成唯識論述記 3.283

3.283

述曰：既言亦似他根，故許變也，此有何義？若言受用，不用他根，又本識變，皆有實用；若許變根，全無實用，非他依故，變何用者？此亦不然，為欲受用他身依處，故變他根。由根若無時，依處亦無故，如色界繫鼻、舌依處，根若無者，依處亦無。不爾，彼界應無二根，唯有依處莊嚴身故，由為受用亦變似根。又本識變皆有實用，此不能生識，故不能變者，理亦不然。色界鼻、舌根雖不能生識，本識亦變故，生盲等亦爾，故知本識定變他根，然無實根用，非他識依故，此即安惠等諸大論師解。然即彼論，舊本第四頌言：「根塵我及識，本識生似彼」，此不應爾，豈復本識亦起我也，亦緣心乎？今正翻云：「識生變似義，有情我及了，此境實非有，境無故識無」，「識」者八識；「生變似義」，即是五塵；「義」之言境，以依他法似實有故；「變似有情」，即是五根，眾生數法，情即根是，名薩埵故；「變似我」者，是末那緣變；「及了」者，六識緣之，即第八緣塵、根二色，第七緣我，六識緣六塵所了法義。舊論長行義與此同，彼頌翻錯，譯師意存一意識義，彼頌長行自違返故。今此論引彼長行文，彼論但言似自、他身五根而現，為是誰緣，不定說言第八能緣自他根故。

The Commentary states: Since it says that it also resembles another's indriyas, it therefore admits that it is manifested. What meaning is there in this? If one says that in terms of enjoyment one does not use another's indriyas, and furthermore that manifestations of the fundamental consciousness all have real practical function, then if one allows the manifestation of indriyas, it completely lacks real practical function, because it does not serve as a basis for the other; what would be the use of manifesting it? This too is not so: for the purpose of enjoying the physical support (adhiṣṭhāna) of another's body, one manifests another's indriyas. This is because when the indriya is absent, the physical support is also absent. Just as with the physical supports of the nose and tongue bound to the form realm: if the indriyas were absent, the physical supports would also be absent. Otherwise, that realm should lack the two indriyas, possessing only the physical supports to adorn the body; thus, for the sake of enjoyment, it also manifests a resemblance to the indriyas. Furthermore, [if one argues that] since manifestations of the fundamental consciousness all have real practical function, and these cannot generate consciousness and therefore cannot be manifested, this reasoning is also incorrect. Although the nose and tongue indriyas of the form realm cannot generate consciousness, the fundamental consciousness also manifests them; the same applies to those born blind, etc. Therefore, one knows that the fundamental consciousness definitely manifests another's indriyas, yet they lack the real function of an indriya because they do not serve as a basis for another's consciousness. This is the interpretation of Sthiramati and other great treatise masters. However, in that very treatise, the fourth verse of the old translation says: "Indriyas, dusts, self, and consciousness: the fundamental consciousness arises resembling them." This should not be so; could the fundamental consciousness again generate a self, and also condition the mind? Now the correct translation is: "Consciousness arises manifesting a resemblance to objects (artha), sentient beings (sattva), self, and cognitions (vijñapti); these objects are not truly existent, and because the objects are non-existent, consciousness is non-existent." "Consciousness" refers to the eight consciousnesses. "Arises manifesting a resemblance to objects" refers to the five dusts; the word "objects" (artha) denotes sense objects, because dependent phenomena resemble truly existent things. "Manifesting a resemblance to sentient beings" refers to the five indriyas, which are phenomena counted among sentient beings; sentient beings are indeed the indriyas, hence called sattva. "Manifesting a resemblance to the self" is manifested by the conditioning of manas. "And cognitions" are conditioned by the six consciousnesses. That is, the eighth conditions the two forms of dusts and indriyas; the seventh conditions the self; and the six consciousnesses condition the phenomena and objects cognized through the six dusts. The prose of the old treatise agrees in meaning with this; that verse was mistranslated because the translator intended the meaning of a single mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna), so that verse and prose contradicted each other. Now this treatise cites the prose text of that treatise, which only says that it appears resembling the five indriyas of one's own and another's body, without definitively stating who conditions it or that the eighth can condition the indriyas of oneself and another.