成唯識論述記 2.682
成唯識論述記 2.682
- Language
- Classical Chinese
2.682
述曰:說為能詮之名、所詮之法,俱非自相。聲是耳所得,無所詮表故。今此能詮是名、句等,意識所緣,緣之起解,故知能、所二詮俱非自相。共相無別體,是假法故。問曰:若不著自相,橫為分別,何非是執?即善心等中應有法執,如法執,不善心亦不稱境故。今答曰:法執之心非但不稱本質,亦不稱影像——親所緣緣共相之法——依他性者,故名為執。或堅著此親相分故,說之為執。此善心等緣共相時,雖不稱自相本質,而稱於影像所變,亦不橫計堅著,與法執不同,以彼影像依他性故。或比量等心緣親相分,亦不相稱。若相稱者,應名得體。由此,但非堅著此境,故不名執。若爾,色等五境有別能緣故,有緣自相,眼等五根及種子亦爾,本識境故。心、心所法,此是誰緣?若言他心智能緣此,應非證量;是散心故;如餘散心。此理不然,護法釋云:一切凡、聖自證分等為證量故。
The Commentary states: The names spoken of as the expressing and the phenomena spoken of as the expressed are both not particular characteristics. Sound is apprehended by the ear, having no expressing or indicating function. Now this expressing agent consists of names, phrases, and the like, which are conditioned by the mental consciousness, and conditioning them gives rise to conceptual understanding; hence we know that both the expressing and the expressed are not particular characteristics. The universal characteristic has no distinct entity, because it is a nominal phenomenon. Question: If it does not grasp the particular characteristic and mistakenly constructs conceptual differentiation, why is it not clinging? Then within wholesome minds and the like there should be clinging to phenomena, just as in clinging to phenomena, unwholesome minds also do not conform to their objects. Now we reply: The mind that clings to phenomena not only fails to conform to the original archetype, but also fails to conform to the mental image—the phenomenon of universal characteristic that is the immediate objective condition—which is dependent on other-nature; therefore it is called clinging. Or, because it obstinately attaches to this immediate objective image, it is spoken of as clinging. When this wholesome mind and the like condition the universal characteristic, although they do not conform to the original archetype of the particular characteristic, they conform to what is transformed as the mental image, and they do not make arbitrary imputations and obstinately attach to it; thus they differ from clinging to phenomena, because that mental image is of dependent on other-nature. Alternatively, minds such as inferential cognition conditioning the immediate objective image also do not conform to it. If they conformed, that should be called attaining the real entity. For this reason, simply because they do not obstinately attach to this object, they are not called clinging. If that is so, the five objects of matter and so forth have distinct apprehending consciousnesses, and therefore there is conditioning of their particular characteristics; the five sense organs such as the eye, as well as seeds, are also like this, because they are objects of the root consciousness. As for the mind and mental factors, by what are these conditioned? If one says that the knowledge of others' minds can condition them, it should not be direct realization; because it is a dispersed mind; just like other dispersed minds. This reasoning is incorrect. Dharmapāla explains: The self-authenticating part and the like of all ordinary beings and noble ones are direct realization.
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation