瑜伽師地論略纂 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

Within the bhūmi of mental activity (manobhūmi), the main text is divided into two parts: above, the essence of the bhūmi of mental activity was distinguished through five gates; below, the meaning of the bhūmi of mental activity is explained through ten gates. The text is divided into three: first, it recites the previous five gates as subsumed under the three loci, marking the beginning of the treatise; next, from "Now we shall first explain the dharmas of material clusters" onward, it explains the ten gates individually; finally, it concludes comprehensively with verses.

2.3

"Excluding nominal dharmas": because they have no distinct seeds from which they arise, and have no distinct substance, they are now excluded. It is not that they are excluded from the bhūmi of mental activity [as a whole], for the four characteristics are distinguished within this bhūmi.

2.4

Regarding the ten gates, the verse below says: "Clusters of matter, associated categories, temporal characteristics and conditions, the gates of distinction such as wholesome, and finally the matters of skillful means." Within the distinctions such as wholesome, there are three gates: first, the three natures; second, the numerical progression of the twelve āyatanas; third, explaining the names and meanings of the twelve āyatanas. Within matter, there are two parts: first, marking; next, explaining. The explanation is divided into seven: first, clarifying that the primary elements serve as five causes in producing matter; second, clarifying the distinction between the existence and nonexistence of paramāṇus; third, clarifying that the primary elements and derived matter do not exist separately; fourth, clarifying the quantity of matters in material clusters; fifth, clarifying the continuity and interruption of various forms of matter; sixth, clarifying the distinctions among the three kinds of material clusters; seventh, clarifying that material clusters function based on the six bases.

2.5

The primary elements, in producing derived matter, can serve as five causes: first, producing cause (janana-hetu); second, relying cause (niśraya-hetu); third, establishing cause (pratiṣṭhā-hetu); fourth, supporting cause (upastambha-hetu); fifth, nourishing cause (upabṛṃhaṇa-hetu). Correlate them as in the text. In the relying cause, "because once derived matter has arisen, it functions without separating from the locus of the primary elements": this refers to production identical to the physical substance and production within the same cluster, being real production rather than nominal production. For the light of the sun, solitary scents, etc., are separated from primary elements; and the matter of morality born of meditative absorption and the path in the formless realm lacks the four great elements. Their force relies on them to exist, so all have a relying cause. In the supporting cause, "because it does not disintegrate along with the equal measure of the primary elements": this is also based on the meaning of what is derived from the four elements in the same cluster; when a physical substance is struck and emits sound, it is because of the large physical substance. Alternatively, when the five sense-objects are attached to the physical substance, they are all equal in quantity to the substance; only when far and remote do they become larger than the substance. In the nourishing cause, the first fascicle of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* states: "It refers to the primary elements nourishing that derived matter, causing it to increase and grow." That text speaks of the sense in which all primary elements nourish derived matter; here in this treatise, it speaks solely of nourishing matter where the four great elements are sustained by the four conditions to arise and can nourish derived matter. However, regarding derived matter, the primary elements nourish it directly; the primary elements must rely on the four conditions to sustain their growth before they can nourish derived matter. Now it says that only with external conditions can the primary elements nourish; it is not that the four external conditions are this nourishing cause, for production means existing in mutual reliance. The five causes such as producing are all subsumed under the sovereign cause (adhipati-hetu); some possess the five meanings and some do not possess all five, not that all are necessarily possessed, as can be known from the above. If based on the real meaning, the direct production of matter must be produced from the same nature, not a different nature; it must be produced from the same category, not a different category, because the contaminated and uncontaminated must be of the same category; it must be produced from the same realm, not a different realm; and meditative absorption and distraction must be the same, not produced from different dharmas. If production is nominally spoken of as distant mutual reliance, then according to what applies, there is no obstruction among the three classes of ripening (vipāka), nourishment (aupacayika), and equal outflow (niṣyanda). Whether each directly produces its own or they mutually produce each other, it is logically not obstructed either. The various approaches of meaning are as explained in the separate chapter.

2.6

"Never has an atom arisen within a material cluster", etc.: this shows sudden transformation, not the meaning of gradual accumulation, unlike the Sarvāstivādins who hold that atoms exist within a cluster.

2.7

"Nor do atoms assemble to form a material cluster": atoms have no real substance, unlike the Sautrāntikas' notion that seeds form the gross. Combining this with the previous point, it also differs from the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that both gross and subtle are real substances, as explained in the commentary on the first fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*.

2.8

"An atom also has spatial direction-parts": "direction" refers to the various cardinal directions; "part" refers to subtle parts; although it has directions, it lacks subtle parts. An atom belongs only to gross matter, having nothing else of its own. Fascicle 1 of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* says: "Atoms have no spatial parts (digbhāga)"—here "direction" is itself the "part", not the meaning of the various directions. Although the two texts differ, they are not contradictory.

