瑜伽師地論略纂 6.124

6.124

There are two meanings to that which is established. Regarding 'intrinsic nature and distinction', etc.: here the proposition and so forth are called that which establishes, and the intrinsic nature and distinction are that which is to be established. Regarding this, there are three tiers: First, it is said that the meaning to be established by the words of the proposition is called that which is to be established (prameya/sādhya), and therefore this 'to be established' has the word 'meaning'. The words expressing the proposition and the words and meanings of the reason, etc., are all called that which establishes (sādhana). The words of the proposition, being established by the reason and example, are although also that which is to be established—as the text below states, in order to first display the intended meaning of one's own proposition, it is therefore also that which is to be established—are not determinately that which is to be established; because they can establish the meaning, just as the reason and example are both established, they are merely called that which establishes. The expressed meaning is determinately only that which is to be established, and is exclusively called that which is established. Second, it is said that the aggregate of intrinsic nature and distinction of all dharmas, whether teaching or principle, is that which is to be established. This is merely called 'meaning', existing as appropriate. A portion within the totality put forward against an opponent, whether words or meaning, intrinsic nature or distinction, is altogether called the proposition, which is precisely called that which establishes. Although the distinct proposition is also that which is to be established, because it establishes the general, it receives the name 'that which establishes'. Therefore Dignāga and others call the proposition that which is to be established, which in principle does not contradict the *Yogācārabhūmi* and so forth, because the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other texts state that the proposition is not exclusively that which establishes. Third, it is said that the combined underlying meaning of intrinsic nature and distinction is called that which is to be established; the combining proposition that relies upon them is stated to be that which establishes, because the general establishes the specific. It is not that this general proposition is determinately only that which establishes; when jointly put forward against an opponent, because it is established by the reason and example, it is also that which is to be established. Because it is not determinately that which is to be established, it obtains the name 'that which establishes'. Dignāga merely uses commonly accepted reasons and examples to establish what the other has not yet accepted. What the other has not yet accepted is solely the combined proposition. The proposition is that which is to be established, and the intrinsic nature and distinction are merely the bases of the proposition; because their referenced meanings differ, there is no contradiction.