成唯識論述記 2.780

2.780

The Commentary states: Here the author of the treatise challenges: Since tathatā is neither one nor different from all dharmas, it should be nominally existent, just as seeds are. Tathatā is dharmatā, neither one nor different from dharmas, as has already been explained before; thus it can serve as an example. This challenges Bhāviveka, Sthiramati, and others. Suppose they defend themselves, saying: 'Tathatā is also nominal, because it does not arise, like a sky-flower.' If this were admitted, then there would be no true ultimate truth. If the true ultimate truth were admitted to be nonexistent, in reference to what could conventional truth be said to exist? How could there be nirvāṇa, and why would there be cultivation and practice seeking the attainment of Buddhahood, and so forth? Skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas pervade both ultimate and conventional truths, whereas tathatā is exclusively ultimate, named 'true ultimate.' Below is the fourth, the differentiation of the two truths. Question: Tathatā is not nominal and is an ultimate existence; seeds should also be like this, because they have substantial substance.