成唯識論述記 2.334

2.334

述曰：應入無色之時，亦有別實法，異色、心等，能礙於色，名無色定。彼既不爾，此云何然？厭心之時，有別非色非心來礙心；厭色之位，亦應有別非心非色來礙色。厭色之位入無色，無別非色非心來礙色；厭心之時入無心，寧別非色非心來礙心？無色既唯有心，無心應唯有色。二、外人難曰：厭心入無心，不許別法礙，即令厭色入無色，亦有別法遮。汝大乘厭色入無色，無色即非是色種，厭心入無心，無心應非是心種。厭心入無心，無心即心種；厭色入無色，無色應色種。然彼無色即非色種，故亦無心即非心種。三、論主云：色法唯所厭，無色非色種，心法亦能厭，無心故。心種即是色法，非能厭，無色非色種。設令色法亦能厭，無色不妨是色種。四、外曰：我亦應然，心法通能厭，別有非色非心來礙心，色法唯所厭，無別非心非色來礙色。五、論主云：心法亦能厭，別有非色非心來礙心。色法唯所厭，唯應有色來礙色。色法非能厭，不許非色非心來礙色。心法即能厭，唯應心種來礙心。我義心法通能厭，即說心法名無色。色法唯所厭，故說心種名無心，即是心法通能厭，唯有心種名無心。色法唯所厭，唯有心法名無色。此中翻覆，子細逐徵，論文雖復不論，講者應須審悉。不爾，此文即為自害。

The Commentary states: At the time of entering the formless, there should also be a distinct real entity different from form, mind, and so forth that could obstruct form and be called the formless absorption. Since that is not so, how could this be so? When revulsion toward mind arises, there is a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct mind; at the stage of revulsion toward form, there should also be a distinct entity that is neither mind nor form that comes to obstruct form. When one enters the formless at the stage of revulsion toward form, there is no distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct form; when one enters the mindless at the time of revulsion toward mind, why should there be a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct mind? Since the formless has only mind, the mindless should have only form. Second, the opponent objects: 'When one enters the mindless through revulsion toward mind, you do not grant that a distinct entity obstructs it; then let it be that when one enters the formless through revulsion toward form, there is also a distinct entity that blocks it. In your Mahāyāna, when one enters the formless through revulsion toward form, the formless is not the bīja of form; when one enters the mindless through revulsion toward mind, the mindless should not be the bīja of mind. When one enters the mindless through revulsion toward mind, the mindless is the bīja of mind; when one enters the formless through revulsion toward form, the formless should be the bīja of form. But since that formless is not the bīja of form, the mindless is likewise not the bīja of mind.' Third, the author of the treatise says: 'Forms are solely what is reviled, so the formless is not the bīja of form; mental dharmas are also capable of revulsion, so there is the mindless. The bīja of mind is just a mental dharma and not capable of revulsion [in itself], so the formless is not the bīja of form. Even if forms were also capable of revulsion, there would be no contradiction in the formless being the bīja of form.' Fourth, the opponent says: 'Mine should also be like that: mental dharmas are generally capable of revulsion, so there is a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct mind; forms are solely what is reviled, so there is no distinct entity that is neither mind nor form that comes to obstruct form.' Fifth, the author of the treatise says: 'Mental dharmas are also capable of revulsion, [yet you say] a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind comes to obstruct mind. Forms are solely what is reviled, so only form should come to obstruct form. Form is not capable of revulsion, so it is not granted that an entity neither form nor mind comes to obstruct form. Mental dharmas are capable of revulsion, so only the bīja of mind should come to obstruct mind. In my doctrine, mental dharmas are generally capable of revulsion, so we say that mental dharmas are called the formless. Forms are solely what is reviled, so we say that the bīja of mind is called the mindless; that is, mental dharmas are generally capable of revulsion, so only the bīja of mind is called the mindless. Forms are solely what is reviled, so only mental dharmas are called the formless.' Back and forth in this manner, closely pursuing each objection—although the text of the treatise does not elaborate on this, the lecturer must examine it thoroughly. Otherwise, this passage would become self-contradictory.