瑜伽師地論略纂 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

In the fourth section of the Bhūmi, on improper mental application, the text on the sixteen deviant doctrines is divided into three: first, the questions; next, the answers; and finally, from "Such sixteen deviant doctrines, through two approaches" downward, it concludes the preceding refutation. The answer has two parts: first, listing and explaining the sixteen superior and prominent deviant doctrines of the Hīnayāna and non-Buddhist traditions; and second, refuting them individually in sequence. The text on the effect being present in the cause is divided into four: 1. a general indication; 2. raising the inquiry; 3. stating the asserted tenets; and 4. from "One should interrogate them" downward, refuting it at length.

3.3

"The Varṣagaṇya non-Buddhists" refers to the great disciples of the Sāṃkhya masters, chiefs of the eighteen sub-schools. Because [their founder] was born during the rainy season, he was named Varṣa ("Rain"); his followers are called the gaṇya ("community/assembly"). They posit that all phenomena are summarized as three, moderately as four, and extensively as twenty-five principles. Excluding the principle of the spiritual self (puruṣa), the middle twenty-three principles are called effects, and the primordial nature (prakṛti) is called the cause. The effect resides within the cause and yet has no separate substantial entity—just as when gold becomes a hairpin or earring, cause and effect differ in their characteristics, yet there is no separate substantial entity; this is called the effect being present in the cause. This is explained as in the Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and the Sāṃkhyakārikā-bhāṣya (Golden Seventy Treatise).

3.4

The explanation of their tenets has two parts: first general, then specific. The specific rationale is divided into three: first, explaining the grounds for their tenets; next, from "their mental application reflects" downward, stating the tenets; and finally, from "in this way, by designation," concluding the eternal nature of the effect within the cause. Under the grounds for their tenets, "being by nature investigative" means that their nature is prone to much deliberation. "Being by nature contemplative" means that their nature is prone to much deducing. The substance of the former is volition (cetanā), and the substance of the latter is wisdom (prajñā). "Abiding in the stage of investigation and abiding in the stage of self-eloquence": "stage" refers to the support. Relying internally on coarse and subtle examination (vitarka and vicāra) and outwardly giving rise to verbal eloquence, they reside in the stage of ordinary beings and in the stage of conjecturing; hence they form such tenets. The first four arise from dharmas and the latter two from stage; this is because they possess those dharmas and reside in those stages.

3.5

The statement of their tenets has two parts: first, stating four rationales; and second, from "if it were not so" downward, presenting four counter-challenges to establish the preceding four. 1. The rationale of worldly consensus: this is shown in "if from that nature this nature comes to be born," and so forth, meaning that from that grain this paddy can be born, and the world universally knows that grain is the cause of paddy, not wheat. 2. The rationale of seeking only in this: "if one seeks the effect, one takes only this cause and not others," meaning that in the world, for the effect of paddy one takes only the cause of grain, planting grain in order to seek the growth of paddy, and not other [seeds] like wheat. 3. The rationale of expending effort on this and not others: "if one applies effort and manages what is sought only in that [grain] and not others," meaning that one applies labor to plant and hoe precisely in that grain in order to seek the effect of paddy, not in wheat and so forth. 4. The rationale that the effect arises from that: "further, if that effect arises precisely from that and does not arise from others," meaning that the effect of paddy arises from that grain and does not arise from wheat. Therefore, one knows that the effect of paddy already previously exists within the cause of grain.

3.6

Above, four rationales were stated; below, four counter-challenges are presented, matching each of the preceding four individually. The first challenge states: If this paddy did not come to be born from that grain, then in worldly convention everyone should establish that everything is the cause of everything, so that effects would have no determinate cause, since effects would arise universally; thus wheat and so forth should also be the cause of grain and the like. The second challenge states: If one seeking the effect of paddy did not seek and take only the cause of grain, then in order to seek a single effect of paddy, one should take all causes such as wheat, beans, and so forth. Third: If one did not apply labor to plant and hoe in grain to seek the effect of paddy, then to seek the effect of paddy, one should apply effort and management among all wheat, beans, and so forth. Fourth: If that effect of paddy did not arise solely from grain, then from all wheat, beans, and so forth, all the remaining grain, wheat, and the like should be born.

3.7

In concluding the formulation, "in this way" refers back to the preceding rationales. "By designation" concludes the first cause above, as it is designated by the world that grain is the cause of paddy. In this way, the three occurrences of the word "because" below are individually matched to the three rationales below, which should be understood according to their meanings.