2.9

Under the two not existing separately, the text is divided into two: first, a brief explanation of the two kinds; from "Moreover, this pervasive…" onward, an elaborate explanation of the two kinds. "Not existing separately in the same locus" means that wherever there is no sense faculty, there is non-faculty matter; wherever there is a sense faculty, there is faculty matter. The primary elements and derived matter of their own category all interpenetrate in the same locus, not that atoms abide each separately. "Not existing separately through harmonious intermixture" means that primary elements of their own category and primary elements of other categories mutually interpenetrate and reside together in one locus. Therefore, the treatise below says: the former is a cluster of shared primary elements, and the latter is a cluster of unshared primary elements. In this explanation of harmonious intermixture it also says: these very atoms of primary elements assemble with others, coexisting in the locus of producing and produced matter. This is unlike the Sarvāstivādins where atoms are distinct and differ in substance within the same cluster. The *Kośa* verse says: "In the desire realm, a cluster of atoms without sound, lacking a sense faculty, has eight entities; with the body faculty, it has nine entities; with other faculties, it has ten entities." Now in the Mahāyāna, all primary elements and derived matter of the same or different categories have no separate atoms; wherever there is a cluster, they all mutually interpenetrate, which is called "not existing separately". Furthermore, "not existing separately in the same locus" means that within all primary element atoms, whether with or without sense faculties, there are corresponding atoms of all derived matter mutually interpenetrating to form a single entity, without separate atoms abiding in two loci. "Not existing separately through harmonious intermixture" means that this single atom of a primary element, though in the same locus with the atoms of all other primary elements and derived matter, does not become a single substance. Because their natures are distinct and their functions are different, we know they are not of one nature; because the faculties universally experience them therein and do not obstruct one another, we know they are in the same locus: this is called not existing separately in the same locus. Because their natures are distinct and their functions are different, it is called "mixture"; because they share the same locus, it is called "harmony". There are not two locations, for both rely on a single locus, yet their substances remain distinct; hence they are called coexisting in locus. The meaning of their not being confused is obvious. From "Moreover, this pervasive material cluster…" onward, taking advantage of the text's flow, it first explains not existing separately through harmonious intermixture. From "Moreover, all derived matter…" onward, it then explains not existing separately in the same locus. In clusters of sesame seeds, etc., their substances and categories dwell separately; primary elements, derived matter, and atoms are not like that. Rather, it is like various substances ground into powder by a stone mill and combined with water: their locations are difficult to distinguish, yet their natures remain distinct; this is the meaning of not existing separately through harmonious intermixture. From "Moreover, all derived matter…" down to the locus occupied by the primary elements, this is production identical to the physical substance. The various forms of derived matter also occupy these very primary elements and derived matter, together relying on a single locus, unlike other schools where each category dwells separately; this is the meaning of not existing separately. What has been explained above: the latter two textual passages follow the meaning of the latter alternative explanation among the two loci explained earlier. If based on the first alternative explanation, taking into account primary elements and derived matter of the same and different categories, the meaning should be understood accordingly. This meaning is as explained in chapters fifty-four and sixty-five of the *Viniścaya*, the fifth fascicle of the commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, etc.

2.10

Under the quantity of matters in material clusters, there are two parts: first, a general clarification of the quantity of matters; later, from "Moreover, regarding mutual subsumption…" onward, a specific demonstration of the meaning of subsumption. "Matter" (dravya) means substance, entity. In all material clusters collectively, there are fourteen entities, excluding the fruits of superior meditative concentration, because they are not definitively existent. This speaks of real substances, excluding all that is nominal.

2.11

Regarding “all aggregations of matter subsumed by the physical sense faculties,” fascicle 54 states: Taking the eye as an example, if considered in terms of essential subsumption, there is only one, namely the translucent matter of the eye. If considered in terms of inseparable subsumption, there are seven, namely eye, body, earth, visible form, odor, taste, and tangibility. If considered in terms of element subsumption, there are ten, adding water, fire, and wind. The ear, nose, and tongue are also like this. As for the body faculty, because it can be found independently without the four [faculties] such as the eye, it can only have nine. "Element" (dhātu) means cause. In accordance with the Sautrāntika tenet that form can uphold seeds, it is said that those elements exist. Alternatively, it is designated as an "element" in the sense of the predominant condition among functions capable of generating that form and so forth within that aggregation. Alternatively, "element" means intrinsic nature, which is just that substantial entity. For instance, in the desire realm, where there are the four such as the eye, the body faculty is definitely present. A certain teacher formed an erroneous supposition regarding this, saying: "If one attains the divine eye, one also attains the body faculty of that stage, because they are inseparable." That principle is incorrect. The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya states: "Subtle atoms in the four faculties / Should be known as of ten kinds; / Nine in the body faculty, eight in the remainder, / That is, in stages where odor exists." If because there are ten kinds in the four faculties the body is definitely present, how could the expression "stages where odor exists" be explained? The Abhidharmakośa also explains that this is due to aggregations of subtle atoms in the desire realm. Kātyāyana also said: "Can one possess the eye of that stage without possessing the body faculty of that stage?" Answer: "Yes, that is, when one's body is in the desire realm and one brings forth the supernormal knowledge of the divine eye." Therefore we know that teacher's explanation is unreasonable. "Essential subsumption" means subsumption with reference to substance, because each subsumes itself through its own substance. For example, when physical form exists, it exists of itself. "Element subsumption" matches substance with function. "Inseparable subsumption" means that substance and function do not separate.

