成唯識論述記 1.509

1.509

述曰：此十句中，除實句外，餘八句義皆是非實。然此唯取有體句者，意明唯識，翻返為量。且欲除實，破餘八句。量云：非實及覺、樂等餘德等八有體句，應非離識有別自性；汝許除心等非實句攝故；如石女兒。石女兒無法，彼此不許識外有性，除心等言，簡覺等者，恐犯一分相符過故，文略不簡也。然佛法真如即識性故，亦非離識，無不定過。虛空、擇滅等理非心外，然假為喻，就他宗比量。

The Commentary states: Among these ten padārthas, setting aside the substance category, the remaining eight categories are all non-substance. However, here only the categories with real substantiality are taken, the intention being to elucidate vijñapti-mātra by turning them around to formulate an inference. For the moment, wishing to set aside substance, one refutes the remaining eight categories. The inference is formulated: The eight substantial categories, non-substance as well as the other qualities apart from cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), and so forth, must not possess a distinct intrinsic nature apart from consciousness; because you accept that they are subsumed under the non-substance categories excluding mind and so forth; like the son of a barren woman. The son of a barren woman is a non-existent dharma; neither [our school] nor the other accepts that it has a nature outside consciousness. As for the words 'excluding mind and so forth' qualifying cognition and so forth, it is for fear of committing the fallacy of partial agreement (ekadeśa-siddhasādhana) with the opponent, but the text is concise and does not state the qualification. However, in the Buddhadharma, tathatā is the nature of consciousness itself and is thus likewise not apart from consciousness, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Space, cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and so on, are in principle not outside mind, yet are provisionally used as an example, formulating an inference based on the other school's [doctrines].