3.8

The specific refutation is divided into three: first, a general interrogation; second, specific challenges; and finally, the conclusion. The specific challenges have two parts: first, presenting four specific rationales; and second, revealing five characteristics to show the correct doctrine. 1. The rationale of non-difference. "Characteristic" means substance. If cause and effect were not different, there should not be two kinds of determinate distinctions. A formal inference (prayogavākya) should be formulated: "Your effect's substance should be non-determinate; because the characteristic of the effect is identical to the characteristic of the cause; just like the characteristic of the cause." The characteristic of the cause is likewise: they hold that the substance is one, yet the characteristics are different. The treatise has the thesis (pratijñā) and reason (hetu), so an example (dṛṣṭānta) is now added. From "if there were different characteristics" downward, an alternative refutation is posited. "If it has the characteristic of not yet arisen, then within the cause, the effect has not yet arisen, yet to say that it exists is illogical": the effect within the cause has not yet arisen in substance, so how could it be said to exist? The inference states: "Your effect should not be said to exist within the cause; because it has the characteristic of not yet arisen; like a rabbit's horn and so forth." "If it has the characteristic of already arisen, then the substance of the effect has already arisen, and to arise again from the cause is illogical": the inference states: "The already-arisen effect previously existing in the cause should not arise from the cause again; because its substance has already arisen; like an already-arisen effect." Alternatively, the word "arise" carries the meaning of "having substance," which is precisely their fundamental thesis.

3.9

In showing the correct doctrine, "further, an endowed phenomenon within an endowed phenomenon": "an endowed phenomenon" refers to the dependent effect-dharma that possesses characteristics and substance; "within an endowed phenomenon" refers to the supporting cause-dharma that possesses characteristics and substance. Third, "precisely through its own characteristic it can be apprehended, just like the cause's own substance, not through inference": just as the cause's own characteristic has the capability to produce the effect and can be apprehended, it is not that the substance of the effect exists. This cause's own substance is directly perceptible at present, not [known] through inference. Fourth, "it can be apprehended through its own operation," meaning, just as the operation of discerning visible form manifests the visual consciousness and so on. Fifth, "because of the alteration of the cause, the effect becomes altered," and so forth: when the direct cause has altered, the effect also follows it, and conditions are also like this, just as with grain and paddy. It is not that without the cause altering, the effect alone alters; how could your primordial nature (prakṛti) not alter while the other principles transform? The inference states: "Your primordial nature should also alter; because the effects alter; like grain, wheat, and so forth." Concluding the above with four reasons, the text is easy to understand.

3.10

In the doctrine of manifestation through conditions, the text also has four parts. This refers to the twenty-three principles of the Sāṃkhya masters' Golden Seventy Treatise residing within the cause, which are manifested through numerous conditions, transform into the other principles, and when their functions cease, return to the source. All mundane things originally have neither arising nor cessation; therefore they are manifested through conditions, as is customarily distinguished.

3.11

Here, some say that the previous Varṣagaṇyas held that phenomena arise from conditions, which is why it was first challenged: "The effect is previously existent, and to arise again from conditions is illogical." Now, [the latter hold that] it is manifested through conditions; hence the two groups are different. This view is incorrect. The treatise states: "This is held by those who assert that the effect exists in the cause"; therefore they are not non-Varṣa masters. Hetuvidyā (Buddhist Logic) also states: "Just as when a Buddhist disciple posits to a Sāṃkhya master that sound is destructible, this is called an unestablished qualificand (viśeṣaṇāsiddha)." If the Sāṃkhya masters held that there is arising, then what is born must cease; why then would it be called an unestablished qualificand? Therefore, we know that the earlier and later [doctrines] are the tenets of the same masters. The previous word "arise" expresses the meaning of "existence," or is an alternative counter-argument.

3.12

"The theorists of sound-characteristics" refers to the sound-manifestation theorists (abhivyaktivādins). It is not the assertion that sound arises; the substance of sound exists, and it is manifested through conditions.

3.13

Under the rationales, "the effect is previously existent, and to arise again from the cause," and so forth: initially it poses a challenge to the tenets of all non-manifestation theorists. It means that that effect-dharma has an existent substance from the beginning, and to arise again from the cause does not accord with reason. And in establishing that the effect-dharma is only manifested from the cause, none of those who assert arising hold that the effect-dharma resides in the cause. Conforming to their own school that the effect is previously existent, they further cross-examine the other tenets that say it arises from the cause.

3.14

"Yet it is not that one does not apply effort to accomplish the effect," and so forth, is the rationale by which worldly [experience] establishes manifestation. It means that when the world seeks an effect-dharma, it is not that one does not apply effort to the cause; if it were not to manifest the effect, for what reason would one make an effort? Therefore, when one makes an effort to accomplish the effect, is it not solely to manifest the effect? Since the effect does not arise, one knows that it comes from manifestation.

3.15

The refutation is divided into three: first, refuting the Sāṃkhya assertion; next, presenting the correct meaning; and finally, by analogy, refuting the sound theorists. The first has two parts: first, specific challenges; and second, the conclusion. The specific challenges have three parts: 1. having obstruction or lacking obstruction; 2. possessing nature or possessing effect-nature; and 3. being different or not different.