2.12

In the section on the continuity and interruption of various physical forms, there are six topics: first, sound; second, wind; third, light and darkness forms; fourth, the uninterrupted arising of large and small; fifth, interpreting the sūtras; sixth, demonstrating the existence of the realm of phenomena (dharmadhātu). "Sound element" refers to the four great elements as the causes producing sound. "Constantly moving wind" refers to the winds that support the world, the sun disc, and so on. Constantly continuous dark forms refer to darkness within the world; it is not said of the empty aeon, hence we know it does not exist then. Or the principle is not so: it is spoken of as open space, and therefore not given the name "darkness". "Firmness is just that element" refers to the earth element. "Subsumed by firmness" refers to the remaining characteristics. "Seeds that are not appropriated" refers to undefiled seeds. Although they depend upon consciousness, because consciousness does not take them as objects, they are called "not appropriated".

2.13

Regarding “aggregations of form have three kinds of flowing succession”: the fruit of karma is called "ripening" (vipāka); that which is nurtured and grown by the four present conditions is called "nourished" (aupacayika); that which is neither of the preceding two, but merely arises from its own kind, is called "nisyanda" (uniform outflow). This differs from the Hīnayāna, which separately establishes the momentary [type]; in the Mahāyāna, this is subsumed directly under nourished by concentration. Or it is nisyanda, because defiled states can lead to undefiled dharmas, and active dharmas arise from those seeds—all the more so since the physical form of the initial path is a designation in substance. "Pervading the location" means that its substance increases in breadth, pervading the location. "Intensification of aspects" means that while the location remains the same, its aspect and appearance intensify. "Transformational nisyanda" means changing former aspects, such as blue turning into yellow, or clarity turning into turbidity. "Intrinsic nature nisyanda" means abiding in its former status, arising and perishing in continuity. The initial arising of ripening refers to the fruit of projecting karma; the subsequent arising of ripening refers to the fruit of fulfilling karma. All dharmas are of two kinds: first, conditioned; second, unconditioned. Unconditioned dharmas lack these three, because they have no differentiation; conditioned dharmas possess them. Conditioned dharmas are of two kinds: first, defiled; second, undefiled. Defiled dharmas possess all three; undefiled dharmas have only two, because they lack the fruit of karma. Now, among the undefiled, the faculties have only one [type], lacking nisyanda. The remaining internal forms are of two kinds: if appropriated, they are only nourished; those that are not appropriated extend to nisyanda. External forms of the five sense objects also extend to both kinds. Those stated above as having nourished and nisyanda each possess the two varieties of nourished and nisyanda. Forms resulting from supreme concentration and all minds and mental factors have two kinds of nisyanda and only one kind of nourishment, excluding pervading the location. This speaks of the nominal forms subsumed by the realm of phenomena. The real forms resulting from concentration may perhaps extend to pervading the location. The undefiled has been explained above. Among defiled aggregates, the five internal faculties have only nourished and ripening, lacking nisyanda; they possess the two kinds of nourishment and lack initial ripening; the remaining internal forms possess all three kinds; as for external forms, ripening alone is excluded; nominal forms subsumed by the realm of phenomena have only one kind of nourishment, excluding pervading the location, and extend to the two kinds of nisyanda; minds and mental factors all possess everything, lacking only the single nourishment of pervading the location. As for the eight consciousnesses and the five forms of the realm of phenomena, they should be differentiated later; fearing prolixity, we pause for now. In fascicle 54, they are gathered together as a text: The form of the five faculties has nourishment and ripening, lacking nisyanda; forms that are not faculties possess all three flows; minds and mental factors have nisyanda, ripening, and the flowing succession nourished by the second kind of nourishment; forms subsumed by the realm of phenomena have no arising of ripening, and the rest is like minds and mental factors. Although stated in this way, there is no contradiction. Furthermore, there are distinctions among the three realms and differences in nourishment; the questions, answers, and analyses are all as in fascicle 54. If ripening is divided into two—the initial moment of arising and the subsequent continuity—this statement differs from the earlier one, and should be considered and measured accordingly later.

