. The two explanations are as before. The intention that can induce the concentration without ideation refers to the volition at the time of the concentration's essence, which is able to induce a separate retribution.

15.5

The treatise says: "The life-faculty is posited on the basis of the determinate stage of duration of the maturation projected by karma. Furthermore, this is of three kinds, and so forth, down to being established by numbers of years, kalpas, and so forth." Here, the initial text says, "the determinate stage of duration of the maturation," etc., which appears to indicate that the life-faculty is solely general retribution. Below, it says, "Because within the three kinds there are also determinate and indeterminate, pleasant and unpleasant," from which one knows that it also extends to the former particular retribution. Again, as a passage in the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: the determinate stage of duration of the maturation, etc., also encompasses both general and particular retribution. This is as [explained in] the Notes on the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya], for it is established not solely upon the eighth consciousness. If it were not so, then as Master Jun said: Just as with seeds of inherent nature (dharmatā), although it is said that from beginningless time the six sense bases are inherently superior, the intention is solely to take the sixth base. This is also like that: although it says six bases, being in the sixth base, it is solely general retribution nominally posited upon the eighth [consciousness]. This is explained in detail in that Commentary. The common share (sabhāga) and so forth are also the same. What is said in [the section on] this life-faculty, "because of being determinate and indeterminate," refers to having untimely death or having no untimely death, determinate lifespan or indeterminate lifespan. "Pleasant and unpleasant" refers to fruits of the good destinies and bad destinies.

15.6

"Being established by numbers of years, kalpas, and so forth" refers to the demarcations of lifespan length, such as one kalpa and so forth.

15.7

In [the section on] the common share, it says: "Furthermore, this is of three kinds, namely, the common share of category," which is like categories such as Brahmins. "The common share of intrinsic nature" refers to the intrinsic natures of various types of phenomena, such as sharp, middling faculties, and so forth. "The common share of livelihood by crafts and trades" means making a livelihood through the work of crafts. It is established only upon the domain of sentient beings, not upon non-sentient beings. Why? Because destinies (gati) and non-destinies are different; this is established only with respect to the destinies of sentient beings.

15.8

The four characteristics of arising, etc., are as [explained in] the text of fascicle 52, where there are five kinds in detail, and so forth.

15.9

Among [the kinds of] abiding, "abiding by instituted rule" refers to establishing disciplinary precepts (saṃvara) and abiding for a long period, which is termed abiding by instituted rule, etc.

15.10

In the treatise's explanation of nominal sets (nāmakāya) and so forth, it says: "Furthermore, these are of three kinds, namely nominal sets of hypothetical designation," etc. It should be understood that designations are posited according to the text, and are also posited on the basis of odors, tastes, and so forth; thus they are neither mind nor matter, since names and so forth are neither material nor mental. If so, could odors, etc., not be [so posited]? That is, names extend to the nature of goodness, which are posited here in this land prior to the transformation [of the basis].

15.11

Below, in the text drawing the analogy of sentences (pada), it says: "Namely, topic-phrases and explanatory phrases, subsumed under vowels (svara) and subsumed under phonemes/letters (akṣara)." Sentences are of two kinds: general topic-phrases and distinct explanatory phrases. Characters are of two kinds: the primary sounds (fourteen vowels), namely a, ā, etc.; and consonants/letters (forty-four letters), namely ka, kha, ga, etc. Both of these are based on the stages of verbal expression as phrase-sets (padakāya), etc., hence it is also spoken of in this way. Furthermore, "subsumed under vowels" refers to the Chandas treatises, which have two kinds of sounds, masculine and feminine, each having seven case endings (vibhakti) to form words. "Subsumed under written characters" refers to spoken phonemes and written letters.

15.12

The treatise says: "Ordinary-being-hood (pṛthagjanatva) is established on the basis of the stage wherein all supramundane noble dharmas have not yet arisen." This is as stated at the end of the fourth fascicle of the Kośa and in the Notes on the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya]. There is a dispute here. In the Hīnayāna, it is exclusively of the obscured-unrecorded nature, severed by the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). In the Mahāyāna, this cannot be so, because there is no separate non-possession (aprāpti) arising. The old Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya says: Ordinary-being-hood is all non-possession and has no single locus of subsumption, because ordinary-being-hood is narrow. The Kośa separately posits non-possession: ordinary-being-hood is included within non-possession, and non-possession is broad, completely subsuming all non-possession. In the Hīnayāna, possession (prāpti) includes possession prior to the dharma, possession posterior to the dharma, and simultaneous possession with the dharma; non-possession has only non-possession prior to the dharma and non-possession posterior to the dharma, and does not have non-possession simultaneous with the dharma. Because when a dharma is present, it must be achieved, which is called possession—thus there is simultaneous possession of achievement; there is no dharma presently achieved that is called simultaneous non-possession with the dharma. Even if non-possession were present, there must be simultaneous possession with the dharma due to achievement; whereas with the past and future, there is non-possession. Now the Mahāyāna has only simultaneous possession with the dharma, because possession is established upon what exists and is supported, and there is no possession or non-possession prior to or posterior to the dharma. Since it is established solely in relation to past and future, non-possession is entirely non-existent, because it is not established upon non-existent dharmas; if there were possession prior to and posterior to the dharma, there could be non-possession, because it would be established in relation to the past and future. Hence the Mahāyāna has no non-possession. It separately posits ordinary-being-hood, and this nature is established upon the defilements to be severed by seeing, because one has not obtained the noble dharmas of the path of seeing and so forth. If one obtains the path of seeing, it cannot be established with respect to any noble path. If one obtains one portion, the remainder belongs to this category; therefore, the path of seeing is not termed ordinary-being-hood, and it pervades the three realms. If one is detached from the contamination of that stage, it is also termed abandoning one portion. It may also be said by implication that, based on existent dharmas among the seeds, it is also of the obscured-unrecorded nature; the meaning of not obtaining the conception of all dharmas resides in the path of seeing of the three vehicles. If not obtaining the path of cultivation were termed ordinary-being-hood, then the path of seeing should be termed this nature; it can also be said to be abandoned at the stage of supreme worldly dharmas (laukikāgradharma) and severed at the time of the path of seeing. This is extensively established in the [discussion of the] fifty-two dharmas above; that text is very precise.