3.16

"Having obstruction or lacking obstruction" means: when the effect is not manifested, does an obstructive substance arise so that it acts as an obstruction and the effect is not manifested, or does it lack an obstructive substance yet obstruct it, so that the effect is not manifested? Challenging the lack of an obstructive substance, the inference states: "What lacks substance should be incapable of acting as an obstruction; because it lacks substance; like the son of a barren woman." Alternatively: "Your effect-dharma should originally already be manifested; because it lacks obstructive conditions; like your cause-dharma."

3.17

Regarding "If there is an obstructing condition, why does it not obstruct the cause that pertains to the effect, since both are equally existent?": this means that if the substance of the effect exists and an obstruction can obstruct it, then since the substance of the cause is also not non-existent, the obstruction should also obstruct it, for both are equally existent. The formal inference is: "The existent cause in your [system] should also be obstructed by the obstruction; because you posit that its substance is existent; just like the obstructed effect." For instance, when water is the effect, darkness can obstruct it; the jar is the cause of the water, and darkness can also obstruct it. Water and jar are both existent, and the obstruction by darkness does not differentiate between them; since neither cause nor effect is non-existent, the obstruction that obstructs them should be equal. By reversing this inference, the principle can be understood accordingly. Suppose they reply to save their position by saying: "The obstructing condition can also obstruct the cause." Then it should also manifest the cause; why do you say only that the effect is manifested from conditions? The formal inference is: "The cause in your school should be manifested from conditions; because it is obstructed by an obstruction; just like the dharma of the effect." Or: "The dharma of the effect in your [system] is not manifested from conditions; because you accept that it has an obstruction; just like the dharma of the cause."

3.18

Regarding "The nature of existence is the obstructing condition," and so forth: "nature of existence" refers to having substantial nature. "Nature of effect" refers to what belongs to the cause—that is, the substance designated as an entity is called the nature of effect. Here we ask: Does having substance act as an obstructing condition, or does being an entity that is an effect act as an obstructing condition? If having substance is the obstructing condition, since substantial nature is permanently existent, its nature could never be manifested; being manifested would be like not yet being manifested, because it always has substance. The cause also always exists; why does it not act as an obstruction, while only the existence of the effect can act as an obstruction? The formal inference is: "The effect in your school should never be manifested; because it permanently has nature; just like [when it is] not yet manifested." "The substance of the cause in your school should also act as an obstruction; because its substance is permanently existent; just like the effect." Regarding "If you say that the nature of an effect is the obstructing condition": take a single phenomenon such as a sprout, which is both a cause and an effect; relative to the seed it is an effect, and relative to the stem it is a cause. Relative to the stem it does not obstruct, while relative to the cause it can obstruct; since the meaning of obstruction subsumes both manifestation and non-manifestation, this would mean that a single phenomenon is both manifested and unmanifested. One should formulate the inference: "The substance of the effect in your school should also not be manifested; because it has the substance of a cause; like the cause of the primal nature (prakṛti)." However, in their school the substance of the effect is exclusively manifested, which is why this objection is raised. Or: "The substance of your primal nature should also be the cause of the effect's manifestation; like the cause of a subsequent effect." Since they hold that a sprout is definitely manifested as a cause, this objection is established. Or: "The nature of the effect should not be an obstruction; because its substance is identical to the cause; like the cause." "The cause should also obstruct; because it is identical to the substance of the effect; like the effect." Hence it is said that a single phenomenon is both cause and effect.

3.19

Regarding "Is the fundamental phenomenon different or not different from its manifestation?" and so forth: the fundamental phenomenon is the effect, because it has existed from the beginning. Manifestation means being made manifest, because it becomes manifest upon encountering conditions. If they are not different, the phenomenon should always be manifest, because the primordial phenomenon of the effect has always existed before; that it was manifest before and is manifest now does not stand to reason. The formal inference is: "The phenomenon of the effect in your school should have been manifest from the beginning; because it is identical with the fundamental phenomenon; just like the fundamental phenomenon." "The phenomenon of the effect in your school should only now begin to exist; because it is identical with the manifestation; just like the manifestation that only now begins." The formal inference concerning the fundamental phenomenon can be understood by reversing this.

3.20

Regarding "If you say they are different, does that manifestation lack a cause?" and so forth: this asks whether, when the effect becomes manifest, it has a cause or lacks a cause. If it lacks a cause, the formal inference is: "The phenomenon of the effect should have been manifest from the beginning; because manifestation lacks a cause; just like at the time of subsequent manifestation." Or: "It should not be manifest now; because manifestation lacks a cause; just like at the time when it was not yet manifest."