2.14

Among the six bases, "establishment" refers to the wind mandala, gold mandala, and so forth, which are dharmas that mutually support and uphold. "Concealment" refers to houses, buildings, and so forth.

2.15

In the second section explaining the associated aggregates, the text is divided into five parts: first, marking the mind and fifty-three mental factors; second, through the fourfold "universality", distinguishing the differences among the five categories of mental factors, because afflictions and secondary afflictions are combined into one; third, distinguishing the arising of the consciousnesses due to faculties, objects, and so forth; fourth, from "Furthermore, consciousness can discern the general characteristics of things" onward, clarifying the cognitive modes of mind and mental factors; fifth, from "Attentiveness..." onward, clarifying the distinctions in substance and operation between the two categories of mental factors: universal and particular. Regarding "all places" (all moral qualities), the fifth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explains: It refers to the locus of the three moral natures.

2.16

"All grounds" has two meanings: one says the three grounds of "with directed examination," etc.; the other says four of form, four of formlessness, and one of the desire realm, combining to make nine grounds. "All times" means whenever mind arises, they definitely exist. "All [factors] together" means that within their own category, when one arises, all definitely accompany it. The universal factors possess all four; the particular factors lack the latter two; among the eleven wholesome factors, they extend to all grounds. "Not in all places" means they are only of the wholesome nature. "Not at all times" means they do not all arise whenever mind arises. "Not all [factors] together" means that pliancy does not pervade all wholesome minds. Regarding "all grounds", one opinion holds: it extends to the nine grounds, because the preparatory stage for concentration is also called a stage of concentration, where there is also a slight sense of harmony and ease; due to this, the desire realm also has pliancy. Another opinion holds: this is not so. The treatise says that because the desire realm lacks pliancy, it is called an uncollected ground. "Extending to all grounds" means they exist in all three grounds of with directed examination, and so forth. This is as stated in the sixth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Afflictions and secondary afflictions are collectively called the defiled status, and they lack all four. The indeterminate factors possess only "all places" (all moral natures). The fifth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: Among the five, the universal factors possess all four universalities; the particular factors have only the first two universalities; the wholesome factors have only one; the defiled factors lack all four; the indeterminate factors have only one, namely all moral natures. This is explained extensively below in fascicle 8 and fascicles 55, 58, 59, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi fascicles 5 and 6, the Abhidharmasamuccaya fascicle 1, and so forth.

2.17

In the explanation of the arising of the consciousnesses due to faculties, objects, and so forth, from "Furthermore, it is not the case that the collection of the five consciousnesses has two moments..." onward, it explains how consciousness is then able to arise.

2.18

The faculties are undamaged due to two causes: first, because they are not destroyed, they are not completely absent; second, because they are not emaciated and weak, they are not deficient and feeble. The explanation in fascicle 54 of destruction, emaciation, and the alteration of the faculties due to four conditions is the reverse of these two meanings here. This refers to the physical faculties. As for the mental faculty being undamaged, it is the reverse of that text's explanation of the mental faculty being damaged due to four conditions. That mental faculty is the sixth [consciousness], unlike the five faculties. That it does not speak of the seventh and eighth faculties being undamaged can be known by inference.

2.19

In the presence of the cognitive object, there are six causes, namely "due to the basis", etc. Fascicle 54 says: Question: As the Maulī Bhūmi speaks of six kinds of objective scopes, what is the distinction here? It explains the six causes here in order, so one should consult that text. "The basis" refers to what the internal body relies upon, which is the receptacle world, because it is the dwelling place of all sentient beings. "Manifest and unmanifest": that text says it refers to apprehending the difference between the real and the unreal; that is, within each one's own sphere, apprehending that which has real substantial existence is manifest and recognizably attained, while apprehending the unreal is called unmanifest. "Entirety and partiality": that text says it refers to apprehending a partial thing and a pervasive thing; that is, within an aggregation of objects, taking the whole pervasively as an object is called entirety, while taking a single part of a thing as an object is called partiality.

2.20

Among the four kinds of obstacles, "obstacle of coverage" refers to houses, buildings, and so forth. "Obstacle of concealment" refers to supernormal powers, medicinal herbs, and so forth, concealing something so it cannot be seen. "Obstacle of overpowering" refers to being overpowered by superior force, namely sunlight and the like overshadowing the light of stars, fire, and so forth. "Obstacle of illusion" refers to various illusory obstacles caused by ghosts, spirits, incantations, and so forth.

2.21

"Extreme distance of location" refers to the dwelling places in the various directions being mutually distant. "Extreme distance of diminution" means that what was previously formed as coarse matter, though nearby and present, is diminished to subtlety, which is called distance of diminution, such as grinding wheat into flour. Fascicle 54 states: Being not extremely subtle or distant is called "present". The specific explanations of the presence of the objects of the various faculties are all as stated there.