15.13

In the treatise's explanation of determination (niyama), "determination of characteristics" refers to the substantial characteristics among the four fruits, and so forth.

15.14

In [the section on] conjunction (saṃprayoga), it says: "Conjunction of means" refers to preparatory wisdom (prayogika-jñāna), which is called means because it acts as the basis for all fundamental matters. "Conforming to reason" refers to wisdom being conjoined with principle.

15.15

In the treatise's explanation of time (kāla), there are three explanations in the West: First, according to the principle of consciousness-only: as when cognizing the past and future, there are images corresponding to the mind that resemble the characteristics of the past and future; these are functions of the past and future existing solely within the mind. When presently cognizing them, they are similar to those; according to the principle of consciousness-only, they obtain the names 'past' and 'future', but they are solely the present. Second, according to the principle of the characteristics of dharmas: a present dharma that is about to perish is called the past; one that has not yet perished is called the future; and one that is presently arising is called the present. Thus the three periods of time are established upon the characteristics of present dharmas. Third, explaining the three periods of time by means of spiritual powers: through the naturally operating power of the supernormal faculties of the buddhas and others, many such characteristics appear; thus they are present dharmas; having formerly functioned, they are called the past; being capable of functioning when arising in the future, they are called the future. That is to say, on present dharmas there are also functions of such periods, so by implication the three periods of time are spoken of.

15.16

What was previously spoken of as "the harmony of assembly" refers to the Saṅgha and so forth. "The harmony of a single purpose" refers to sharing reliance upon a single task to be accomplished. "The harmony of fulfillment" refers to the time of attaining final completion.

15.17

The three kinds of subtlety are as explained in fascicle 54. The meaning of coarseness/greatness here refers to that part within the aggregate of form (rūpa-skandha) which consists of coarse matter; it is not those subtle forms, nor is it [the whole of] the aggregate of form, but only the coarse that is meant.

15.18

In the treatise's explanation of the meaning of defiled (sāsrava), there are four faults: First, lack of serenity: below it says 'produced by the active manifestation of the entanglements', which refers to the actual substance of the active defilements as stated in the treatise. The Dharma Master says: Because defilements manifest actively, they agitate and trouble the faculties and so forth, hence it is termed 'lack of serenity'. Second, internal and external mutation: the text below speaks of 'produced by the matters of the defilements following upon the defilements', which refers to the matters produced by the defilements; because such greed, hatred, and so forth arise, they cause internal and external mutation, making faculties and sensory objects alter; faculties and sensory objects are called 'matters'. Third, initiating bad conduct: below it says 'produced with defilements as cause and condition'; because defilements serve as cause and condition, they initiate bad conduct, and bad conduct is produced by defilements. Fourth, being a cause of grasping: the text below says 'projecting future existence', which can be understood from the text.

15.19

The treatise's explanation of contentious, attachment, and so forth, is extensively clarified in the Prakaraṇāryavācā, and explained in the first volume of the Notes on the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-bhāṣya]. The Dharma Master says: 'Contentious' refers solely to anger, whose substance pervades all defiled dharmas; 'attachment' is directed solely to the internal body; 'craving' arises solely with respect to external matter. According to this text, it is present in the desire realm.

15.20

In the treatise's explanation of the three periods of time, it says: "Causes and fruits that have already been experienced are called the past; causes and fruits that have not yet been experienced are called the future; causes that have already been experienced while their fruits have not yet been experienced are called the present." The future and past are both spoken of in terms of simultaneous cause and fruit, as well as fruits already experienced; the present is spoken of based on causes and fruits of equal outflow (niṣyanda) occurring at different times, where the past fruit is in the present, not simultaneous cause and fruit, since in the present there is as yet no fruit; hence one knows this is based on a distinct meaning. Therefore it conflicts with the third fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmi, etc.; examine this.

15.21

In the treatise's explanation of far and near, it says: "The meaning of separation in space, past and future, time, and direction," etc. This is like the four paths in the Hīnayāna: namely, place, time, nature, and characteristic, as extensively clarified and cited to establish it here. Regarding being bound to the three realms, the statement that in the desire realm there is "active manifestation at three times" means: first, being born here without yet having attained the counteractive path—which consists of all five aggregates, pervading all five aggregates; second, having attained it—that is, the body being in the desire realm, when one attains and enters the dhyāna of the form realm, the mental consciousness belongs to the form realm, while the remainder is bound to the desire realm, differing only in degree; third, having emerged—that is, having entered that absorption and already emerged. The rest below should be known in accordance with these three. However, as for those aspects among the above rubrics that are identical with the Abhidharma[-samuccaya], the degrees of detail differ greatly; investigate them to know, for it would be cumbersome to record them in full. There are further distinctions.

