成唯識論述記 1.290

1.290

述曰：彼立五法藏，三世、無為及不可說。彼計此我非常、無常，不可說是有為、無為也。今者論主直以我、非我而為例也，應立量云：汝所執我，應不可說是我；許不可說是有為、無為故；如龜毛等。以二比量破第三計。若破俱句，他宗亦說我非俱句，不可說是我、非我故，犯相符過，又無同喻。今破是我，兼說非我，應定說是蘊，不應說非蘊。又量云：汝所執我，於我、非我聚義，亦應不可說；許不可說故；如有為、無為義。今者文意不令隨入我、非我俱句，故無過失。

The Commentary states: They establish five repositories of dharmas (dharmakośa): the three times, the unconditioned, and the ineffable. They posit that this self is neither permanent nor impermanent, and is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned. Now the author of the treatise directly draws a parallel with 'self' and 'non-self'. One should establish the formal inference: The self you hold should be ineffable as a self; because it is admitted to be ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned; like a hare's horn, etc. The third positing is refuted with two formal inferences. If one were to refute the conjunct proposition ('both'), since the other school also states that the self is not the conjunct proposition, because it is ineffable as self or non-self, one would commit the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), and there would be no positive example. Now, in refuting that it is a self and concurrently stating that it is a non-self, it should definitely be stated to be an aggregate, and should not be stated to be non-aggregate. Furthermore, the inference is: The self you hold should also be ineffable with respect to the meaning of the collection of self and non-self; because it is admitted to be ineffable; just like the meaning of conditioned and unconditioned. Now the intention of the text is not to let it fall into the conjunct proposition of self and non-self, so there is no fallacy.