2.22

The four powers of attentiveness: The first three kinds take future, past, and present objects as their spheres, in respective order; the fourth single power takes the three times universally as its sphere. "If it were other than this, attentiveness would arise exclusively toward a single intentional object at all times": If it were different from the previously explained arising of attentiveness through the four powers, one attentiveness would constantly arise toward a single object. Therefore, we know it must depend upon the four powers.

2.23

From "Furthermore, it is not the case that the five consciousnesses have two moments..." onward, in clarifying how consciousness is then able to arise, the text is divided into four: first, clarifying the moment of the five consciousnesses; second, clarifying the distinction among the five minds; third, interpreting the sūtra's statement of "one mind"; fourth, clarifying the temporal periods of the objects apprehended by the five minds. Regarding the moment of the five consciousnesses, the fourth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi presents two opinions. The first says: The five consciousnesses last for only a single moment; between earlier and later moments of their own category, there are definitely never two moments arising in succession, nor do the five consciousnesses arise mutually and uninterruptedly from one another. This passage is cited as proof. Where the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī and other texts say that if these six consciousnesses act as the equal and immediate condition for those six consciousnesses, the word comprehensively speaks of six, but the intention is that before and after the five consciousnesses there is definitely only the mental consciousness, because the mental consciousness readily arises. The second says: This refers to the stage where mastery has not been attained; for the most part, the spontaneous mind (manaskāra / āvarjana) lasts only a single moment, not the flowing mind (nisyanda-citta) or the stage of mastery. Extensive citations of reason and scripture are all as stated there. Regarding the open-and-guiding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) there, although the third correct view maintains their own separate streams, it does not state that the five consciousnesses continue in succession; whether identical to the former or the latter, neither contradicts reason. However, adopting the latter view is more consistent with the various texts.

2.24

As for "Furthermore, when the five consciousnesses have arisen for one moment, immediately following this, the mental consciousness will definitely arise," etc.: this states that after the initial reactive mind (rate-er-xin) of the five consciousnesses, there is definitely investigation. After investigation, if there is distraction at that time, its arising is not fixed; if there is no distraction, the mind of determination arises. Defiled and pure minds arise due to two causes: conceptual discrimination and prior inducement. That conceptual discrimination arises is because, regarding an object not previously attained, it now discriminates it. As for prior inducement, regarding an object previously attained, it arises because it is familiar. The mental consciousness is due to two causes; the five [consciousnesses] are due to only one. This refers to the equivalent outflow of the five consciousnesses, and the equivalent outflow of the mental consciousness is also like this. Here it is only said that after investigation it is not fixed, without saying that after determination and after defilement and purity it is not fixed, because the principle applies to both. However, now it does not say that after the initial reactive [mind] the arising of investigation is not fixed; thus we know that after the initial reactive [mind], investigation definitely arises. The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī also says: While in meditative absorption, the ear consciousness initially hears a sound; if there is anticipation, only later does it emerge [from absorption]. Anticipation is precisely the mind of investigation. The remaining meanings are as explained in the "Chapter on the Five Minds".

2.25

As for "one thought-moment": this means that regarding a single object there is a mind of focused concentration, which, though lasting many moments, is still termed "one mind"; furthermore, because the nature and category of earlier and later moments are similar, it is termed "one mind".

2.26

From "Furthermore, when the mental consciousness operates spontaneously and with distraction, apprehending an unaccustomed object" onward, this clarifies the time-period of the objects apprehended by the five minds. There are two explanations of this. One says: When the mental consciousness arises spontaneously without strong conceptual discrimination, and arises in distraction without being in meditative absorption, if it apprehends an unaccustomed object without arising together with the particular mental factors such as desire (chanda), at that time the mental consciousness apprehends the object for the very first time, which is called the mind falling into the initial reactive state. Because there is no anticipation, it is not said to apprehend the future; although it apprehends the present, because it is merely a category of object previously attained, it is designated solely as apprehending a past object. This refers to the solitary mental consciousness. Because the mode of activity arisen in the initial reactive mind apprehends a category of past objects, it is designated as apprehending the past. If there is strong conceptual discrimination, or a mind in meditative absorption, apprehending an accustomed object together with desire and so forth, this initial reactive mind of the mental consciousness is not fixed as to the time-period it apprehends. As for the mental consciousness that arises immediately after the initial reactive mind of the five consciousnesses—namely, investigation and determination—it should only be said to apprehend a present object. If considered from the perspective of a single moment, it actually apprehends the past; but in terms of the three periods of state and in terms of the direct cognitive object-aspect (sākṣād-ālambana-nimitta), it should only be said to apprehend the present. If someone objects: "Both investigation and determination arise apprehending the object of the five consciousnesses in the preceding moment, which apprehends the past period; why is it now said to apprehend the present?" Therefore, the treatise answers generally: If it is this, it arises apprehending that object. This means: if these two minds apprehend that very object apprehended by the five consciousnesses in the preceding moment, it should be designated as apprehending the past; yet because a similar continuity exists in the present period and is taken as the object by these two minds of investigation and determination, it should be designated as apprehending the present, and is not designated as apprehending the past relative to the fundamental substance (benshi). The import here implicitly indicates that the initial reactive [mind] of the five consciousnesses apprehends only the present, whereas investigation and determination [subsequent to] the initial reactive [mind] of the mental consciousness also apprehend the past. A second explanation: Everything before "named the mind falling into the initial reactive state" explains the initial reactive mind of the mental consciousness, because previously the initial reactive mind of the mental consciousness had not yet been explained. If there is strong conceptual discrimination and a mind in meditative absorption, together with an accustomed object, and desire and so forth arise, at that time the mental consciousness is not called the mind falling into the initial reactive state; only if it is spontaneous and so forth, up to having no desire and so forth arise, is it called initial reaction. Because previously the initial reactive mind of the mental consciousness was not discussed, it is discussed now.

