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瑜伽師地論略纂 3.91

English (machine translation) 3.91

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English

3.91

Regarding the view of annihilation, the text also has four parts, which are the seven doctrines of annihilation. Regarding “I have a coarse physical body made of the four great elements,” and so forth: this is the first, annihilation after death; the remaining six are as in the text. Regarding “If after death I have a body again, one should obtain a fruit without performing karma”: they reckon that at the time when the present body dies and perishes, karma perishes along with the body; if there is a body later, one should obtain an arising fruit without having created the cause. If the fruit arises, there would be the fault of obtaining a fruit without having created [the cause]. Regarding “If the essential nature of the self is completely and forever non-existent, then there should be no experiencing of karmic fruit”: it cannot be that because it is non-existent in the future, it is also non-existent in the present; since it exists in the present, it cannot be that the self is completely and forever non-existent. Therefore, the essential nature of the self exists in the present and is completely and forever non-existent in future lifetimes; thus there should be no experiencing of karmic maturation, and consequently it constitutes annihilation. Regarding “If one says the aggregates are annihilated”: they concede that the aggregates are impermanent. Since they concede impermanence, it clearly is not annihilation. The syllogistic inference is: for those who have not attained arhatship, all aggregates after death are not annihilated; because they are conceded to be impermanent, like the states of previous births. Regarding “If one says the self is annihilated, then what you previously stated about the coarse physical four great elements,” and so forth: since it is the self that is annihilated, having previously stated that the coarse physical body made of the great elements has illnesses, carbuncles, and so forth, and is annihilated after death, this turns out to be contradictory. This is because the stated aggregates of form and so on are not the self, and the body of the four great elements and so on are precisely the aggregates. In the four immaterial spheres, they separately reckon nirvāṇa; the realms of the form realm share the same destiny, so they are grouped together into one; for the desire realm, humans and devas are distinguished, being further split into two: thus they make up the seven annihilations. The two views of causelessness and these seven annihilations could actually be more; roughly categorised, they are merely divided into two and seven, not that there is no annihilation or causelessness in other aspects. Here, the seven annihilations and the forty-odd [views of] permanence are all extreme views.

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