成唯識論述記 2.334

2.334

The Commentary states: At the time of entering the formless, there should also be a distinct real entity different from form, mind, and so forth that could obstruct form and be called the formless absorption. Since that is not so, how could this be so? When revulsion toward mind arises, there is a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct mind; at the stage of revulsion toward form, there should also be a distinct entity that is neither mind nor form that comes to obstruct form. When one enters the formless at the stage of revulsion toward form, there is no distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct form; when one enters the mindless at the time of revulsion toward mind, why should there be a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct mind? Since the formless has only mind, the mindless should have only form. Second, the opponent objects: 'When one enters the mindless through revulsion toward mind, you do not grant that a distinct entity obstructs it; then let it be that when one enters the formless through revulsion toward form, there is also a distinct entity that blocks it. In your Mahāyāna, when one enters the formless through revulsion toward form, the formless is not the bīja of form; when one enters the mindless through revulsion toward mind, the mindless should not be the bīja of mind. When one enters the mindless through revulsion toward mind, the mindless is the bīja of mind; when one enters the formless through revulsion toward form, the formless should be the bīja of form. But since that formless is not the bīja of form, the mindless is likewise not the bīja of mind.' Third, the author of the treatise says: 'Forms are solely what is reviled, so the formless is not the bīja of form; mental dharmas are also capable of revulsion, so there is the mindless. The bīja of mind is just a mental dharma and not capable of revulsion [in itself], so the formless is not the bīja of form. Even if forms were also capable of revulsion, there would be no contradiction in the formless being the bīja of form.' Fourth, the opponent says: 'Mine should also be like that: mental dharmas are generally capable of revulsion, so there is a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind that comes to obstruct mind; forms are solely what is reviled, so there is no distinct entity that is neither mind nor form that comes to obstruct form.' Fifth, the author of the treatise says: 'Mental dharmas are also capable of revulsion, [yet you say] a distinct entity that is neither form nor mind comes to obstruct mind. Forms are solely what is reviled, so only form should come to obstruct form. Form is not capable of revulsion, so it is not granted that an entity neither form nor mind comes to obstruct form. Mental dharmas are capable of revulsion, so only the bīja of mind should come to obstruct mind. In my doctrine, mental dharmas are generally capable of revulsion, so we say that mental dharmas are called the formless. Forms are solely what is reviled, so we say that the bīja of mind is called the mindless; that is, mental dharmas are generally capable of revulsion, so only the bīja of mind is called the mindless. Forms are solely what is reviled, so only mental dharmas are called the formless.' Back and forth in this manner, closely pursuing each objection—although the text of the treatise does not elaborate on this, the lecturer must examine it thoroughly. Otherwise, this passage would become self-contradictory.