2.27

From "apprehending only past objects, immediately following the five consciousnesses" onward, this explains investigation and determination following the five consciousnesses. Because the mental consciousness grasps the fundamental substance of the object of the five consciousnesses in the preceding moment, it apprehends only past objects. Because the mental representation of the preceding initial reactive object apprehended by this mental consciousness appears upon the two minds of investigation and determination as a similar continuity, it should only be said to apprehend present objects; that is, in terms of the fundamental substance, it apprehends only the past. If in terms of the representation, it apprehends only the present, then as for the initial reactive mind of the mental consciousness apprehending present objects, what doubt could there be about its principle? If one speaks in a general way of apprehending the past, it invites objections; therefore, the passage should be read continuously. The text below "apprehending only the past" is subsumed under the two minds of investigation and determination, and its "apprehending the present" also belongs to the two minds; the line of reasoning is then far-reaching and free of contradiction. If this mind that apprehends present objects arises apprehending that past object, it therefore encompasses both periods. Because there is a distinction between fundamental substance and mental representation, defilement, purity, and equivalent outflow must inevitably follow what precedes them; thus we know that the two minds also apprehend the present. The five minds in other periods are likewise not fixed.

2.28

As for "Furthermore, consciousness is capable of discerning the general characteristic of things," etc.: the Cheng Weishi Lun says: "The primary mind apprehends only the general characteristic of the cognitive object; the mental factors also apprehend its particular characteristics, assisting and completing the function of the mind, and thus obtain the name 'mental factors'—just as a master painter and his apprentice make the outline and fill in the colors." The primary mind cannot apprehend the particular characteristics of an object, but apprehends only the general object; mental factors not only apprehend the general characteristic of the object, but also apprehend its appropriate particular characteristics on that object. Therefore, it is said here: "that which has not yet been discerned on this [object]," etc. The Weishi explains: This statement expresses that the mental factors also apprehend the general characteristic of the object, [as well as] the particular characteristics of the object not yet discerned upon this general object.

2.29

As for "the discernibility of the characteristics of the object discerned," it is designated as manaskāra (attention), which indicates that attention grasps the particular characteristics grasped by the various mental factors, all as explained there. Here, it only speaks of what definitely accompanies the mind when it arises, so it mentions solely the modes of activity of the omnipresent (sarvatraga) mental factors. By this it also reveals that the omnipresent and particular (viniyata) mental factors both extend across the three natures. When the mental mode of activity is predominant, the text specifically speaks of essence and function, briefly setting aside the rest, all in accordance with the Weishi. The boundaries and limits of an object are the cause of verbal expression, and conception (saṃjñā) can apprehend them; the characteristics of harmony with principle or violation of principle upon an object are the causes of the actions of the three karmas, and through intention (cetanā) they can be apprehended. Although all mental factors can generally apprehend them, speaking in terms of predominance also involves no contradiction.

2.30

Attention means the turning of the mind. Contact (sparśa) is the coming together of the three, etc., all as in the beginning of fascicle 3 of the Weishi. "Turning" means initiating movement. That [other treatise's] statement that it should not be omnipresent is not an accurate principle.

2.31

Concentration (samādhi) causes the mind to focus on a single object; it is called one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā).

2.32

Regarding the function of contact being solely that "feeling, conception, and intention serve as its basis": the Weishi explains that because intention is primary and preeminent in the saṃskāra-skandha, it actually serves universally as a basis.

2.33

Among the time-periods there are three: first, the three periods of logical principle; second, the three periods of consciousness-only; third, the three periods of supernormal knowledge (abhijñā). As explained in the commentary on fascicle 3 of the Weishi.

