成唯識論述記 1.157

1.157

問：此二體無，識體如何轉似二分？答：相、見俱依自證起故，由識自體虛妄習故，不如實故，或有執故，無明俱故，轉似二分。二分即是相及見分，依識體起，由體妄故，變似二分。二分說依自證而起，若無識體，二分亦無。故二分起，由識體有。既有自體及此二分，依何分上假說我、法？答：依斯二分，施設我、法。依此相、見計所執上，世間、聖教說為我、法。此相、見之中皆說為我、法，彼我、法二離此相、見，無所依故，故依所執相、見二分，施設我、法。世尊能知識自證分及真如等，法性離言，非我、非法，為除愚夫所執實我、法，於彼識所變二分之上，假說為我、法，方便誘引，令知假說，非謂實有。問：前護法解，後安惠解，何故我、法但依二分，不計自體以為我、法？答：若護法說，據實亦計，且舉所變二分為依，非無依於自體計也。略有三義，所以不說：一、二執遍，我執不依自證起故；二、共許遍，今、古、大、小皆不許有自證分故；三、義已說，若計自體，即能取攝，見分中收。但言二分攝能、所取，非不依於自體分計。今顯自證離見體無，故但說二見分中攝，顯能、所取攝法盡故。若安惠解，凡是所執體皆是無，若執自體，即說能取不異見分，故更不說為我、法依，以自證分體是有故，或離言故，不可依說。問：護法云：相、見識所變，相、見名唯識，自證不言變，應非是唯識解。若立三分，種所變故，名為唯識。若說四分，三、四更互變名唯識。又即識體，何故非唯。問：何故二師所說三分，義各有異，今合為文？答：譯者欲以文同義別，文約義繁，所以合二師總為一文也。又如因明宗等多言名為能立，陳那所說宗非能立，今舉其宗意，不違古文，辭遣同義取所等，因一喻二，以為能立，理即別也。此文亦然，文不相違，所以合譯，義有乖返，故為二釋。問：真如非識之所變現，何成唯識？亦依真如執為實法，寧非染分之所依止？答：雖非識變，識實性故，亦名唯識。真如離言，與能計識非一非異，非如色等，可依起執，故非執依。此中不說。又《解深密經》說，亦為執依，然與依他稍不相似。依他之法與所計執有少作用，相狀可同，隨能計心新新而起，心上所現即是依他，是能計心之所親取。真如不爾，故此不說。遠望疎言亦可依執，諸末學者依起執故，《解深密》說亦不相違。真如既非識所轉變，應非唯識，不以變故名為唯識；不離識故亦名唯識。此中且說依他唯識。問：依所變相，執為我、法，內道、外道皆可了知，依所變見，執法可爾，如何依見，亦執我耶？答：如外僧佉執思為我，犢子部等我名能見，故依二分，皆執我、法。前敘計中，已略敘說。

