成唯識論了義燈 2.8

2.8

破俱非我量中，疏云：若破俱句他宗，亦說我非俱句，犯相符過，又無同喻。此意：他立非即離我，亦不得說為我非我俱句，以不可說故。如大乘說：真如之體，非亦有亦無俱句所攝等。今若破他云：應不可說為我非我，故犯相符，又無同喻。如龜毛等，雖不得說為我。得說為非我故，非同喻。有為無為，為喻亦爾。又若雙取我非我為法，有無為中，隨舉一法，亦得為喻。何須雙舉為無為耶？今助解云：彼意雖不得說為我、非我，然許我在不可說藏，不可說藏中我，不得說為我、非我。今難：欲令既不可說為我、非我，亦應不得說有不可為我、非我聚，我在聚義中。何以故？如有為、無為，汝我不得說作有為、無為，即不說有不可說有為、無為，為不可說藏。汝我既不得說作我、非我。如何即立有不可說我、非我聚，為不可說藏？故舉有無為以為同喻。又，亦應雖不可說為我非我，然許執為我；亦應不可說作為無為，執作為無為。然疏意云：彼宗計我，雖不說作我非我、常無常、為無為，然執為我。故云：且以我非我為例，不說所餘。量云：汝所執我，應不可說是我者，據本執說。雖不得說為我非我，然執作我，故今偏破。又量云：汝所執我，於我非我聚義，亦應不可說等者。應立量云：汝我於我非我聚應不得說在彼中；以不可說故。因；如有為無為。此意云：不可說者，不是離言，故不可說。但取於我上不可說，作為無為、我非我之不可說以為因，如有為無為是喻。此意取我上不可說，作為無為之義為喻，不取別為無為體，以為同喻。此意總說：不得說在我非我聚義中，如不得說在為無為中。以不可說故，不取其體，不爾我是有法，更有何法名為我非我聚？故此量正。西明《要集》俱取《樞要》所非量為正。所非量者量云：汝所執我，不應說是我我，非他我；許不可說故；如有為無為。以之為正。且西明云：汝所說我，應不可說是自我非他我；不可說有為無為故；猶如空華。如《樞要》非不取為正。又彼本計雖執有我，不得說為我非我，攝在不可說藏。若言說為自我非他，何名不可說？若云不可說作有為無為，故在不可說，彼有為法亦不可說作無為及我，應在不可說藏。《要集》云：云自我非他我，但破一師一我，非謂一切，若爾，何者外道計我是他我者？數論受果我，是自非他，勝論計作受我皆爾。說三藏量云：自我非他我者是餘人立，三藏敘他非自正釋。論文既云，又既不可說有為、無為，亦應不可說是我非我。此是舉喻，不取為因，若取為因，云何言亦應不可說為是我非我？言亦亦誰，故本疏正。問：大般若中亦說五藏，謂三世為三。有為為一名有為藏，無為為一亦名不可說藏，與此何別？答：論有別准可知。