2.34

As for "because all seeds are not separate from dharmas, they are established in accordance with dharmas": conforming to the Sarvāstivādins, it is said: seeds are not separate from mental dharmas, and the three periods are established in accordance with mental dharmas, for they say that the essence of seeds is precisely mind. Conforming to the Sautrāntikas, it is said: seeds are not separate from dharmas such as form and mind, and the three periods are established in accordance with dharmas of form and mind, for they say that form and mind can preserve seeds. Now the Mahāyāna explains: seeds are not separate from the dharmas of the eighth consciousness, and the three periods are established in accordance with the dharmas of the eighth consciousness. Furthermore, seeds do not possess an essence distinctly separate from active dharmas, just as active dharmas establish the three periods based upon seeds. How are they established? That a seed can produce a fruit in the future is called the future; the cause that was able to produce the seed is called the past; the self-nature of the seed is called the present. Furthermore, active dharmas are for the most part intermittent, whereas seeds are constantly continuous. Since seeds do not possess an essence distinctly separate from active dharmas, and since dharmas have three periods, seeds now establish the meaning of the three periods in accordance with dharmas. This is a general heading showing that the basis for establishing the three periods is established upon seeds. Below, the meaning of the time-periods will be explained specifically. Lest an external opponent object that since seeds are constantly existent they should not be subsumed under the time-periods, [it is said that] just as with dharmas, they are also included in the time-periods.

2.35

As for "Furthermore, due to having given fruit and not yet having given fruit": this explains the meaning of establishing the two periods of past and future upon present seeds. The meaning of having already given fruit upon a present seed is called the past; the meaning of not yet having given fruit is called the future; the entity that is the basis of both is called the present. Here, the three periods are distinguished solely on the basis of logical principle. Now in the Mahāyāna, the capacity to serve as a cause is called "grasping the fruit" (phala-parigraha), which belongs only to the present period; therefore the Weishi says: "Although cause and fruit can be simultaneous or non-simultaneous, only in the present time does the causal function exist." When the fruit arises, the cause transmits itself to the fruit, which is called "giving the fruit" (phala-dāna). When a present seed has the sense of having transmitted fruit in a past period, it is called past; when it has not yet given fruit in the present and will only transmit it in the future, it is called future; when it is currently grasping in the present, it is called present.

2.36

From "If all fruitional dharmas, if their characteristic of having already ceased" onward, this explains the meaning of establishing the periods based on active dharmas.

2.37

Among the four characteristics, there are three parts: first, distinguishing the basis; second, distinguishing the features; third, distinguishing the nominal establishment of states. In Mahāyāna, since arising and cessation are distinguished as identical with dharmas, they have no separate essence; the Hīnayāna says they exist [separately]. The Śataka-śāstra objects: "If there is a cessation that ceases a dharma, causing nonexistence to enter the past, and the ceasing dharma is present, it is called existent; if there is an arising that arises a dharma, causing existence to enter the present, and the arising dharma is future, it should be called nonexistent." This objection demonstrates that the entities of the four characteristics would both be existent.

2.38

The treatise says: "Namely, they are established in the continuity of consciousness in all places, co-occurring with the continuity of all seeds." This is a general heading showing that the four characteristics are established based on seeds. "In all places" means the three realms and nine planes. "Continuity of consciousness" means the eighth consciousness. "Continuity of all seeds" means that because seeds perish moment by moment without interruption, they are termed a continuity. "Co-occurring" means that seeds constantly co-occur with the mūlavijñāna. "Established" means that the four characteristics are established on the basis of all seeds that continuously co-occur with the eighth consciousness in these nine planes, not based on active dharmas. This is due to three meanings: first, because seeds are continuous; second, because they are the cause of all dharmas; third, because they are not separate from consciousness. If seeds are spoken of, all consciousnesses are spoken of. Another explanation says: The establishment of the four characteristics upon the dharmas co-occurring with the continuity of all seeds in the mūlavijñāna is precisely the establishment of the four characteristics upon all conditioned dharmas, because whenever any conditioned dharmas, defiled or undefiled, arise, they must co-occur with seeds. That is, it speaks comprehensively of establishing the meaning of the four characteristics based on both active dharmas and seeds. That difference is stated immediately after arising has two meanings: first, to cause aversion to arise, wishing to reveal that the self-nature of the entity of arising undergoes transformation and is not lovable. If abiding were stated immediately, it would mostly give rise to attachment and love for the arising of abiding. Second, wishing to reveal that the various characteristics have no separate functional moments; that very characteristic of arising, being distinct from what precedes and follows it, is called difference. Since this is so, following along in continuity is called abiding, and definitely not abiding later is called cessation; thus it differs from other schools. Between the two differences, the first is the difference between earlier and later moments of dharmas of the same kind; the second is the difference between earlier and later moments of dharmas of different kinds. This merely states that arising takes place due to the power of conditions; the rest are established based upon this without depending on causes to be accomplished, and therefore it is said to be established separately according to the states of dharmas. The Prakaraṇāryavācā verse says: "Because the cause of arising is contrary, there are no causes for abiding or cessation; abiding by nature entails the flaw of permanence; know that cessation occurs spontaneously." This is as explained in [fascicle] 52, Weishi fascicle 2, etc.