3.21

Regarding "If there is a cause of manifestation, then the nature of the effect can be manifested, but not the nature of the cause," and so forth: both equally having a cause, yet the nature of the effect being manifestable while the nature of the cause cannot be manifested, does not stand to reason. The formal inference is: "Your cause should be manifested; because its manifestation has a cause; just like the phenomenon of the effect." Or: "The effect should not be manifested; because its manifestation has a cause; just like the cause." If they reply to save their position by saying: "The phenomenon of the effect was not yet manifest, so the manifestation requires a cause to manifest it; the phenomenon of the cause is not hidden, so why would it require a cause to manifest it?": having substance is identical in both, and the cause of manifestation matches what exists; that one has manifestation and the other does not contradicts reason. The formal inference is: "When the cause having substance is manifest, it should also manifest the cause; because the cause's manifestation exists; just like manifesting the effect."

3.22

Concluding by restating their words, "If its nature is dead, it cannot be manifested," and so forth: among phenomena possessing characteristics, if they lack that nature, they cannot be manifested, like milk in a horn or curd in water; only if they have that nature can they be manifested, like curd in milk or gold in ore. We do not deny the existence or non-existence of a nature; we only refute that the effect resides within the cause.

3.23

Setting forth the correct doctrine has six aspects: first, being difficult to apprehend due to distance; second, being difficult to apprehend due to the four obstructions, which the preceding third chapter calls concealment, disappearing, overpowering, and magical deception; third, being difficult to apprehend due to subtlety, like atoms; fourth, being difficult to apprehend due to mental distraction, like the sphere of supernatural powers; fifth, being difficult to apprehend due to impaired faculties, like old age, blindness, or illness; sixth, being difficult to apprehend due to lack of knowledge, like lacking true knowledge or knowledge of others' minds. It is not that the nature of the effect exists previously in the cause and cannot be apprehended, because it is not subsumed under these six.

3.24

The assertions of the grammarians (Śabdavādins), whether internal or external, entirely or partially, are all as explained in the first commentary on the Vijñaptimātratā. The preceding two assertions are both subsumed under the false view of superimposition (samāropa).

3.25

In the treatise on the three times, the text also has four parts: first, stating the doctrine; second, cross-examining; third, stating their tenets; fourth, refuting them. In stating their tenets, it first states those of the non-Buddhists and then states those of the Hīnayāna. The inference of the external school is: "Past and future are substantially existent; because they are subsumed under the temporal periods; just like the present." In the teachings of the inner school, the "all-existent" refers to the twelve āyatanas. The intention of their school is to say: "These twelve āyatanas exist in their real characteristics; the mental consciousness takes the twelve dharma-āyatanas of the three times as objects; therefore, past and future exist." This is broadly explained as in the twentieth fascicle of the Kośa and at the beginning of the fifty-second fascicle in expounding the meaning of this sūtra.

3.26

Under the reasoning, "If a phenomenon abides in its own characteristic, this phenomenon is truly existent": this summarizes that when phenomena abide in their own characteristics, these phenomena truly exist; if they do not abide in their own characteristics, these phenomena become non-existent, like the hair of a turtle. Because past and future times abide in their own characteristics, the substances of the phenomena are existent, unlike the hair of a turtle. If the future were non-existent, it would not yet have received its own substance, and it should not be the future. The formal inference is: "The future in Mahāyāna should not be the future; because it has not received the characteristic of its own substance; like the hair of a turtle." If the past were non-existent, it would lose the characteristic of its own substance in the past, and it should not be called the past. The formal inference is: "The past in Mahāyāna should not be the past; because it has lost the characteristic of its own substance; like the hair of a turtle." If it were like this, phenomena across the three times would not have their own characteristics established; because their own characteristics are not established, they would also not be real. The formal inference is: "The present in Mahāyāna does not establish its own characteristic, or it is also not real; because it is subsumed under the temporal periods; just like past and future." Since the present is not so, how could the past and future be so? Or: "Conditioned phenomena do not truly establish their own characteristics; because they lack the three times; like the horns of a hare."

3.27

Refuting their school has five parts: first, presenting three objections; second, the opponent's counter-questioning; third, cross-examining and refuting again; fourth, explaining their sūtra; fifth, explaining twelve characteristics each for the three times to reveal their error. Within the first, there are two: first, presenting the three objections; second, summarizing the preceding text with "Because their own characteristics are as such." The three objections are: first, the objection regarding identity or difference of own-characteristic; second, the objection regarding common characteristics such as permanence; third, the objection regarding the seven meanings such as coming.

3.28

Some say that their characteristics are identical; but establishing characteristics of the three times [thereby] does not stand to reason. "Characteristic" means substance. The formal inference is: "There should not be three temporal periods; because they are identical in one substance; just like a single substance." Or: "There should not be three temporal periods; because their characteristic is single; just like the present." This is a hypothetical refutation, not the position of our own school.