Question: Since these two lack an intrinsic nature, how does the substance of consciousness transform into what resembles the two parts? Answer: Because both the nimittabhāga and the darśanabhāga arise relying on the svasaṃvittibhāga, due to the false habitual tendencies of the substance of consciousness itself, due to not being in accordance with reality, or due to having grasping, and due to being accompanied by ignorance, it transforms into what resembles the two parts. The two parts are precisely the nimittabhāga and the darśanabhāga; they arise relying on the substance of consciousness, and because the substance is false, it transforms into what resembles the two parts. The two parts are said to arise relying on the svasaṃvitti; if there were no substance of consciousness, the two parts would also not exist. Therefore, that the two parts arise is due to the existence of the substance of consciousness. Since the substance itself and these two parts exist, relying upon which part are self and dharmas metaphorically designated? Answer: Relying on these two parts, self and dharmas are posited. Relying upon this parikalpita-svabhāva of nimitta and darśana, the worldly realm and the noble teachings speak of self and dharmas. Within both this nimitta and darśana they are spoken of as self and dharmas, because apart from this nimitta and darśana, that self and dharmas would have nothing to rely upon; therefore, relying upon the grasped two parts of nimitta and darśana, self and dharmas are posited. The World-Honoured One, fully knowing the svasaṃvittibhāga of consciousness and tathatā and so forth, that the nature of phenomena is beyond words, being neither self nor dharma, in order to remove the real self and dharmas grasped by foolish persons, metaphorically speaks of self and dharmas upon the two parts transformed by that consciousness, using expedient means to guide them and lead them to know they are metaphorical designations, not meaning that they really exist. Question: In the previous explanation by Dharmapāla and the subsequent explanation by Sthiramati, why are self and dharmas only relied upon the two parts, and the substance itself is not conceptualized as self and dharmas? Answer: If according to Dharmapāla's explanation, in reality it is also conceptualized, but for now he adduces the transformed two parts as the basis, not that there is no conceptualization relying upon the substance itself. Briefly, there are three reasons why it is not mentioned: first, the two graspings are pervasive, for ātmagrāha does not arise relying on the svasaṃvitti; second, common consensus is pervasive, for both modern and ancient, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna do not universally accept having a svasaṃvittibhāga; third, the meaning has already been explained: if one conceptualizes the substance itself, it is subsumed under the grāhaka (apprehender) and included within the darśanabhāga. Only speaking of the two parts subsumes the grāhaka and the grāhya (apprehended), not that it is not conceptualized relying on the substance part. Now, to show that apart from the darśanabhāga the substance of the svasaṃvitti does not exist [separately], he only speaks of the two, subsuming it within the darśanabhāga, to show that grāhaka and grāhya exhaustively subsume phenomena. If according to Sthiramati's explanation, whatever is grasped lacks intrinsic nature altogether; if one grasps the substance itself, it is said that the grāhaka is not distinct from the darśanabhāga, hence he does not further speak of it as the basis for self and dharmas, because the substance of the svasaṃvittibhāga is existent, or because being beyond words, it cannot be spoken of as a basis. Question: Dharmapāla says that the nimitta and darśana are transformed by consciousness, and nimitta and darśana are called vijñapti-mātra; since the svasaṃvitti is not said to be transformed, should it not be that it is not vijñapti-mātra? Explanation: If one establishes three parts, because they are transformed by seeds, they are called vijñapti-mātra. If one speaks of four parts, the third and fourth mutually transforming each other is called vijñapti-mātra. Furthermore, being precisely the substance of consciousness, why should it not be mātra (only)? Question: Why do the three parts explained by the two masters differ in meaning, yet are now combined into a single text? Answer: The translator wished, because the text is identical but the meanings differ, and the text is concise while the meanings are complex, to therefore combine the two masters together into one text. Furthermore, just as in Hetuvidyā, where the thesis and other multiple statements are called the sādhana (proof), yet Dignāga stated that the thesis is not the sādhana; now adducing the intention of that thesis without contravening the ancient text, using phrases that dismiss identity of meaning while taking what is intended, with one reason and two examples acting as the sādhana, the underlying principle is indeed distinct. This text is also like that: since the words do not contradict each other, they are translated together, but because their meanings diverge, they are given as two interpretations. Question: Since tathatā is not what is transformed and manifested by consciousness, how does it constitute vijñapti-mātra? Also, relying upon tathatā, one grasps it as a real dharma; how could it not be the basis of the defiled part? Answer: Although it is not transformed by consciousness, because it is the real nature of consciousness, it is also called vijñapti-mātra. Tathatā is beyond words, neither identical to nor different from the conceptualizing consciousness; it is not like form and so forth, which can be relied upon to give rise to grasping, hence it is not the basis of grasping. It is not spoken of here. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra says it is also a basis of grasping, yet it is somewhat dissimilar to the paratantra. Phenomena of the paratantra share some function with the parikalpita, and their marks can be identical, arising anew following the conceptualizing mind; what is manifested upon the mind is precisely the paratantra, which is what is directly grasped by the conceptualizing mind. Tathatā is not like this, hence it is not spoken of here. Viewed from afar and spoken of loosely, it may also be grasped relying upon it, because subsequent learners give rise to grasping relying upon it; thus what the Saṃdhinirmocana says is also not contradictory. Since tathatā is not transformed by consciousness, it would seem not to be vijñapti-mātra; yet it is not called vijñapti-mātra because of transformation—because it is not separate from consciousness, it is also called vijñapti-mātra. Here, for the time being, paratantra vijñapti-mātra is spoken of. Question: That, relying on the transformed nimitta, one grasps it as self and dharmas can be understood by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists; relying on the transformed darśana, grasping dharmas may be so, but how, relying on the darśana, does one also grasp a self? Answer: For instance, the external Sāṃkhyas grasp cetanā (volition) as the self, and the Vātsīputrīyas and others hold that the self is called 'that which can see'; therefore, relying on both parts, both self and dharmas are grasped. In the previous narration of positions, this has already been briefly recounted.