15.22

"Samādhi associated with pliancy (praśrabdhi)" excludes scattered samādhi; this is not bound [to the lower realm], being associated with pliancy. "Retinue" refers to the simultaneous mind and mental factors. "Its fruit-dharmas" refers to the discipline co-arising with absorption and the path (dhyāna-saṃvara and mārga-saṃvara), as well as form that is the sphere of absorption (dhyāna-gocara-rūpa), as explained in the preceding fascicles. These are all bound to the form realm, etc.; the remainder are bound to the desire realm. In the further distinctions, where it says "namely, free from faults, and fault-virtue," etc., there are three aspects here: first, freedom from faults; second, the antidote to faults; third, conformity with virtues—which are good. The stages of training (śaikṣa), severing by seeing, and so forth, are as in the fourth fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya]; examine each one, for there should be distinctions.

15.23

In the treatise's refutation of [the view that] there are no mental factors (caitta) and that only mind (citta) is real, this refutes the Sautrāntikas, who hold that there is only the single phenomenon of the primary mind (cittarāja) and that the minds of feeling, conception, and volition do not have separate substances. Now, refuting it, [the treatise] says that, for one thing, the five aggregates cannot be established, because there would be no distinct conception, feeling, or volition, which is the fault of contradicting the scriptures. If it is postulated that there is one mind, and that its sequential states are distinctively feeling, conception, and so on, rather than feeling, conception, and so on existing within a single moment, now we refute this: whether [they are held to] exist or not exist, both involve error. If [such states] arise, then because this mental mark is distinct, a real teaching ought to exist simultaneously. Why would the first moment be termed only 'consciousness', the second moment 'feeling', and the third moment 'conception'? A single mind would contain distinct conceptions; thus we know that it is due to simultaneously existing mental factors that this is so. Just as in cognizing an object that can be cognized, the first moment and so on ought to be termed 'feeling' because the mind is aware of the cognitive object, just like the second moment. If [such a distinct] mind does not exist, then to distinguish separate states is merely wasted effort. A formal inference against the postulation of distinct states: 'The mind of the second moment, according to you, should not be termed feeling, because its function is not distinct, just like the mind of the first moment.' If it is postulated that, as with the six consciousnesses, it is not simultaneous but has six distinct states, that is not like this case: because their bases and so forth are distinct, whereas here mind and mental factors arise together at one locus; hence it cannot serve as an analogy. The statement, 'If it is said to be transformation,' etc., can be understood from the text. Furthermore, regarding the statement that there is no distinction between mental conditions and non-mental conditions, etc.: the earlier postulation said that the minds of feeling, conception, and volition are established according to states of the mind, yet distinctive conditions for those states of the mind cannot be found. For instance, when a mind arises taking an agreeable object as its cognitive condition, greed should arise in the very first moment, and so on throughout all times until one departs from this object; why should the first moment be called consciousness, the second feeling, and the third conception? Because there are no distinct conditions. If there are no mental factors, in a single moment of mind there can be no distinct conditions. As for the statement, 'If you again say that it is preceded by consciousness, this too is unreasonable,' etc.: the opponent's counter-defense says, 'Why do you say that we hold greed to be simultaneous with mind? Just as when one takes an agreeable object as a cognitive condition, the first moment is called consciousness, the second is called greed, so what is to prevent the subsequent greed from defiling the mind of the first moment?' Now we refute this: 'Because distinct conditions cannot be found, since they take the one agreeable object.' Regarding the 'analogy of the lamp flame': the flame and the wick symbolize the simultaneous mind and mental factors, with greed and so forth defiling the mind.

15.24

Explaining the *Ṣaḍdhātu-sūtra*, it says: 'It only intends to explain the supreme bases of form, motion, and mental factors.' Among the six elements, the four great elements are the basis of form, space is the basis of movement and locomotion, and consciousness is the basis of mental factors; it is the basis only of consciousness. If it is said that because there are no mental factors in the six elements, mental factors have no separate substance, then since the six elements do not speak of derivative form, would form have no substance? Regarding the 'three analogies of milk, curd, and fresh butter': Master [Xuanzang] said, 'The sūtra says that in the sūtra these three are stated; the analogy means that outside of these three there is no analogy.' Outside the six elements, could there be no other mental factors? Master Bei said, 'This analogy illustrates the first three states, such as the kalala.' Master Tai said, 'Milk illustrates the four great elements of the desire realm as the self; curd illustrates the form realm where there is form that should arise; fresh butter illustrates the formless realm where the conception of space arises. Because they become progressively superior, these three analogies are used. Yet outside these three, how could the form realm and so forth lack mind, etc.?'

15.25

In the category of nominal versus real, regarding 'either seventeen or twelve': seventeen means excluding the mind element, because the text below states that 'six are made into one', meaning that the immediate cessation of the six consciousnesses constitutes the one mind [element]; twelve means that the text below states 'one is made into six', meaning that the mind element is opened into six consciousnesses, collectively forming the mind element. The former accords with the conventional truth principles of the Hīnayāna and so forth; whereas in the Mahāyāna, there are inherently the seventh and eighth consciousnesses which constitute the mind element, and their substances are both real. If so, since the tangible element is nominal, why is it not discussed? Here we take the subject and object without explaining it. Furthermore, excluding the tangible element, this is nominally existent. The text below says 'one is made into six' and so forth to explain the reason for twelve.

15.26

Regarding the four permutations of the eye element: as in the two competing explanations in the second fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*, both seeds and actualized [states] are called elements; thus we reconcile and explain this text. Master Jayasena took this as textual proof that seeds and actualized states do not arise simultaneously; now, taking the actualized eye as the element, it is superior and hence without fault. Second, in the external dust one should form four permutations such as obtaining the eye but not obtaining form: when the eye does not transform into form, it is obtaining the eye but not obtaining form; one without eyes has only the form of the nimittabhāga of the eighth [consciousness], hence obtaining form but not obtaining the eye; both are matured; neither is matured, and so on.