In the syllogism (pramāṇa) refuting the self that is both-negated, the commentary says: If refuting the alternative of "both", the other tradition also says that the self is not the alternative of "both"; hence it incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), and furthermore lacks an example of similarity (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta). The meaning is: the other posits a self that is neither identical nor separate, and it also cannot be designated as the alternative of "both self and non-self", because it is ineffable. Just as the Mahāyāna says: the substance of tathatā is not subsumed under the alternative of "both existent and nonexistent", and so forth. Now, if one refutes them saying, "It should be ineffable as self and non-self," it incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted, and furthermore lacks an example of similarity. Like the hair of a turtle, although it cannot be designated as a self, it can be designated as non-self; hence it is not an example of similarity. Conditioned and unconditioned as examples are also like this. Furthermore, if one takes both self and non-self together as the probandum (sādhya-dharma), then between conditioned and unconditioned, whichever one is cited can also serve as an example; why is it necessary to cite both conditioned and unconditioned together? Now I assist the explanation by saying: although their intention is that it cannot be designated as self or non-self, they nevertheless admit that the self exists in the ineffable repository, and the self within the ineffable repository cannot be designated as self or non-self. Now we challenge them: since it cannot be designated as self or non-self, one should also not be able to say that there is an aggregate of what cannot be designated as self or non-self, in which the self exists as a member. Why? Just as with the conditioned and the unconditioned, your self cannot be designated as conditioned or unconditioned, so one does not state that there is an ineffable conditioned or unconditioned as an ineffable repository. Since your self cannot be designated as self or non-self, how can you establish that there is an aggregate of what is ineffable as self or non-self as an ineffable repository? Therefore, the conditioned and unconditioned are cited as examples of similarity. Furthermore, it should also follow that although it cannot be designated as self or non-self, you still admit grasping it as a self; so it should also follow that although it cannot be designated as conditioned or unconditioned, you grasp it as conditioned or unconditioned. However, the intent of the commentary is: although that school's postulation of a self does not designate it as self or non-self, permanent or impermanent, conditioned or unconditioned, they nevertheless grasp it as a self. Therefore it says: taking self and non-self merely as an analogy, without stating the rest. The syllogism says: "The self you postulate should be ineffable as a self"—this is spoken based on their original grasp; although it cannot be designated as self or non-self, they nevertheless grasp it as a self, so here it is specifically refuted. Furthermore, the syllogism says: "The self you postulate, in the sense of the aggregate of self and non-self, should also be ineffable," and so on. One should formulate the syllogism: "Your self, within the aggregate of self and non-self, should not be designable as existing therein; because of being ineffable (hetu); like the conditioned and unconditioned (dṛṣṭānta)." The meaning is: "ineffable" does not mean being beyond words and hence ineffable; it simply takes the ineffability of being conditioned or unconditioned, self or non-self, upon the self as the reason (hetu), and like the conditioned and unconditioned as the example. This takes the sense of ineffability as conditioned or unconditioned upon the self as the example, and does not take the separate substance of conditioned or unconditioned as the example of similarity. The general meaning is: it cannot be designated as existing within the meaning of the aggregate of self and non-self, just as it cannot be designated as existing within the conditioned and unconditioned; because of being ineffable, one does not take its substance. Were it not so, the self being the subject (dharmin), what other dharma could be called the aggregate of self and non-self? Therefore, this syllogism is correct. Both Ximing and the Yaoji take the syllogism rejected by the Shuyao as correct. The rejected syllogism runs: "The self you postulate should not be designated as one's own self and not another's self; because you admit it is ineffable; like the conditioned and unconditioned." They take this as correct. Moreover, Ximing says: "The self you speak of should not be designable as one's own self and not another's self; because of being ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned; like a sky-flower." As rejected by the Shuyao, this should not be taken as correct. Furthermore, although their original postulation grasps the existence of a self, it cannot be designated as self or non-self and is subsumed under the ineffable repository. If one designates it as one's own self and not another's, how could it be called ineffable? If one says it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned and therefore exists in the ineffable [repository], then those conditioned dharmas are also ineffable as unconditioned and as a self, and should likewise be in the ineffable repository. The Yaoji says: Saying "one's own self and not another's self" merely refutes one master's single self, not all of them. If so, which tīrthikas postulate the self as another's self? The Sāṃkhya's self that experiences the result is oneself and not another; the Vaiśeṣika's postulated agent and experiencer self are all likewise. The statement of the Tripiṭaka Master's syllogism, "one's own self and not another's self," was formulated by others; the Tripiṭaka Master was merely recounting others' views, not giving his own correct explanation. Since the text of the treatise says, "Furthermore, since it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned, it should also be ineffable as self or non-self," this is citing an example, not taking it as the reason. If it were taken as the reason, why would it say "it should also be ineffable as self or non-self"? To what does the word "also" refer? Therefore, the original commentary is correct. Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitā also speaks of five repositories: the three periods of time are three, the conditioned is one called the conditioned repository, and the unconditioned is one also called the ineffable repository—what is the difference between that and this? Answer: The treatise has distinct standards, which can be understood.