瑜伽師地論略纂 4.76

4.76

Third, regarding the meaning of dependent origination, there are two parts: first, explaining dependent origination through eight meanings, and second, distinguishing it through questions and answers. The Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra each explain it through eleven meanings. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: First, the meaning of being devoid of a sentient being: because there is no spontaneous self. This refutes the Vaiśeṣikas, Vātsīputrīyas, and others who hold that the self is the agent; hence it is devoid of that sentient being. Second, the meaning of impermanence: because it is not eternal. This refutes the Sāṃkhya view that the primordial nature (prakṛti) is permanent, is the root of the myriad things, and becomes things by acting as a condition; hence it reveals impermanence. It also refutes the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas, and others who hold that the twelve [links of] dependently arisen phenomena are unconditioned dharmas. Third, the meaning of abiding only momentarily: because once the time of arising has passed, there is no abiding even for an instant. The Abhidharma-samuccaya also calls this the meaning of momentariness. This refutes the Sautrāntika-affiliated Sammītīya view that conditioned dharmas such as matter and the life-faculty undergo the four characteristics over a whole lifetime and are not momentary. Fourth, the meaning of dependent arising (paratantra): because they arise relying on multiple conditions. This refutes the non-Buddhist naturalists who hold that dharmas exist spontaneously and are not produced by relying on causes; hence they are dependently arisen. Fifth, the meaning of being devoid of activity: because the activity of multiple conditions is empty. This refutes the Sarvāstivādin view that real activity constitutes the entity of conditioned arising; here it reveals that there is efficacy without activity. Sixth, the meaning of the unbroken continuity of cause and effect: because the cause ceases in an instant and the effect arises in an instant, their duration being equal; hence cause and effect are continuous. This refutes the annihilationist non-Buddhists who hold that cause and effect do not continue; it also excludes the Sautrāntika masters' view that past and future times do not exist, yet the fruitional cause and effect are still not simultaneous, which would sever cause and effect. Seventh, the meaning of the similar progression of cause and effect: because everything is not produced from everything, cause and effect are similar. This excludes those who take harming to be the true Dharma, asserting that killing a sheep and the like is the cause for subsequently being born in heaven—which posits that wholesome fruits have unwholesomeness as their cause, so that cause and effect are not similar. Here it reveals that wholesome causes yield wholesome maturation, and unwholesome causes likewise; thus cause and effect are similar. Eighth, the meaning of being made by one's own karma: because one does not experience the fruit in another continuum, one's own karma is experienced by oneself. This refutes the nihilistic views asserting that there is no cause and that effects are not karma; it also refutes the doctrine that another acts and I experience the fruit, which is the assertion of asymmetric causality. Both the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra explain these extensively; for fear of verbosity, they are not detailed here.