成唯識論了義燈 2.65

2.65

言非麁相識緣細相境。《集》云：有說汝緣瓶麁相之識，即是緣微細相之識。若許爾者，量云：汝緣色之識，亦應緣聲；計相違法得俱緣故；如麁細境者。此量喻中所立不成過，緣麁細心非緣聲等，故不成喻，彼麁細境非聲等故者。此破不爾，敘量不依本疏所說。本疏量云：汝餘聲等境，其緣餘色境之識，應亦得緣，許相違法得俱緣故，此量以餘聲等境是有法，其緣餘色境之心為法。色境非法、有法，標境取心緣色之心，是違緣聲之心，此相違心應亦得緣，正是其法。許相違法，得俱緣故因，如麁細喻，有二立故，得成比量，勿餘境識緣餘境故。西明云：勿之言莫，莫即緣麁，亦緣細境，有雜亂過故。若不許緣圓細相境，本圓細相應非五境，若許違宗。一識應緣一切境者，若緣麁識亦得緣細相者，緣青等心應緣聲等，即眼等識通緣十八界。《集》云：有說後量，有解二量，皆有過失。由此有釋，但以理破，非立量破。此亦不爾，立量破彼何過不得？且立量云：汝聲境，應為餘相違識緣，許相違法得俱緣故，如麁細境，此聲亦有麁細，相違識得緣故，因有三相。

Regarding: "It is not that a consciousness of a coarse appearance perceives an object of a subtle appearance." The Ji states: "Some say: your consciousness that perceives the coarse appearance of a jar is precisely the consciousness that perceives the subtle appearance of atoms. If this is accepted, the inference (anumāna) is: 'Your consciousness that perceives form should also perceive sound; because you maintain that contradictory phenomena can be perceived together; like coarse and subtle objects.' In this inference, the example has the fault of lacking what is to be proved (sādhyavikala), for the mind perceiving the coarse and subtle does not perceive sound and so forth, and thus it cannot form an example, since those coarse and subtle objects are not sound and so forth." This refutation is not correct, as the formulation of the inference does not follow what the original Commentary (Shu) stated. The inference in the original Commentary is: 'Your other object, sound and so forth, should also be perceived by the consciousness that perceives other form objects; because you allow that contradictory phenomena can be perceived together.' In this inference, other objects like sound are the subject (dharmin), and the mind that perceives other form objects is the property to be proved (dharma). The form object is neither the property nor the subject; pointing to the object to identify the mind, the mind perceiving form is contrary to the mind perceiving sound; that this contrary mind should also be able to perceive it is precisely its property to be proved. The reason (hetu) is 'because you allow that contradictory phenomena can be perceived together', and as in the example of coarse and subtle, since there is a dual establishment, the syllogistic inference is successfully formed, preventing a consciousness of another object from perceiving another object. Ximing says: 'The word wu (勿) means "do not"; "do not" means that perceiving the coarse while also perceiving the subtle object incurs the fault of confusion.' If you do not allow perception of a circular subtle appearance, the original circular subtle appearance should not be one of the five objects; if you allow it, it contradicts your own school. One consciousness would have to perceive all objects: if the consciousness perceiving the coarse could also perceive the subtle appearance, the mind perceiving blue and so forth should perceive sound and so forth, which would mean that the visual and other consciousnesses universally perceive all eighteen realms (dhātu).
The Ji states: "Some say that the latter inference, or according to some explanations both inferences, have faults. Because of this, some explain that it is only a refutation through reasoning, not a refutation by establishing an inference." This too is not so; what fault is there in establishing an inference to refute them that would make it impermissible? One may tentatively establish the inference: 'Your sound object should be perceived by another contrary consciousness; because you allow that contradictory phenomena can be perceived together; like coarse and subtle objects.' This sound also possesses coarse and subtle aspects, and can be perceived by contrary consciousnesses; therefore the reason possesses the three characteristics (trairūpya).