瑜伽師地論略纂 6.124

6.124

所成立義有二：「自性差別」等者，此中宗等名為能立、自性差別為所立者，此有三重：一云宗言所成立義，名為所立，故此所立而有義言。其宗能詮之言及因等言義，皆名能立。其宗之言，因喻成故，雖亦所立，此下文說為先顯示自所愛樂宗義，故亦所立。非定所立，能成義故，猶如於因喻皆成，故但名能立。所詮義決定唯是所立，獨名所成。　二云諸法總聚自性、差別，若教若理俱是所立。此但名義，隨應有故。總中一分，對敵所申，若言若義，自性、差別，俱名為宗，即名能立。雖別宗，亦是所立，能立總故，得能立名。故陳那等，宗名所立，與《瑜伽》等，理不相違。《瑜伽》等說宗非一向唯能立故。　三云自性、差別合所依義，名為所立；能依合宗，說為能立，總立別故。非此總宗定唯能立，對敵合申，因、喻成故，亦是所立。由非定所立，故得能立名。陳那但以共許因、喻，成他未許。他未許者，唯是合宗。宗為所立，自性、差別但是宗依，所望義殊，不相違故。

There are two meanings to that which is established. Regarding 'intrinsic nature and distinction', etc.: here the proposition and so forth are called that which establishes, and the intrinsic nature and distinction are that which is to be established. Regarding this, there are three tiers: First, it is said that the meaning to be established by the words of the proposition is called that which is to be established (prameya/sādhya), and therefore this 'to be established' has the word 'meaning'. The words expressing the proposition and the words and meanings of the reason, etc., are all called that which establishes (sādhana). The words of the proposition, being established by the reason and example, are although also that which is to be established—as the text below states, in order to first display the intended meaning of one's own proposition, it is therefore also that which is to be established—are not determinately that which is to be established; because they can establish the meaning, just as the reason and example are both established, they are merely called that which establishes. The expressed meaning is determinately only that which is to be established, and is exclusively called that which is established. Second, it is said that the aggregate of intrinsic nature and distinction of all dharmas, whether teaching or principle, is that which is to be established. This is merely called 'meaning', existing as appropriate. A portion within the totality put forward against an opponent, whether words or meaning, intrinsic nature or distinction, is altogether called the proposition, which is precisely called that which establishes. Although the distinct proposition is also that which is to be established, because it establishes the general, it receives the name 'that which establishes'. Therefore Dignāga and others call the proposition that which is to be established, which in principle does not contradict the *Yogācārabhūmi* and so forth, because the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other texts state that the proposition is not exclusively that which establishes. Third, it is said that the combined underlying meaning of intrinsic nature and distinction is called that which is to be established; the combining proposition that relies upon them is stated to be that which establishes, because the general establishes the specific. It is not that this general proposition is determinately only that which establishes; when jointly put forward against an opponent, because it is established by the reason and example, it is also that which is to be established. Because it is not determinately that which is to be established, it obtains the name 'that which establishes'. Dignāga merely uses commonly accepted reasons and examples to establish what the other has not yet accepted. What the other has not yet accepted is solely the combined proposition. The proposition is that which is to be established, and the intrinsic nature and distinction are merely the bases of the proposition; because their referenced meanings differ, there is no contradiction.