3.29

If their characteristics are different, that their nature and characteristics are substantially existent does not stand to reason. This actually means that if the characteristics of the three times are different, existing apart from the present, then that the nature and characteristics of the past and future times are substantially existent does not stand to reason. The formal inference is: "The nature and characteristics of the past and future should not be substantially existent; because they are different from the present; like the horns of a hare." In the Mahāyāna, tathatā is not definitively different from the present, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Or the reason may be: "because they are not subsumed under the unconditioned in the present," with the thesis and example being the same as before.

3.30

Regarding whether it is a permanent characteristic or an impermanent characteristic: it is shared across the three times, so it is called a common characteristic. If it is a permanent characteristic, this is a hypothetical cross-examination, not their actual school. The formal inference is: "The five skandhas in your school should not fall into the three times; because you accept that their characteristic is permanent; like the unconditioned." If it is an impermanent characteristic, that they are constantly existent across the three times also does not stand to reason. The formal inference is: "The five skandhas in your school are not constantly and substantially existent across the three times; because their characteristic is impermanent; like the horns of a hare." If they say this is an affirmative statement of impermanence and not an exclusion, the formal inference is: "The dharmas of the five skandhas are not constantly existent across the three times; because they are subsumed under the temporal periods; like an illusion." Under the objection

3.31

concerning the seven meanings: first it states the seven objections, and then restates them to refute them individually. Altogether there are four Sarvāstivādins. In the Kośa, fascicle 20, the verse says: "Herein there are four kinds: / Differences of mode (bhāva), characteristic (lakṣaṇa), state (avasthā), and relativity (anyathātva); / The third, based on function (kāritra), / Is the most excellent in establishing the temporal periods." Dharmatrāta says: "The periods differ by mode. When a dharma traverses the periods, its mode differs, not its substance. Just as when gold is made into a vessel, the shape differs but the material is the same; and as milk becomes curd, the taste is abandoned while the color remains. A dharma flows from the future into the present and from the present enters the past; it merely abandons and acquires modes, not abandoning or acquiring substance." Ghoṣaka says: "The periods differ by characteristic. When a dharma traverses the periods, the past is precisely conjoined with the past characteristic, yet is not called separated from the present and future characteristics; the future is precisely conjoined with the future characteristic, yet is not called separated from the past and present characteristics; the present is precisely conjoined with the present characteristic, yet is not called separated from the past characteristic. Just as being attached to one wife does not mean one is separated from lust toward other concubines." Vasumitra says: "The periods differ by state. When a dharma traverses the periods, the substance is the same but the states differ. Just as moving a single counting-stick, when placed at the ones place it is called one, at the hundreds place it is called a hundred, and at the thousands place it is called a thousand." Buddhadeva says: "The periods differ by relativity. When a dharma traverses the periods, it is relative to before and after that different designations are established. Just as a single woman is called a mother and called a daughter." Vasubandhu says: "Among these four explanations, the first assertion is identical to the non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya. The second asserts that in separation each has all three characteristics; just as when attached to a wife, lust is presently arisen, while toward the others it is merely possessed—what meaning makes them the same? The fourth asserts that a single period should contain all three periods; just as in the past period, prior and subsequent moments should be called past, future, and present; the same applies to the future, because the mutual relativity is the same. Therefore, the third is the most excellent explanation, because it differentiates based on a dharma's function being not yet arisen, presently arisen, or already ceased." Now, in these seven meanings: the first question about coming attacks Dharmatrāta's meaning of difference of mode; the fourth, objecting to activity (karman), refutes Vasumitra's position of the Master of Function who posits difference of state; the sixth, different characteristics, refutes Buddhadeva's position of the Master of Relativity; the fourth and seventh, having a present share, refute Ghoṣaka's meaning of difference of characteristic; the remaining three are hypothetical refutations and not the tenets of this school proper. The refutation of these four masters is as explained in the Kośa. Chapter 51 of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī relates them as six assertions, the import of the text being largely the same.

3.32

"Before reaching the present" means that the substance of the phenomenon does not alter, but transfers toward the present. "Arises here" means that it dies out in the future and only then arises in the present. "Arising in the present by serving as a condition" means that a phenomenon abiding in the future, by acting as a cause and condition, produces a distinct phenomenon in the present. "Now having activity" means that it lacks function in the future, and its function arises in the present. "Its characteristics are now complete" means that its original characteristics were not complete, and only become fulfilled upon reaching the present. "Its characteristics are now distinct" means that although the original substance is identical, its characteristics differ in mutual dependence. "Possessing a present part" means that a phenomenon in the future has a future part as well as present and past parts, implying that the present also has a present part as well as future and past parts, and the past is likewise. Here, it merely cites possessing parts of two time periods; the rest can be known by analogy. Fascicle fifty-one has six [theses], lacking this sixth one. That sixth one is precisely this seventh one. Or some explain: this sixth and seventh together constitute that sixth one. "Its characteristics are now distinct" is precisely that the present has a present part and a future part; separating them here and combining them there do not conflict. If one interprets it thus, the position of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta on mutual dependence would be absent; therefore, one should know that the former explanation is superior.

