成唯識論述記 2.93

2.93

述曰：四、識行相互通難。此中量云：緣大瓶等識應即緣極微之心；彼執所緣即極微故；如緣極微心。何故緣瓶等，但作瓶等解，不作極微解？若言見微，微雖細相，瓶雖相麁，以體一故，彼緣瓶麁相之識，即是緣微細相之識；若許爾者，汝餘聲等境，其緣色境之識應亦得緣；許相違法得俱緣故；如麁細境。若許，即有世間相違。

The Commentary states: Fourth is the objection that the modes of activity of consciousnesses would mutually interpenetrate. Here an inference is formulated: "The consciousness cognising a large jar and the like should be identical to the mind cognising atoms; because what it posits as the cognitive object is precisely atoms; like the mind cognising atoms." Why is it that when cognising a jar and the like, one only forms the understanding of a jar and the like, and not the understanding of atoms? If they say that one sees atoms—although the atom has a subtle mark and the jar has a coarse mark, because their substance is one, the consciousness cognising the coarse mark of the jar would be identical to the consciousness cognising the subtle mark of the atom. If that were granted, then for other objects such as sounds, the consciousness cognising visible form should also cognise them; because mutually contradictory phenomena would be allowed to be cognised together; just like coarse and subtle objects. If this were granted, there would be a contradiction with worldly experience.