成唯識論述記 2.780

2.780

述曰：此論主質：如與諸法既非一異，應是假有；如種子故。真如是法性，與法不一異，如前已解，故得為喻。此難清辨、安惠等。設彼救言：真如亦假；不起故；如空華，許則便無真勝義諦。真勝義諦若許無者，約誰說有世俗諦耶？何有涅槃，而有造修求成佛等？蘊、處、界等通真、俗諦，真如唯真，名真勝義。自下第四、二諦分別。問：真如非假，是勝義有，種亦應然，實有體故。

The Commentary states: Here the author of the treatise challenges: Since tathatā is neither one nor different from all dharmas, it should be nominally existent, just as seeds are. Tathatā is dharmatā, neither one nor different from dharmas, as has already been explained before; thus it can serve as an example. This challenges Bhāviveka, Sthiramati, and others. Suppose they defend themselves, saying: 'Tathatā is also nominal, because it does not arise, like a sky-flower.' If this were admitted, then there would be no true ultimate truth. If the true ultimate truth were admitted to be nonexistent, in reference to what could conventional truth be said to exist? How could there be nirvāṇa, and why would there be cultivation and practice seeking the attainment of Buddhahood, and so forth? Skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas pervade both ultimate and conventional truths, whereas tathatā is exclusively ultimate, named 'true ultimate.' Below is the fourth, the differentiation of the two truths. Question: Tathatā is not nominal and is an ultimate existence; seeds should also be like this, because they have substantial substance.