3.33

The separate refutations have two parts: first, refutations in five sections; second, applying them by analogy to the past, because the latter three are analogously refuted together with activity. The first objection has three points: 1. Having a spatial location; 2. Being non-distinct from the present; 3. Being necessarily permanent. In the first objection, the formal proof is: The future must have a spatial location, because of having arrived, just like the present. Furthermore, the future must be non-distinct from the present, because of having arrived and because of having a spatial location, just like the present. Furthermore, the substance of future phenomena must be permanent, because of existing both originally and now, like space, etc. Fascicle fifty-one states: Future phenomena do not arrive in the present, because of lacking spatial location, just like the unconditioned good. The second objection has two points: 1. The future does not arise in the present; what originally did not exist in the present now arises. The formal proof is: Phenomena of the future period must not be conditioned, because of originally not arising, like space, etc.; nor are they real existents, because of not being unconditioned and originally not arising, like a rabbit's horn, etc. 2. What has not arisen in the future is said to die out. The formal proof is: Future phenomena must have no dying out, because of originally not having arisen, like space, etc. Furthermore, future phenomena must also have arising, because of admitting death, just like the present. The third objection has two points: 1. Refuting that it would be permanent. The formal proof is: Phenomena abiding in the future period that serve as conditions must be permanent, because of not undergoing flux, like the unconditioned, etc. 2. What originally did not exist must now arise, rather than a future phenomenon arising. This is an objection showing contradiction with their own tenet. They say that future phenomena flow into the present; now, present phenomena arise conditioned by the future, which originally did not exist in the future and only now begin to arise—it is not that future phenomena arise, so how does this not contradict their tenet? The fourth objection refuting activity has three points: 1. Originally lacking activity, but now having activity. The objection states: This means that its substance originally exists and only now possesses function, incurring the same second fault as in the previous conditioning, because present activity arises without arising from the future. Function is not separate from substance, so it should not be newly existent; substance is not separate from function, so it should not be previously established. The formal proof is as before. 2. It states: Activity and the phenomenon have distinct characteristics. The objection states: The characteristic of this activity and its original phenomenon both substantially exist, yet activity does not exist in the future, which is therefore unreasonable. The formal proof is: Activity should exist in the future, because of admitting that all exists, like the substance. Substance should not exist in the future, because of admitting that all exists, like activity. Or one may take distinct characteristics as the reason, because substance and activity are mutually distinct; the thesis and example are as before. 3. It states: Activity and the original phenomenon have no distinct characteristics. The objection states: Activity is just the phenomenon; the substance of the phenomenon originally exists, while originally it lacked activity and only now has it, which does not accord with correct reasoning. The formal proof is: Activity should originally exist, because it is identical with the substance, like the substance. Substance should originally not exist, because it is identical with activity, like activity. That school posits that activity and substance are non-distinct; here, objecting to distinctness is merely a hypothetical negation. Fascicle fifty-one states: The Buddha taught that conditioned formations are not permanent and not eternal; if your activity is impermanent, the formations must be permanent, which then contradicts the Buddha's teaching.

3.34

Among the remaining three analogical refutations, "There is furthermore the fault of confusion of intrinsic nature" demonstrates the fault of confusion in the seventh [thesis] of having a present part. Since the future already possesses a present part, it should be the present, because it possesses a present part, just like the present. The objection regarding the present is also like this; hence confusion ensues. Regarding its characteristics being complete, one should establish the formal proof: The future's characteristics should be complete, because of possessing the characteristics of another part, like the present. Or: The present's characteristics should not be complete, because of possessing the characteristics of another part, just like the future. The objection regarding distinct characteristics has a formal proof identical to this. Second, in concluding the preceding, there are nine occurrences of the word "therefore". "Specific characteristics" concludes the preceding oneness and difference of the specific characteristics of the three time periods. "Common characteristics" concludes the preceding permanence and impermanence of the three time periods, because they are shared by the three time periods. The remaining seven are precisely the previous seven objections concerning the three time periods. Second, their cross-examination in response.

3.35

"Having thus explained" refers to vyākaraṇa, distinguishing and explaining the profound and esoteric meaning.

3.36

"As it is said that all exists, meaning the twelve āyatanas": this is intended to show that the twelve āyatanas encompass the three time periods, and the sphere of phenomena (dharmadhātu) that is the cognitive object of mental consciousness belongs to all three time periods. If past and future did not exist, it would contradict this teaching.

3.37

Third, in the re-investigation and refutation: according to that school, consciousness does not arise with a non-existent as its object; when cognising a rabbit's horn or the like, one previously saw the rabbit separately and previously saw the horn separately, combining them in one place, so it is not presently cognising a non-existent. If so, it would contradict the Buddha's teaching, because he spoke of knowing a non-existent as non-existent. Otherwise, there should only be cognition of what exists. The objection below regarding consciousness taking a non-existent as its object is a refutation of a hypothetical position.

