瑜伽師地論略纂 3.95

3.95

In the refutation, there are two parts: first, separate refutations; later, the conclusion. The separate refutations have two parts: first, fourfold refutations of the non-Buddhist views of emptiness; later, refuting the Buddhist view of emptiness. In the fourfold refutation of the non-Buddhist views of emptiness, the previous recounting of attachments had six: the first three attachments are combined into one section for refutation, and the latter three are each refuted individually. Regarding “If both exist, what you previously said about 'there is no giving',” and so forth: that teacher's original theory did not deny all causes and fruits; relying on dhyāna, seeing that in the world those who practice giving are born into poor and base families, they thought that giving has no efficacy, and thus denigrated a part. Therefore, it now asks them whether the two karmas of subsequent lives are co-existent or not co-existent. If they had completely denied everything, this objection would not hold. “Detached from desire with ideation” means detaching from the desire of all [spheres] having ideation, which is the heaven of non-conception. The other two are, respectively, detaching from desire of the form realm and entering nirvāṇa. They reckon that there is detachment from the lower desire realm's desires, but do not concede that there is detachment from desires of higher realms. Below the third dhyāna, they say it is not non-existent, but denying the remainder alone violates inferential reasoning. Regarding “Is there an arhat-nature, regarding which an exaggerated pride arises?”: this intended question says, does there exist a true arhat in the world regarding which exaggerated pride arises, claiming oneself to be an arhat? Does this exist, or does it not? If it exists, [the claim that] there are no true arhats fails. If there are no true arhats, one who gives rise to inverted grasping and calls oneself an arhat should be an arhat who is not inverted; since they are not inverted, they should be true. In refuting the internal view of emptiness: “there should be no inversion” refers to the imagined [nature]; “defilement” refers to the dependent [nature]; “purity” refers to the consummate [nature]. Furthermore, inversion refers to the confused mind; defilement refers to the three defilements; purity refers to the two purities. Since in the ultimate truth none of these exist at all, then there would be neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa; what would there be to delight in or loathe? What to attain or abandon? As in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and so forth, and the cross-examinations in this treatise, all should be understood in accordance with reason.