15.27

Regarding 'homogeneous' (sabhāga) and 'non-homogeneous' (tatsabhāga): properly speaking, they refer to the five faculties, but conceptually they can also refer to the six consciousnesses. However, in the Mahāyāna, the seventh consciousness and the mental consciousness should also be distinguished, just like the five faculties. In the dharma element, if mental factors are considered in terms of each of their own real dusts, how can they be called homogeneous? Now, taking them as jointly relying on one faculty, taking the dust of the single root-consciousness constitutes what is meant by 'homogeneous' and so forth.

15.28

Now, regarding 'capable of grasping': as stated in the fourth fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya Commentary*, the mind grasps only without contact. Here, where it encompasses both contact and non-contact: because here the five faculties serve as the approach, it encompasses both contact and non-contact; whereas there the specific dust serves as the approach, so it is strictly without contact, and there is no contradiction. In the dharma element, one should say that one portion grasps through contact; since this is only one portion of the dharma element, it is omitted from discussion. In the Mahāyāna, the seventh and eighth [consciousnesses] grasp neither through contact nor through non-contact.

15.29

Regarding 'Question: How many are bound only to the desire and form realms? Answer: Eleven': these are the five faculties, three consciousnesses, and three dusts, because smell, taste, and their consciousnesses belong only to the desire realm. In the category of appropriated and non-appropriated: in terms of the definitive truth of the Mahāyāna, only the eighth [consciousness] is called the grasper; in terms of the conforming rational approach, it applies to all six consciousnesses. Now, looking at the drift of the text below, which says, 'Because apart from that, no other grasper can be found,' this is the conforming rational approach. The sound element is not separate from the faculty and is constant, so it is called appropriated; sound as an āyatana exists but is not continuous, which is why it is not discussed. Here we take its element. As for the claim by some that the eighth consciousness does not take sound as a cognitive object: this is as explained elsewhere in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya Commentary* and other texts.

15.30

In the differentiation between the original-nature element and the perfumed element, Jayasena, Candragomin, and Dharmapāla distinguish three positions.

15.31

Regarding 'Question: In the eye, ear, and [eye and] ear consciousnesses, because they arise from a multitude of conditions, because they perish in an instant, because they lack agency': first, because they do not arise naturally, seeing occurs; second, it is not because they are permanent that they are able to see; phenomena devoid of agency, because they lack the agency [asserted by] the non-Buddhists such as the Vaiśeṣikas, cannot really see.

15.32

The treatise says: 'Or there is a stream of consciousness, but not the eye and other faculties; whether defective or non-defective, both can be found.' This means that the seeds of the faculties are impaired and unable to produce actualized states; the seeds of consciousness are not impaired, and these seeds of consciousness stream at all times, whereas the faculties may be defective or non-defective. Thus we know that if there are faculty seeds, they will certainly produce actualized seeds of consciousness; producing consciousness inherently has seeds of consciousness, but faculty seeds do not necessarily produce faculties. It is also said: 'stream' means stream-category. For instance, when the three kinds [of seeds] concurrent with consciousness are accomplished, if the faculty is defective, there is the accomplishment of seeds; that stream-category of consciousness can be found whether the faculty is defective or non-defective. Thus we know that consciousness arises when there are faculties, but faculties do not exist because of consciousness. Furthermore, 'stream' means the sense of continuity; that is, consciousness exists elsewhere without faculties, streaming continuously from continuity; when faculties arise, they stream together without faculties, and its faculties may be defective or non-defective. Thus we know that the faculty is superior, and seeing is seeing as such, with no separate meaning.

15.33

Regarding the sequence: the threefold sequence refers to 'basis, realm, and both capable of relying', hence the threefold sequence. Among the six kinds of distinctions, 'delight' means what the mind delights in, establishing this sequence; furthermore, the mind mostly delights in the eye seeing various forms and so forth, hence this sequence. *Añjana* is the name of a medicine; that medicine is a stone that is bluish-black; this is not yet suitable for dyeing the eyes; when dyeing the eyes it matches bluish-black, and does not let the eyes become white.

15.34

The form realm possesses the nose and tongue elements; regarding the statement, 'Furthermore, in the form realm, one has not detached from desire regarding these two': it means that because external craving has been severed, there are no smell and taste; because smell and taste do not exist, the two consciousnesses also do not exist. If there is consciousness, it must arise by taking an object. These two arise by relying on external craving, but internal craving has not yet been severed; hence the two elements exist.

15.35

Regarding the reply: 'Because the seeds of the various consciousnesses with applied and sustained thought follow along with the concentration devoid of applied and sustained thought, they manifest after emerging from concentration': here, the mind with applied and sustained thought concurrent with the mental consciousness serves as the inductor, inducing the arising of the five consciousnesses; it is not as in the Hīnayāna, where the five consciousnesses must possess applied and sustained thought of their own to arise. Because, by means of the path of antidotes or by revulsion, one has removed the desire for applied and sustained thought, it is called nature-free from desire, hence termed 'devoid of applied and sustained thought'; yet because seeds are still operating, there is no error. Here an objection should be raised: applied and sustained thought belong to the first dhyāna, yet detachment from desire for the second dhyāna causes them to arise. The faculty of pain is abandoned in the second dhyāna, yet pain still arises within the second dhyāna; the seed of pain is the oppressive, unwholesome fruit. In the second dhyāna there is no faculty of pain, but applied and sustained thought stimulate the three consciousnesses, which is why the higher stages possess applied and sustained thought.