2.39

The passage on the four conditions (pratyaya) has three parts: first, stating the names; second, generally setting forth the substantial entities of the four conditions; third, from the words "Furthermore, on account of the seeds" downward, pointing specifically to the mind in order to reveal the four conditions. This is explained extensively in the seventh fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Regarding "the substantial entity of the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya)": that text says, it refers to conditioned phenomena directly producing their own effects, which are of two kinds: first, active manifestations (samudācāra); second, seeds (bīja). Here it only mentions seeds; that text reconciles this by saying: where some say that seeds alone are the cause-condition, they rely on demonstrating the superior [factor], and do not speak exhaustively of the principle, for the noble ones teach that the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna) and the ālaya[-vijñāna] serve mutually as cause-conditions for each other. Regarding "the equal and immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya)": it refers to the eight active consciousnesses and their mental factors (caitasika), the preceding collection providing equal opening and guidance for the subsequent one, causing the latter to arise definitely. The fourth fascicle of that text reconciles this passage by saying: if this consciousness is immediately followed by that consciousness definitely arising. The statement is general while the intention is specific, so the meanings do not conflict. Regarding "the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya)": that text says, it refers to if there is a phenomenon that bears its own image, which is contemplated and relied upon by the mind or what is associated with it. This entity has two kinds: one is direct and one is remote. Here it speaks generally, so it likewise does not conflict. Regarding "the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya)": that text says, it refers to if there is a phenomenon possessing superior efficacy and function, capable of being favorable or contrary to other phenomena. That text reconciles this itself by saying: although the preceding three conditions are also dominant, here the fourth takes what remains excluding those, in order to reveal the distinctive meanings of the conditions. Therefore here it says, "it refers to, excluding the seeds, the remaining bases and accompanying factors." The remaining bases are those excluding the equal and immediate base. Not mentioning the cognitive realm clearly also indicates the exclusion of the objective condition. Therefore it reveals the four conditions solely by relying on the mind, not speaking of the mental factors as the equal and immediate [condition].

2.40

In the sixth, the progressive enumeration of wholesome states and so forth, only three wholesome states are established. There is no ultimate [wholesome state] because it speaks of the conditioned. "Wholesome states sharing in merit" are wholesome states concordant with saṃsāra. "Wholesome states sharing in liberation and decisive discrimination" are as explained in the thirteenth fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā] and the Chapter on Decisive Discrimination. Rightly supreme wholesome states are the four right exertions, which are also called right abandonments; because they surpass all evils, because the exertion itself is supreme, and because they are not wrong exertions, they are called rightly supreme. Immeasurable wholesome states are the four immeasurables. Dependent wholesome states are those with something to rely upon and seek, wholesome states seeking the three existences; independent wholesome states are those without anything to rely upon or seek, wholesome states aspiring to nirvāṇa. Moreover, giving material things is called a dependent wholesome state; rejoicing without material things is called an independent wholesome state. Or, wholesome states with signs are called dependent wholesome states; all signless wholesome states are called independent wholesome states. The entity of wisdom through cultivation is called the fundamental wholesome state. The associated five aggregates are called the retinue wholesome state, because they belong to the category of wisdom through cultivation. Or, the fundamental and preliminary courses of action are called the fundamental and preliminary wholesome states, combining the two into one category of courses of action. Only mentioning [the wisdoms of] listening and reflection and not the wisdom through cultivation is because, as appropriate, they are the remaining wholesome roots.

2.41

"Eight births of merit": these refer to a petty king in the desire realm as one, ministers as the second, which added to the six desire-realm heavens make eight. This differs from the ancient explanation: in the desire realm, ministers were excluded and the wheel-turning king was taken. The wheel-turning king would be the ninth. Unmoving wholesome states are the tenth, referring to wholesome states of the form and formless realms and uncontaminated wholesome states.

2.42

"Well understanding things" refers to the wisdom that knows causes.

2.43

Under crafts, "merely for entertainment and pleasure" and so forth: in other places it is said that this actually extends to the three natures, but here it only selects out the defiled, because the characteristics are difficult to discern. That is, if for entertainment and pleasure, greed, restlessness, and so forth arise. "Not for livelihood": because it is for practicing skills and selective discernment. These crafts for entertainment and pleasure are defiled; for livelihood and practicing skills, their entities are actually neutral (avyākṛta); selective discernment is wholesome, because wholesome mind, prajñā, and so forth arise through selective discernment.

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瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese