成唯識論述記 1.494

1.494

地、水、火、風實句所攝，性是有礙；堅、濕等法是德句中觸，德所攝，而是無礙，俱身根所得故。今翻覆為量破之，以實地等，即德堅等。量云：地、水、火、風非有質礙，實句所攝；身根取故；如堅、濕等。此中身根亦得大有、同異，並在喻中。若但言非有礙，不言非是實句所攝，即有違宗失。有礙之言簡無礙，實句所攝，彼不說為無礙，實故。又對無礙堅、濕等故，故舉有礙。下德句等，無礙等言，亦准此釋。

Earth, water, fire, and wind are subsumed under the category of substance, and their nature has obstruction; solidity, moisture, and such dharmas are touch (sparśa) in the category of quality, subsumed under quality, yet are unobstructed, both being apprehended by the bodily faculty. Now he turns them back and forth to frame inferences refuting them, taking the substance of earth and so forth to be identical with the qualities of solidity and so forth. The inference states: Earth, water, fire, and wind do not have physical obstruction and are not subsumed under the category of substance; because they are apprehended by the bodily faculty; like solidity, moisture, and the like. Here, the bodily faculty also apprehends great existence and generic particularity, which are both included in the example. If one only says 'do not have physical obstruction' and does not say 'are not subsumed under the category of substance', there would be the fault of contradicting one's own thesis. The words 'have obstruction' exclude the unobstructed; as for 'subsumed under the category of substance', they do not state that it is unobstructed substance. Furthermore, because they are contrasted with unobstructed solidity, moisture, and so on, he mentions having obstruction. For the category of quality and so on below, the words 'unobstructed' and so on should also be explained in this way.