15.36

Regarding the oneness and twoness of the eye consciousness relying on the faculty, when it says 'relying on two portions', this refers to the faculty. 'Should be spoken of as one or two' refers to the consciousness of phenomena. In accordance with the text below, because consciousness is not form, it cannot be said to become two by virtue of spatial location; this speaks of substance. By the two meanings of relying on the faculty, the consciousness also becomes two in accordance with the faculty. Just like the direction of consciousness, its substance is not directional.

15.37

In the question and answer regarding how the eye and consciousness, being cause and effect, can be simultaneous, why is this so? The eye and consciousness are not direct productive causes (janaka-hetu), but merely establishing causes. Master Jayasena: This text proves that seeds and actualized states arise at different times, as in the case of not being direct productive causes. The faculty does not produce consciousness simultaneously; it is an establishing cause, which can arise simultaneously; thus we know that direct productive causes arise at different times. Now we explain: This text is based on productive and non-productive causes. Productive causes are causes like the seed producing the sprout, explaining simultaneity; if one does not say productive cause, then it is at a different time. Here, calling it an establishing cause means it is an empowering condition (adhipati-pratyaya), not a directly productive causal condition (hetu-pratyaya); what is to prevent the cause and effect of an empowering condition from arising simultaneously? Hence the text below states that even if one has one's own seed, without this support, consciousness would not arise. Its productive cause is indeterminate, because seeds producing seeds occur at different times. As in the preceding fifth fascicle of the *Maulī Bhūmi*, if it arises from a homogeneous, different thought-moment, it does not at that very moment produce an actualized, heterogeneous state; hence they arise simultaneously. Master Jayasena's explanation of these seven meanings of seeds and the text on simultaneous seeds is as distinguished under the four characteristics. Here, the Sautrāntikas hold that cause and effect arise [at different] times; the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* details their objections extensively, as in the three rescues.

15.38

Regarding skill in the matter of elements, analogized to the verses on skill in the aggregates, etc.: this means that just as the final verses in skill in the aggregates subsume the preceding text, the bases (āyatana) being like the elements are also like this.

15.39

In the four permutations of the eye not being an āyatana, the first permutation says: 'If the eye has been obtained and not relinquished, but is a phenomenon subject to immediate cessation': this refers to the final eye of an arhat, which ceases immediately and cannot produce consciousness. Because 'āyatana' has the meaning of a gateway for arising and growth, this cannot bring about arising and growth.

15.40

In the permutations contrasting contact and āyatana, the statement 'yet is not a phenomenon subject to immediate cessation' excludes the final eye of an arhat and so forth. That fourth permutation is neither a contact-āyatana nor an āyatana; hence it is identical with what is bound to the form realm. Here there is no second [permutation of] being a contact-āyatana but not an āyatana.

15.41

The eight spheres of mastery (abhibhv-āyatana) and so forth, among the twelve āyatanas, are subsumed under the mental faculty and mental phenomena āyatanas, excluding only the sphere of non-conception. Those are subsumed under ten āyatanas, excluding smell and taste. In the Mahāyāna, this is like the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*'s chapter on subsumption, which states that the eight possess the mental āyatana.

15.42

'Sovereign controller' refers to the self. 'Lacking inherent agency' refers to Īśvara, or that these phenomena arise from conditions and lack inherent agency. The rest can be understood. 'Revealed only by phenomena', 'capable of moistening', and so forth can be understood.

15.43

The support-state for the projecting cause and the support-state for the producing cause are both spoken of according to the states of past birth, and aging and death; therefore they are named 'contact-born' and so forth. Collating the text regarding the essential nature of the projecting cause and the producing cause, it is identical with the text of Fascicle 10 of the Maulī Bhūmi, the Abhidharma[-samuccaya], and so on.

15.44

In refuting the view that ignorance is non-existence, [the treatise] says: First, if one explains non-existence as ignorance, this entails the fault that a non-existent phenomenon would be ignorance; second, if one takes real phenomena distinct from the three natures (wholesome, etc.) lacking the brightness of undefiled wisdom to be named ignorance, this entails the fault that all minds would be defiled. As for 'Furthermore, in a mental continuum devoid of brightness, brightness could never arise at any time': this means that if wholesome and other three natures were all ignorance, then in the mental continuum of one who has not yet attained undefiled bright wisdom, because all three natures would be ignorance, there would be no preparatory application for undefiled brightness, and it could never arise at any time. If, proceeding from a wholesome mental continuum, there is no ignorance within wholesome conditions, then undefiled brightness has preparatory application, and thus brightness can arise. Therefore, one cannot say that wholesome and other three natures are all ignorance.

15.45

The treatise says: 'Furthermore, if by the power of afflictions such as craving, they cause the associated knowledge to take on the nature of delusion...': this means that the external view asserts: 'Delusion is itself view; by the power of association with view, it causes knowledge to take on the nature of delusion.' If so, then delusion would be caused by craving, rather than delusion being predominant and primary, causing all afflictions such as craving. Furthermore, it should be like prajñā accompanied by other [afflictions such as] anger: through associated anger and so on, it would be caused to become delusion; it would not be intrinsic delusion that could take on the nature of delusion. Moreover, it should be that all mental factors and so forth would likewise be caused to take on the nature of delusion, because of being defiled by the power of craving and so forth. As you say, view should also have the intrinsic nature of delusion; like the five omnipresent mental factors, etc., whose essence is not delusion, yet by the power of craving and so forth, they are caused to become delusion.

15.46

The treatise says: 'One should know that herein, the wind of in-and-out breathing is named the bodily formation.' They grasp that bodily activity depends on wind, and therefore attains continuity. For example, in one who is strangled to death, the wind of in-and-out breathing does not circulate or pass through, and therefore it is called death. Furthermore, with wind as primary, bodily karma and so forth are caused to function. There are two meanings here. Another explanation: these are both one single explanation. Stating that the wind of in-and-out breathing is called bodily [formation] is the ultimate presentation; from 'wind as the guide' downward explains the reason. It is necessarily due to the presence of wind that bodily karma then functions.

15.47

Regarding 'Whatever realm or bhūmi one is born into, one should know that the existence-limb is subsumed therein,' etc.: Master Bei says: This existence-limb is judged with respect to the place where one will be born, and thus belongs to the bondage of the place where one will be born. This is solely the single limb of existence, not the twelve limbs of pratītyasamutpāda. Master Jing says: This generally subsumes cause by means of effect; being born into this one bhūmi, when birth and aging are present, the ten causes capable of inducing this follow the effect and are also bound to this one bhūmi. If so, then one knows that ignorance of a lower realm does not generate karma of an upper realm. In subsuming the limbs under the three—karma, affliction, and thing—it contradicts the Abhidharma[-samuccaya] and the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra; this is harmonized as in the Commentary on the Abhidharma[-samuccaya]. Regarding 'craving and grasping are called initiators': 'initiate' means produce; they are capable of producing existence; craving and grasping are also called initiators, not the afflictions that initiate karma.

15.48

In [the passage on] ignorance regarding karma giving rise to improper faith, it says 'Rudra Deva': this is named the Fierce and Evil Deva. 'Viṣṇu Deva': this is named the Delusion Deva, because he can magically transform into various forms such as wild geese and crows. Both are the eight transformation bodies of Maheśvara. Or some say that Viṣṇu Deva is a transformation body of the Vasu Devas. 'Lord of the World Deva' is Brahmā.

15.49

The treatise says: 'Ignorance, in brief, serves as a productive cause in five places': First, it can produce doubt, because it can produce doubt concerning the three times; second, it can produce craving, because it can produce the three kinds of craving, internal, external, etc.; third, it can produce improper faith, that is, three kinds of wrong faith regarding cultivation of karma, difference, and co-arising; fourth, it can produce views: through not correctly penetrating the Three Jewels and the Four Truths, it therefore produces the sixty-two views, wrong views, and so forth; fifth, regarding cause and effect, and claiming to have attained the fruits of the śramaṇa when one has not attained them, it produces excessive conceit (abhimāna) among the three kinds. Thus there are seventeen kinds of ignorance. Regarding 'ignorance concerning the six contacts': this means that when one attains the fruits of the śramaṇa by means of the path, one must penetrate the emptiness of the six sense-fields of contact, which is called the exhaustion of name-and-form, before one attains finality; now those non-Buddhists, without penetrating, claim to have penetrated, which is called excessive conceit. The expedient that produces it is attachment to rules and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa).

15.50

Fascicle 57

15.51

The essence of skill in the possible and impossible (sthānāsthāna-kauśalya) is the posterior wisdom that apprehends the characteristics of causes and effects; it is the knowledge of what is conforming as possible, and what is contrary as impossible.

15.52

The treatise's brief explanation of the knowable pervades all phenomena.

15.53

The treatise says: 'It refers to relying on the initial door of accomplishment, the remaining distinctive characteristics not subsumed by that': this means that regarding what is not subsumed outside of solely the initial door of accomplishment, it is now displayed so that all varieties of distinctions are subsumed completely; that is, the subsequent three doors.

15.54

The treatise says: 'There is no place and no state where coarse portions of water and fire conjoin simultaneously; there is no such possibility.' 'Place and state' means time and period; it means there is no place and no time. 'Coarse portions of water and fire' excludes the subtle fire of hot touch within water. Coarse fire, like the substance of burning embers, does not coexist with water.

15.55

The treatise says: 'Without severing all afflictions and secondary afflictions such as craving, to cultivate the four smṛtyupasthānas is impossible': this means that during the defiled state, it is because craving is subdued that one then gives rise to aśubha-bhāvanā and so forth. Furthermore, having already accomplished the smṛtyupasthānas, one cultivates them undefiledly.

15.56

Regarding the twenty-two faculties, the Kośa verse says: / Mind's support, distinctions, / Its staying, its defilement, / Its provisions, and its purification: / Relying on this measure are faculties established. / By virtue of this verse, there can be neither addition nor reduction.

15.57

Regarding 'predominant in experiencing the fruits of karma, five feeling faculties are established': grief is not a fruit; however, having attained the fruit, one also gives rise to experiential enjoyment during the state of the fruit, and therefore it is said to 'experience the fruit.'

15.58

The treatise says: 'To reveal the meaning of experiencing objects through internal doors, six faculties are established; to reveal the meaning of experiencing through external doors, two faculties are established': this means that the six faculties of the eye, etc., do not rely on another person as a condition, but self-experience objects, which is called internal doors; the two faculties [of masculinity and femininity] rely on another to make use of objects, which is called doors. 'To clearly reveal the meaning of sentient beings' merits and faults, eight faculties are established': this means that the three undefiled ones, and among the five [faculties] of faith, etc., are the aids to liberation (mokṣabhāgīya), which are merits; the five [faculties] of faith, etc., are the aids to merit (puṇyabhāgīya), and the defiled ones are faults. Alternatively, merits refers to the eight faculties; faults refers to what is severed by the eight faculties.

15.59

The treatise relies on designations such as these to establish the six faculties, establishing the faculties among the eight designative phrases. That is, such name is the first, referring to the intermediate existence; gotra and family name are the second, that is, the gotra of father and mother; such food, suffering, and pleasure are the third; such longevity is the fourth; such abiding is the fifth; such lifespan limit is the sixth. The above are designations based on the lay category. Such faith up to prajñā establishes the five, faith and so on, as the seventh; such four fruits establish the latter three undefiled faculties as the eighth designation. These are in the monastic category.

15.60

The treatise says: For accumulating the wholesome factors, one is established, named the life faculty; because it exists relying on life, one can cultivate the wholesome factors. Because defilement arises by means of the five feelings, acting with clear comprehension, the defiled five feelings do not arise.

15.61

The sixteen substantial entities exclude male, female, life, and the last three. Seven are material: form. Mind faculty entirely, and a minor part of the last three, are mind. Five feelings and the five of faith, etc.—ten entirely, and a minor part of the last three—are mental factors. The life faculty is non-concomitant. Answering: The last three faculties are portions of nine faculties, namely mind, the five of faith, and three feelings. As in the tenth fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya], ten faculties are the faculty of learning what is not yet known; that text adds the grief faculty, whereas this treatise takes the fifteen-mind darśanamārga as learning what is not yet known, wherein there is no grief. That text takes the wholesome roots that are aids to liberation onward as being named the initial faculty, so among ten it adds grief.

15.62

The treatise says: 'The life faculty has no subordination.' The Dharma Master says: Hence we know that the life faculty is not solely established upon the eighth primary mind, but pervades the five simultaneous mental factors. Now this interpretation is not correct, as it contradicts the text of the Prakaraṇāryavācā. Furthermore, [the life faculty] is the remaining momentum of the root; like male, female, and the three undefiled faculties, which all take a minor portion of their supporting faculty as their essence, resembling root form and mind. This is nominally designated upon them, and is not a part of the supporting faculties; hence it is said to have no subordination, not that it is established across the five mental factors alongside [mind]. As in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its Commentary.