3.38

Fourth, explaining the sūtras cited by them, which has three parts: first, explaining the twelve āyatanas; second, explaining past karma; third, explaining that form, etc., exist in the three time periods. "With intentional meaning, it is spoken of as having the characteristic of non-existence regarding non-existent phenomena": this is intended to show that a non-existent phenomenon can maintain its own non-existence; since there is this phenomenon of maintaining non-existence, it is intentionally spoken of as existing and spoken of as a phenomenon, not showing that a non-existent phenomenon has a substantial entity like an existent. "In existent phenomena, it is also intentionally existent": its existence is not real; it is conventionally designated as having maintenance, hence called intentional.

3.39

"Due to this cause and condition, the superior and distinct continuation of those formations turns, which is called vāsanā": this is because this vāsanā has distinctions such as the continuation of formations being superior or distinct, interrupted or uninterrupted, concealed or manifest, subtle or coarse, cognising or not cognising, obstructed or unobstructed, and so forth.

3.40

Fifth, the three explanations of the twelve characteristics. In the future: the characteristic of phenomena that can arise refers to phenomena that have not attained apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; the characteristic of phenomena that cannot arise refers to phenomena that have attained apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha; arising phenomena are those that should be sought; non-arising phenomena have the characteristic of not being sought.

3.41

Fourth, refuting the self has five parts: 1. Describing the tenets; 2. Inquiring into the meaning; 3. Describing the attachments; 4. Investigation and refutation; 5. Revealing the correct meaning.

3.42

"There is a self, a sattva," etc.: here there are only six; in fascicle eighty-three there are eight; in the Prajñāpāramitā there are four, etc.—all are reconciled as in the Shuyao.

3.43

In describing the attachments, first it generally sets forth two causes, and then separately reveals the two causes. Because through cultivation one knows there is consciousness even without conceptualising, and through mental application and deliberation one also knows there is a self, they are therefore called the two causes.