15.63

Regarding '[Question:] How many are wholesome? Either eight, or five and fractions of six': 'eight' refers to the five beginning with faith and the three uncontaminated [faculties], discussing both nominal and real together. 'Five' refers solely to the five beginning with faith; this [number] eight is stated based on the five faculties. 'Five completely and fractions of six' refers to the five feelings and a fraction of the mind [faculty]. As for the unwholesome, fractions of six likewise refer to the five feelings and the mind. 'Eight are indeterminate' refers to the seven physical [faculties] and life [faculty] completely; 'fractions of five' refers to the four feelings excluding grief, and the mind making five. How many have maturation? Answer: one, and fractions of ten. 'One' refers to the faculty of grief, which invariably has maturation; 'fractions of ten' refers to the five beginning with faith, the four feelings, and the mind, excluding those that are indeterminate or uncontaminated; hence, fractions of ten. 'Without maturation' refers to eleven, and fractions of ten. 'Eleven' refers to the seven physical [faculties], the life [faculty], and the three uncontaminated [faculties], because the former eight are indeterminate and the latter three are uncontaminated. This is spoken with respect to the initial faculty in the path of seeing. 'Fractions of ten' refers to the five beginning with faith, the four feelings, and the mind, because good and bad are excluded. How many are maturation? Answer: one, and fractions of nine. This refers to the life faculty completely, and the seven physical [faculties], mind, and equanimity as fractions of nine, the remainder being those nourished, physical, and of the two mental natures: mind, equanimity, and so forth. Here, those produced by karma that are unbroken in continuity are taken as faculties; joy, pleasure, and suffering are not, because they are interrupted. 'How many seeds are maturation? All are.' The Dharma Master states that because they are held within the maturation consciousness, all are called maturation. Another explanation states: here, what is in continuity is called maturation; thus, because all seeds are continuous, all are called maturation. This text is not as good as the first, because in the lower realms such as the narakas, seeds of the male and female [faculties] and so forth do not exist, and thus are not continuous, as explained in the second fascicle of the Cheng weishi [lun]. Among those that are not maturation, twelve are completely so: namely, the five beginning with faith, the three uncontaminated [faculties], and grief, joy, pleasure, and suffering, because these are interrupted and so forth. 'Fractions of nine' refers to the seven physical [faculties], mind, and equanimity—fractions of nine, which are the remainder mentioned previously. The life faculty is invariably maturation. Four completely belong to the desire realm: namely, male, female, grief, and suffering; fractions of fifteen refer to the five physical faculties, the three feelings, mind, life faculty, and the five beginning with faith, excluding the uncontaminated ones. This is the same as the previous text. The fractions of fifteen in the form realm are the aforementioned fifteen. In the formless [realm], because the five physical faculties are excluded and joy and pleasure are excluded, there are eight. Three completely do not belong [to any realm], and fractions of nine are as explained above; the reason for their differences [is stated there]. In the threshold stage there are eleven: namely, the eight beginning with faith, adding mind, joy, and equanimity. If so, is the limb of joy not established? Because it is close to the distractions of the desire realm, it is not established; for the initial fundamental absorption, it is said to be distant, so it is established. 'The initial gate speaks of the threshold stage' refers to 'arising from separation, joy and pleasure moisten one's body'; 'pervading' and below is the latter gate. The initial only moistens the mind, whereas the latter gladdens the body and so forth; thus the latter is superior and the former inferior. Why did the former mention pleasure? To clarify that pleasure is also present; now joy is prominently established, and when both the hidden and the prominent are cited, only the prominent is taken. If reasoned theoretically, this stage also has pleasure, for because it gladdens the faculties, it is called pleasure. Because there is no fixed location and no accompanying realm, and the five faculties are hidden, they are not mentioned; mentioning them or not presents no hindrance, as the dharmas of this stage can be relied upon, extending to both contaminated and uncontaminated. The initial [absorption has] eighteen, excluding male, female, grief, and suffering. Previously it was said that bound dharmas are exclusively contaminated; hence above and below differ, yet neither is faulty. The third and fourth in order exclude joy and pleasure. The sphere of empty space excludes the five physical ones, hence eleven. Neither-perception[-nor-non-perception] serves as the path of severing defilements, hence eight; if for roaming contemplation and the like, it extends to eleven. However, by taking the eleven of the sphere of empty space as agreeing with the Abhidharma, because the superior wholesome roots contributing to liberation are all called the faculty of coming to know what is not yet known, the eleven conflicts with the earlier text. This is based on the distant preliminary practice. The previous text was based on the fifteen mind-moments of the path of seeing: one text takes this faculty to be exclusively uncontaminated, one text takes it to extend to both contaminated and uncontaminated, and one text states it belongs to the form realm and does not belong to any realm. Another text says it exclusively does not belong to any realm, one text takes nine faculties as its nature, and one text takes ten faculties as its nature. There is a text stating that the wholesome roots contributing to liberation extend to neither-perception[-nor-non-perception]; thus the nature of the eleven faculties of the sphere of empty space in the earlier text is precisely this. When reaching the other texts, they should be reconciled. When neither-perception[-nor-non-perception] is said to be contaminated, this is in terms of kind: namely, because the path of severing defilements is absent in kind, it is called contaminated; if in terms of continuity, it extends to both kinds. Or it is called kind, meaning that in that stage there is no uncontaminated kind that severs defilements. Again, when it is called uncontaminated because of liberation from afflictions, this refers to subsequent attainment wisdom. Or it is said that in that stage, just as in the body of an arhat the various faculties are free from contamination and thus called uncontaminated, it is not that severing contamination makes them uncontaminated. The text below says that neither-perception[-nor-non-perception] has the uncontaminated; one cannot say that because afflictions are liberated, contaminated faculties are perfected, and that the six faculties in an uncontaminated body are called uncontaminated, for this would conflict with the text below. For the desire realm, based on the majority of persons and dharmas, all [are present]. In the narakas, eight faculties are perfected in both active manifestation and seeds. Among those where three are excluded, there are two sets of three: first, the three uncontaminated faculties. This one is in terms of active manifestation being unperfected, while seeds may or may not be perfected. Second, three feelings. Here there is an extreme error; check the two disputes in the sixth fascicle of the Weishi regarding the eight faculties. Those perfected in both active manifestation and seeds are the five beginning with the eye, as well as mind, life, and suffering. These are invariably continuous; unlike the Hīnayāna, because of life and suffering, they possess the five faculties. The male and female faculties are indeterminate: they may or may not exist, and their seeds are likewise indeterminate. As in the text, because the seeds of uncontaminated faculties are also impaired, they are not subsumed under 'active manifestation unperfected, seeds invariably existing'. The five beginning with faith are also like this: just as one with wrong view impairs and suppresses wholesome seeds, this is also called not perfecting seeds. This is stated in the context of the text on the three kinds of perfection, and therefore is not among those where active manifestation is unperfected while seeds are definitely present. Regarding the second and third where active manifestation is unperfected while seeds are definite, they are joy, pleasure, and equanimity. This is a formulation discussed in terms of the six consciousnesses. Question: Why is equanimity concurrent with the eighth [consciousness], yet it is not said to be invariably perfected in active manifestation, and with grief, why is suffering instead said to invariably exist? Answer: The feeling of equanimity is eclipsed by suffering, as in the text of the fifty-first fascicle; hence only suffering is mentioned. Furthermore, this is a formulation in terms of the six consciousnesses, so there is no equanimity concurrent with the eighth; equanimity in the sixth is brought about by wholesome karma and is interrupted, so it is not taken. As for not taking the faculty of grief: in the Mahāyāna now, the faculty of grief is in places of extreme suffering; just as extreme joy is called pleasure, this grief is called suffering. There, only suffering exists, yet it is not said that grief is absent; grief arises provisionally, so it is not mentioned. If so, why is it not in the second or third [category]? In 'active manifestation unperfected, seeds perfected', because it is of one substance with suffering, it obtains a different name, 'suffering', and thus is not mentioned. Only the five beginning with faith and the two, male and female, are indeterminate in both seeds and active manifestation. The remaining grief is to be understood accordingly, based on the second. There is an explanation: the eight that are perfected in both active manifestation and seeds refer to taking equanimity and excluding suffering; this is a formulation in terms of the eighth [consciousness]. In the latter category, under 'active manifestation unperfected, seeds invariably perfected', suffering is taken. Why was suffering not mentioned previously? Because it has periods of cessation and rest. Why do the latter three not mention grief? Because they mutually alternate in existence and nonexistence, as existing and not existing. Just as there is pleasure and there is joy, and pleasure does not mutually alternate in existence and nonexistence, why is it so for grief and suffering? Answer: It is also due to extreme suffering. When grief flows into the mind, it is called suffering, and grief is not mentioned; when suffering is spoken of as grief, suffering is excluded. The former explanation is superior. Here, regarding the two disputes between Jayasena and Candragomin on innate [seeds], Candragomin takes this as evidence.

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