3.44

In the interrogation and refutation, there are two parts: first, stating the ten objections separately; second, concluding them as a whole. 1. The objection based on non-deliberation being prior, which challenges the previous assertion that one spontaneously knows there is a self. 2. Beginning with "Is worldly action caused by deliberation...", the objection based on deliberate cognition being prior, which challenges the previous assertion of deliberate reflection; and beginning with "one also knows there is a self", it combines the refutation of both. 3. Beginning with "Is a self hypothetically designated based on the aggregates...", the objection regarding hypothetical designation upon the aggregates. 4. Beginning with "Is the imputed self the characteristics of a seer and so forth...", the objection regarding positing [the self] upon those [aggregates]. 5. Beginning with "Is it associated with defilement and purification...", the objection regarding the establishment of defilement and purification. 6. Beginning with "Is it associated with the characteristics of saṃsāra...", the objection regarding saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. 7. Beginning with "Is either suffering or pleasure produced by objects...", the objection regarding acting, experiencing, and liberation. 8. Beginning with "Furthermore, you should now state your own position: is the self alone described as the agent...", the objection regarding the designation of an agent. 9. Beginning with "Furthermore, you should state your own intention: is 'self' established solely in reference to the self...", the objection regarding the designation of conventional speech. 10. Beginning with "Is the view that imputes a self wholesome or unwholesome...", the objection regarding the designation of manifold views. In the concluding section below, there are ten occurrences of the word "therefore," which correspond to these passages. The first objection has four parts, marked by four occurrences of the word "furthermore" (又). The first part states: "Does the cognition of a sentient being arise in reference to the very entity that is seen?" This master originally postulated that the self exists apart from the aggregates, and thus postulating that seen form and so forth are the self is an inverted cognition, which refutes the view that [the self] is identical to the aggregates. This is a flaw of contradicting scriptural teaching; there is no separate syllogism. Alternatively, the proponent of the identical-aggregates view says: "Clinging to the view of self leads to sinking in saṃsāra; speaking of the view of selflessness enables one to realize nirvāṇa. Therefore, [positing] that this self exists on form and so forth is called inverted. If they postulate a self separate from the aggregates, that the self has spatial dimensions and so forth would be unreasonable. Their self separate from the aggregates is either the size of the body or like a mustard seed, and therefore possesses spatial dimensions." This challenges the assertion that the self possesses form as unproven. "Possessing superiority and inferiority is the function of sensation. Being a kṣatriya and so forth is the function of conception. Being foolish or wise is the function of volition. Being able to grasp objects is the function of consciousness. Therefore, apart from the aggregates, there is no separate capability of this kind." The overall syllogism is stated: "The self separate from the aggregates should be devoid of spatial dimensions and the like; because both parties accept that it is separate from the aggregates; like a rabbit's horn." The second objection states: "Does this cognition arise solely from the intrinsic nature of this dharma..." This means to ask: does the cognition of a self arise from the intrinsic nature of the cognized object, or elsewhere? If the cognition of a self arises from the intrinsic nature of the cognized dharma, how can you say that postulating a self as identical to the aggregates is inverted? Since one gives rise to the cognition of self toward seen form that has spatial dimensions, form is precisely the self, and thus there is no separate self apart from form; clinging to form as the self is therefore not inverted. The syllogism is: "Your cognition that takes form as the self should not be inverted; because it is accepted to conform to its ālambana; just like knowledge of another's mind." In "If this cognition arises from another entity...", it means that the cognition of a self possessing spatial dimensions would also arise from the mind and so forth, which means that the cognition of spatial dimensions would arise in reference to all objective dharmas, not solely by taking form as its condition; one should also be able to have cognitions of the self's superiority and inferiority by taking form as its condition, and not only give rise to those cognitions by taking sensation and so forth as conditions. The two categories of object and mind would then become confused, and a single object such as form would also be the causal condition for cognitions of sensation, conception, volition, and so forth. The syllogism is: "In your system, form and so forth should be sensation and so forth; because they give rise to cognitions of superiority, inferiority, and so forth; just like sensation and so forth." All other syllogisms should be understood by analogy with this. In the third objection, "If it does not arise conditionally, it would deny direct perception (pratyakṣa), for through direct perception one actually sees a distant post as a person, and thereby gives rise to the cognition of a sentient being toward an inanimate object." What does not arise is called non-direct-perception. Here there is also a contradiction with worldly consensus, but it is omitted for brevity. The meaning of this objection is: you postulate that giving rise to cognitions of sensation and so forth by taking form as a condition are all true cognitions and not inverted cognitions; therefore, the cognition of clinging to a distant post as a person should also not be inverted. Since this [post-cognition] is inverted, it conversely proves that one falsely gives rise to the cognition of a sentient being toward what is selfless, because of postulating [a sentient being] and giving rise to the cognition of a sentient being toward inanimate objects. The fourth objection states: "If it apprehends an object of direct perception, only the aggregates of form and so forth are objects of direct perception, while the self is not an object of direct perception, which is unreasonable." "Artha" (義) means object (viṣaya). That system posits that the self is not an object of direct perception; now stating that it is a direct-perception object is a hypothetical refutation, demonstrating that only the five aggregates are objects of direct perception, which is established mutually between both parties. That the self is not such an object is their own system's assertion; now stating it is an object of direct perception contradicts their own school. As for "If this cognition apprehends an object of inference (anumāna)", this cognition of self arises even in young infants; since they are not yet capable of deliberate reflection and cannot infer, the cognition of self should not abruptly arise in them. The syllogism is: "The cognition of self in an infant should not be able to arise; because it lacks deliberate reflection; like the child of a barren woman." The overall syllogism is stated: "Your self is neither an object of direct perception nor of inference; because of the absence of a concordant example; like a rabbit's horn."

3.45

The preceding four passages conclude the objection based on non-deliberation being prior. From here onward is the second: the objection based on deliberate cognition being prior, which contains five occurrences of "furthermore" (又), constituting five sections. The Sāṃkhyas hold that the self's essence is solely an experiencer (bhoktṛ), while the Vaiśeṣikas hold that the self encompasses both an agent (kartṛ) and an experiencer; the refutation of agency below should be understood according to the sense. In the second objection, "If it is impermanent, then the cause of this that is produced is fundamentally a mutating entity; yet clinging to an existent self...": "what is produced" means arising. The cause of what is produced is fundamentally a mutating, impermanent dharma; while the self is the agent, to still claim that it is permanent and yet produces something is unreasonable. The Prakaraṇāryavācā states: "Holding that the self has agency is unreasonable." It does not explicitly mention permanence, but now only speaks of "holding that the self exists." "Exists" encompasses two meanings: first, having permanence; second, having agency. In terms of permanent existence, the syllogism is: "The self should not be permanently existent; because it has agency; like coarse earth and so forth." If it were permanent, the self should lack agency, because it is permanent, like space and so forth. Permanence is the primary target of objection; impermanence is a hypothetical refutation.

3.46

In the third objection, regarding "a self with motion": for the Sāṃkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas, the self has no motion because it is all-pervading like space, as they hold it completely transcends bondage. [Others] hold that the self has motion because it does not pervade space; while the meaning of agency is the same, the meaning of motion differs. In "a self with motion performs actions": it would then act constantly and should not act anew. Because the self is permanent, it moves constantly and acts constantly; it is not acting newly now, and should not act anew. The syllogism is: "Your moving self should already have acted before acting; because it constantly moves and acts; just like what it acts upon now." "A self without motion performs actions" is unreasonable. The syllogism is: "A self without motion should have no agency; because it lacks motion; like space and so forth."

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瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese